Approval of the Nuclear Agreement in Iran: Parliament or National Security Council?

The nuclear agreement reached in Vienna has sparked three debates in the internal political landscape of Iran: whether or not to review this agreement in Parliament, considering the resolution 'obligating the government to maintain nuclear rights', the amount of frozen assets and their uses, and the possibility of political openings following this agreement. The first debate is more legal in nature, but political institutions and factions are weighing the benefits of each side of the debate, especially with upcoming parliamentary elections. The second debate concerns the interests of the three economic empires in the Islamic Republic, namely the empires of the IRGC, state companies, and leadership, and the share that each of the frozen assets will receive. The third debate relates to the promises of the Rouhani government and the possibility of their realization. In this article, I will focus on the first debate. Parliament must approve the agreement. 201 members of Parliament have called for the nuclear agreement to be presented as a bill by the government. They believe that the initiation and implementation of the 'Joint Action Plan' in the recent nuclear agreement lacks legal legitimacy before being approved by Parliament and the Guardian Council. However, the position of Parliament officials is to wait for the decision of the National Security Council and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic: 'Whether this JCPOA should come to Parliament as a bill or whether this presentation from Parliament to the government is sufficient is currently under review, and legal experts have differing opinions. Certainly, if Parliament concludes that the government must present a bill regarding the JCPOA, the government is obliged to do so, and the Speaker of Parliament has also stated that the government must present a bill. Rest assured, if the system concludes that a bill regarding the JCPOA should be presented to Parliament, the government will be obliged to submit the relevant bill to Parliament.' (Mohammad Reza Bahonar, Fars, August 10, 2015) Those who believe the nuclear agreement should be approved by Parliament have three arguments: First, according to Article 77 of the Constitution, treaties, agreements, contracts, and international agreements must be approved by the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The nuclear agreement is also of the nature of agreements and is not outside the scope of the above article. Second, the resolution obligating the government to nuclear rights, which was approved by two-thirds of the members, has set conditions that obligate Parliament to test these conditions after reaching an agreement, such as lifting all sanctions on the day of the agreement, prohibiting access to documents, scientists, and security and military centers, and no restrictions on acquiring nuclear knowledge and technology. Without review in Parliament, the above conditions become ineffective, and the approved law becomes irrelevant. Third, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has stated after the agreement: 'To approve the prepared text, the legal path must be followed.' (July 18, 2015) Members of Parliament interpret this statement from Khamenei as his desire for it to be reviewed and approved in Parliament and use this justification to advance their opinion. Parliament should not approve the agreement. Contrary to the opinion of some members of Parliament, the negotiating team and the government believe that Parliament should not intervene in this matter. They have mentioned several reasons: First, reviewing this agreement in Parliament is contrary to the Constitution. The government spokesperson, citing Article 176 of the Constitution, believes that the National Security Council must determine defense and national security policies within the framework of the general policies of the system, of which this agreement is one. (Nobakht, ISNA, August 6, 2015) Second, referring this matter to Parliament depends on the interests that the presidency and the National Security Council decide on: 'Whether it is in the interest of Parliament, as the legislative body, to endorse the agreement is currently under review in the National Security Council and also in the legal deputy of the presidency.' (Legal Deputy of the President, ISNA, August 5, 2015) Third, the nuclear agreement is not subject to the provisions mentioned in Article 77: 'This text is not yet considered a treaty, convention, or international agreement; hence it is named the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' and does not require Parliament's approval. (Ali Akbar Salehi, House of the Nation, August 9, 2015) Fourth, some international agreements of the Islamic Republic have not been approved by Parliament, such as Resolution 598, which led to the end of the war, and the Supreme Leader made the decision in this regard. Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Parliament, while not opposing the review of the agreement in Parliament, opens the way for not reviewing it with such statements: 'The Islamic Consultative Assembly must express its opinion on such international treaties based on constitutional principles, but in some cases, it has not expressed an opinion, such as Resolution 598. We will address the nuclear issue, and perhaps it would be better for Parliament to express its opinion, and support and consensus will be achieved.' (Khabar Online, August 10, 2015) Fifth, approving the agreement in Parliament obligates the government to implement it, whereas without Parliament's approval, the government can refuse to implement it whenever it wishes: 'Turning the Vienna nuclear agreement into law and making it enforceable for the government is not in the interest of the government because it does not correspond with the actions of the other party.' According to this opinion, 'none of the countries in the 5+1 group will approve this agreement in their parliaments.' (Abbas Araghchi, Central News Unit, August 20, 2015) This opinion, of course, contradicts the ongoing discussions in the U.S. Congress, but Araghchi excludes the U.S. from the equation because he believes that 'the discussions in the U.S. Congress are aimed at rejecting the JCPOA, not approving it.' (Same source) In discussing the U.S., Araghchi confuses the legislative bodies' entry into this discussion and the approval, which has unpredictable results. The officials of Rouhani's government are aware that Khamenei does not have Khomeini's legitimacy and cannot conclude the matter simply by his approval. Furthermore, Khamenei does not want to take full responsibility for the agreement himself and has not explicitly approved it, thus referring it to legal authorities. Now that the situation is such, two institutions remain to review it: the National Security Council with 12 members and Parliament with 290 members. Naturally, non-democratic and closed systems prefer smaller circles for decision-making. The composition of the National Security Council (two appointed by the leader, heads of the three branches, three high-ranking military officials, and four cabinet members) is such that this agreement will be approved there without any hassle, while a group of 60 to 80 members in Parliament is firmly opposed to the nuclear agreement, and reflecting their opposition in the public space is neither in favor of the government nor the leadership apparatus that has led and brought the negotiations to fruition. Parliament is now at a crossroads: if the majority of members insist that the government present a bill on this matter and the issue is referred to Parliament before the National Security Council (the first path), but the government refuses and Khamenei does not intervene, the matter will be referred to the arbitration committee, and given the composition of this committee (only one member from Parliament), the likelihood of the government's opinion being approved is higher. However, if Parliament does not insist (the second path) and the government refers the agreement to Parliament after the National Security Council's approval, Parliament will have no choice but to approve it, or at least its maneuvering area will be much more limited. Of course, if Parliament takes no action in this regard, whether the matter is referred or not, it has recognized its ineffective and marginal status in national decision-making. In the first case, Parliament will also be the loser. Thus, whether Parliament insists on reviewing the agreement or not, it is the loser in this story. Two seemingly elected institutions in the Islamic Republic—Parliament and the President—have continuously ceded their power to appointed institutions over the past three decades. The issue of reviewing the nuclear agreement in the National Security Council is, in fact, another witness to this event.