Can Iran Rely on Europe to Counter the United States?

The announcement of a new policy by the United States regarding the JCPOA has created a new dynamic in the relationship between the world's most powerful country and not only Iran but also the European Union. In fact, the refusal of the U.S. President to certify Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has opened a new chapter of ambiguity and difficulty in Iran's international economic relations and, at the same time, has placed Washington in a position contrary to Brussels regarding the interpretation and future of this agreement. The bitter lesson from Donald Trump's refusal to re-certify Iran's compliance with the JCPOA has temporarily left the decision about its future to the U.S. Congress, but it has left no doubt that from the White House's perspective, this agreement in its current form is no longer acceptable, and its future will either involve a harder stance detrimental to Iran or abandoning it altogether. The imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S. on the entire Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is a clear manifestation of the policy that the U.S. intends to implement regarding Iran. In an unprecedented move, the leaders of Germany, France, and Britain, the three major European powers that signed the JCPOA, expressed their concerns through a joint statement regarding the U.S. President's stance on this agreement, and Ms. Federica Mogherini, who effectively serves as the European Union's foreign minister, stated that the JCPOA is performing well contrary to Donald Trump's opinion and is fulfilling the hopes placed in it. The leaders of the three European powers that signed the JCPOA emphasize Iran's adherence to the provisions of the Vienna agreement, contrary to Donald Trump. From their perspective, the U.S. has the right to be concerned about the Islamic Republic's missile program and its policies in the Middle East, and they consider themselves partners in this concern. However, they also state that separate issues should not be conflated. In other words, from the Europeans' point of view, issues such as the Islamic Republic's missile program and its Middle Eastern policies, and even moving towards negotiations over them, should not jeopardize an agreement like the JCPOA, which was formed after years of difficult negotiations over Iran's nuclear program. We see that the rift that has arisen between the two sides of the Atlantic over the JCPOA is very serious. To what extent will this rift benefit the Islamic Republic? Does Europe want and can it mitigate the difficulties that arise for Iran due to the increasingly hostile U.S. policy regarding this agreement? Given the history of sanctions prior to the JCPOA and the severe blow that this caused to Iran's economy, finding answers to these questions is currently at the forefront of the concerns of Iran's political and economic circles. The very bitter lesson that the leadership of the Islamic Republic can draw from the disastrous pre-JCPOA sanctions is the necessity of adopting realism in foreign policy. Not long ago, at least a significant portion of the senior managers of the regime learned that they should not describe United Nations Security Council resolutions as 'pieces of paper.' Also, relying on the experience of sanctions, the designers of Iran's foreign policy strategic lines became more familiar with the issue of power in international economic relations and now know that ignoring it can be very costly. In the current struggles between Tehran and Washington over the JCPOA, Iran enjoys a more favorable legal and political position internationally. However, the realities of international economic relations, especially the decisive role of the United States in these relations, have not changed. Nevertheless, the theory that the rift between the U.S. and Europe over the JCPOA can be exploited to Iran's advantage still has many supporters in the circles of the Islamic Republic. Regarding this tempting theory, several key points can be emphasized: Despite the lack of unity between the U.S. and Europe regarding the Islamic Republic, the risk of expanding U.S. sanctions against Iran should not be underestimated. For an economy like Iran's, which is heavily dependent on international trade and requires massive foreign investments to solve its enormous problems, including unemployment, having such a hostile relationship with the world's most significant economic power (25% of the world's economy) is a very significant obstacle. The effectiveness of the pre-JCPOA sanctions was largely due to the unity of Europe and the U.S. in imposing economic penalties against the Islamic Republic. The EU's decision to cut oil imports from Iran and deprive this country of the SWIFT system was a severe blow that, following other international sanctions, largely closed the Islamic Republic's breathing pathways in both the oil and banking sectors. A repeat of the unity of the two sides of the Atlantic against Iran is currently impossible, given the completely contradictory positions that Europe and the U.S. have taken regarding the JCPOA. This is a reality, and based on it, there are tendencies in the Islamic Republic that attempt to downplay the hardline shift of the U.S. regarding the JCPOA and consider Europe a refuge for Iran. Despite the lack of unity between the U.S. and Europe regarding the Islamic Republic, the risk of expanding U.S. sanctions against Iran should not be underestimated. For an economy like Iran's, which is heavily dependent on international trade and requires massive foreign investments to solve its enormous problems, including unemployment, having such a hostile relationship with the world's most significant economic power (25% of the world's economy) is a very significant obstacle. Who is a guest at the White House (Trump or Obama) does not change the reality of power relations in the world. U.S. influence heavily weighs on the global financial and monetary system. A large portion of international trade (including oil) is conducted in dollars, and over 62% of the foreign exchange reserves of central banks worldwide are held in U.S. dollars. One of Iran's significant problems is that it has a dollarized economy but is deprived of trading in dollars internationally. Also, being deprived of the capital and technology of major American companies, which have played a significant role in the emergence of new economic powers like South Korea, China, and India, is a significant loss that has burdened the country for several decades and does not seem to be coming to an end soon. After the signing of the JCPOA, many investments that were supposed to be made by Europeans in Iran have stalled due to the reluctance of major European banks to participate in financing them. These banks fear that if they participate in projects related to Iran, they will face severe penalties from the U.S. It is worth noting that European banks have paid tens of billions of dollars to the U.S. judicial system for cooperating with countries under U.S. sanctions, and if they had not done so, they would have been excluded from the U.S. market and from using U.S. dollars. Already, the fear of intensified U.S. sanctions against Iran due to Donald Trump's new policies regarding the JCPOA has significantly increased the risk level of economic transactions with Iran. In France, major companies active in Iran (Renault, Peugeot, Total, etc.) see their objectives in this country as being in serious danger, and if U.S. sanctions against the Islamic Republic expand, they will be among the first victims of U.S. economic penalties. According to Paris economic media, major French companies present in Iran are already stating that if the U.S. Congress intensifies sanctions, they will end their activities in Iran.