Former Red Lines Are Not Red in the Agreement

During the Eid al-Fitr prayer ceremony in Tehran, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic expressed support for nuclear negotiators and the resolution, effectively sidelining previously established red lines for negotiators and instead outlining new lines regarding Iran's presence in the region and its relations with the United States. Ayatollah Khamenei stated: "Whether this text is approved or not, we will not withdraw our support from our friends in the region." The implication of these remarks is the acceptance of the agreement and its domestic consequences in its current entirety, emphasizing the red lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran in relations with regional 'friends'. Khamenei's emphasis on the term 'approval' of the resolution is the first sign of a retreat from previous red lines, as he had previously stated that 'at the time' of reaching an agreement, all sanctions against Iran must be lifted. Another emphasis he reiterated, which had previously been highlighted by conservatives, was that the lifting of sanctions is not the 'result' of the agreement! One day before Khamenei's Eid al-Fitr remarks, the Foreign Ministry in Tehran published an 'unofficial' Persian translation of the annexes of the agreement, which was also disseminated by domestic media. A comparison of the Persian translation text of the annexes indicates that, contrary to past discrepancies in the statement published by Iran in Persian with the U.S. fact sheet, which caused controversy, this time the translated document—aside from the use of vague and sometimes incomplete words lacking coherence and writing rules to obscure the concessions made and Iran's specific commitments—does not fundamentally differ from the original document. In the fifth annex of the document, a point is emphasized that is also reflected in Khamenei's recent statements. This document states that the 'day of approval' of the resolution will be 90 days after the next Security Council resolution regarding the plan to lift (limited and gradual) sanctions against Iran. The implementation date in the same document is practically postponed to a longer time (at least several months). The implementation of the document is also conditional on the completion of the commitments accepted by the negotiators in the five annexes, and consequently, the lifting of sanctions will not occur at the time of reaching the agreement (July 14 in Vienna) and adhering to Iran's previous red lines, but rather will commence at the end of the first phase of Iran's commitments. In the first annex document, it has been accepted that the Arak heavy water reactor will be removed from the previously determined status and instead, another reactor with a capacity of approximately 50% of the current reactor (20 megawatts) will be designed and constructed in Arak. The sensitivity of the Arak reactor, which was supposed to operate with natural uranium fuel, was related to its fuel waste (producing plutonium and opening a second route for producing materials necessary for building an atomic bomb). According to the accepted document, the fuel for the next reactor, instead of natural uranium, will be enriched uranium with a concentration of 3.6% (similar to the fuel of the Bushehr reactor), which has very little plutonium waste. The Islamic Republic continues to emphasize the heavy water nature of the next reactor in Arak, whereas this red line has practically changed, and the next reactor, while being smaller, will not resemble conventional heavy water reactors due to the change in the nature of plutonium production; even if heavy water is used as a coolant in it. The production from the Arak heavy water plant, which currently has several thousand tons of reserves and is not supposed to be used domestically in the past manner, should not exceed 130 tons over the next 15 years, and if the next reactor in Arak is activated, it should not exceed 90 tons. Regarding the activity center in the Fordow enrichment unit, which is built underground, it has been decided that current activities will be suspended and that location will only be used for research under agency supervision and camera installation. Khamenei had previously emphasized that Iran's uranium productions would remain in Iran, whereas according to the first annex text, about 10,000 kilograms of Iran's 3.6% enriched uranium, which is the product of 9 years of work in Natanz, must be converted to uranium oxide and removed from Iran. Iran, as one of the preconditions for lifting sanctions, must comply with this commitment on the day of implementation and reduce its uranium gas reserve from 10,000 kilograms to 300 kilograms. Another red line of Khamenei that has been crossed in the agreement annex document is Iran's enrichment capacity, which was previously emphasized as needing to have 190,000 SWU (separating units of uranium isotopes), whereas under the accepted arrangement in the agreement, the allowable number of centrifuges for Iran will be limited to 5,060 units of the old P-1 type for at least ten years after the implementation of the agreement instead of 120,000 units. In paragraph 64 of the first annex, it is stated that Iran will undertake the full implementation of the Additional Protocol and, according to paragraph b of Article 17 of the Protocol, it will also pass it through the parliament and give it legal form. The Islamic Parliament in 2006, following the approval of the first Security Council resolution against Iran, prohibited the government from implementing the Additional Protocol, and subsequently, Khamenei emphasized that Iran would not allow inspectors to visit its military sites. According to this document (paragraph 64), Iran has also accepted the implementation of the clause known as Code 3.1, and consequently, it is obliged to inform the agency of its intent six months in advance if it intends to inject uranium gas into new devices, produce centrifuges, and engage in any other activities related to enrichment or the separation of uranium isotopes and processes. One of the most important points in the second annex relates to the re-imposition of sanctions in the event of Iran's violation of its commitments. In an arbitration council consisting of 8 members, 5 of whom are Western countries (the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, and a representative of the European community) and the other 3 (Iran, Russia, and China), the issue of violation is raised, and by a majority vote (previously predetermined: 5 to 3) within a 65-day period, sanctions can be implemented against Iran without the need to be raised in the Security Council. This clause alone could deter many economic and financial partners from entering into long-term commitments with Iran. The beginning of the lifting of sanctions will also—contrary to Iran's previous demand—occur at the end of the accepted commitments of Iran. Nevertheless, only sanctions related to Iran's nuclear activities will be lifted, and sanctions related to accusations of terrorism and missile development and arms restrictions will remain in place. Regarding nuclear programs, the U.S. congressional law regarding the control of Iran's nuclear material exchanges with North Korea and Syria will be respected and remain in effect. Thus, the lifting of sanctions will not occur on the day of the agreement and, contrary to Khamenei's red line and based on the text of Annex 5, the lifting of sanctions will be the result of the complete implementation of Iran's commitments and can be reversed at any time.