Implementation of the JCPOA Alone is Not Enough

The lifting of sanctions related to Iran's nuclear activities, which was officially announced after four years of visible and hidden political efforts following the issuance of a statement by the Secretary-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency on January 16, is a flame that will extinguish in the coming weeks and months without complementary actions. In implementing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran either completely halted all its nuclear activities that could be used to produce atomic bombs (such as the Arak heavy water reactor and the uranium enrichment facility in Fordow) or minimized them as much as possible. In return for the Islamic Republic's actions, part of the UN Security Council sanctions imposed against Iran since 2006 following the start of uranium enrichment, as well as all unilateral sanctions from the United States and the European community enacted since January 2012, were lifted. After the sanctions were lifted, Iran, like any other oil or non-oil country, is now able to engage in normal trade and conduct banking transactions with other countries and institutions, with the difference that countries, manufacturing companies, and investment institutions are hesitant to enter into medium-term commitments or sustainable investments in Iran until they are assured of the continuity of the current situation, and under the best conditions, they only come to Tehran motivated by selling goods and services. In the view of these institutions and countries, Iran is like a patient that still has the potential to revert to past complexities until it achieves lasting and reliable stability, as this possibility is also considered in the JCPOA, which includes the potential for the re-imposition of lifted sanctions in case of Iran's violations. The nature of Iran's nuclear activities, which neither aligned with economic needs nor with the nature and industrial capacity of Iran, and which in the eyes of the global community pursued only military objectives, was rooted in a ruling body whose leaders remain unchanged on the throne of power and decision-making. The Islamic Republic's decision to accept the cessation of suspicious nuclear activities was made under economic, political, and military pressures, not voluntarily, as the U.S. Secretary of State claimed in a separate press conference after the announcement of the JCPOA's implementation that 'the nuclear agreement with Iran prevented a new war in the region.' The U.S. Secretary of Energy, Ernest Moniz, also stated in a separate statement on the same day (January 16) that 'with the implementation of the JCPOA, Iran's distance from the atomic bomb has increased from two to three months to one year.' Iran's economy has been plunged into complete recession during the three years of unilateral sanctions from the U.S. and Europe, and according to official Iranian officials, the costs of maintaining the current situation for Iran amount to over $150 billion annually. Considering the price of each barrel of oil at around $25, the negative economic growth this year, remaining construction commitments, and financial debts from last year's budget, it can be estimated that the current year's budget deficit has reached 50 percent, particularly affecting construction credits. The continuation of this situation could extend the risk of economic collapse in Iran to social and political arenas as well. In the eyes of the global community, Iran's one-year distance from the bomb remains dangerous, and the recurrence of past adventurous tendencies in Iran, after overcoming the current economic crisis or a change of government, could be probable unless the Islamic Republic demonstrates sufficient will to normalize and genuinely join the ranks of normal countries rather than revolutionary ones during the verification period. Achieving this level of domestic and foreign expectations requires a change in the nature, composition of governance, and a structural review of the country's macro policies. The concept of lifting sanctions is merely about unshackling the feet and opening doors and will not solve Iran's current problems unless there is sufficient will to walk and then run towards the right goals. Iran's economy is state-driven, reliant on rent-seeking, and influenced by rent-seekers, and it must be directed towards a free economy, privatization, and the creation and strengthening of a middle class with a clear plan and strong will. Iran's administrative structure is considered one of the most corrupt possible structures according to credible global assessments, and the fight against political and administrative corruption must be prioritized without wasting time. Iran's social order relies on the propagation and preservation of fears, and only a free society devoid of fears (political, poverty, unemployment, illness) can enjoy normal stability. If the political authority in Iran refrains from opening doors and liberalization, it is doomed to be affected by destabilizing consequences and even collapse; a result that the former Soviet Union experienced at the beginning of the 1990s. On the foreign front, the Islamic Republic has shown over the past three years that it can engage in formal, informal, and secret negotiations and reach results even with a power it calls the 'Great Satan' and still identifies as an 'enemy.' Achieving a nuclear agreement and simultaneously exchanging four prisoners in the custody of the Islamic Republic for seven prisoners of interest to Tehran who were convicted in the U.S. demonstrated that despite the apparent directives of official officials, the Islamic Republic is ready to shake hands under specific conditions with those who are labeled 'satanic' in official policies. If the Iranian religious authority remains indifferent to the outlined necessities and refrains from internal and external reconstruction, the JCPOA is a flame that does not provide warmth, and over time, as the psychological impact period passes quickly, the doors will once again turn on the axis of recession and instability.