Islamic Clemency in the Islamic Republic

Mohseni Ejei, the spokesperson and deputy of the judiciary, recently stated: "Islamic clemency applies until the issuance of a verdict. After a definitive ruling is issued, Islamic clemency has no meaning. If someone wants to make amends, repent, and cooperate, they have the opportunity to do so before the court's ruling." These remarks from this senior judicial official were in response to a letter from several members of parliament regarding the heavy judicial sentence (16 years in prison) for Narges Mohammadi, a human rights activist. What 'judicial ruling'? What 'court'? The deputy of the judiciary speaks of 'the issuance of a court ruling'; however, the main problem in the judicial system of the Islamic Republic is precisely the lack of fair judgment and independent and just arbitration by judges. When the judiciary lacks impartiality and fairness, and especially in political and ideological cases, judges rely solely on the assessments of security institutions and rewrite the interrogators' verdicts, discussing 'court rulings' becomes a bitter joke. When due process and the emphases of the constitution and the Islamic Penal Code are repeatedly and grossly violated and ignored by security institutions and revolutionary courts, the concept of 'court ruling' is fundamentally absent. The astonishing and strange issuance of a 16-year prison sentence against Narges Mohammadi is just one new witness. In this case, the issued ruling has even disregarded the stipulations of the Islamic Penal Code. This is independent of the illegal process undergone against this human rights activist. A few days ago, a group of parliament members pointed out this gross violation of the law in an open letter to the head of the judiciary; they wrote: The 36th branch of the Tehran Court of Appeals has confirmed the 16-year prison sentence of Ms. Narges Mohammadi from the primary court. Ms. Mohammadi had previously been sentenced in a court presided over by Judge Salavati to five years in prison for 'collusion and conspiracy to commit a crime against national security', one year for 'propaganda against the regime', and ten years for 'forming and managing the illegal group Legam'. This ruling was not correctly issued based on Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code, which explicitly states that in the case of committing three crimes, the perpetrator should be sentenced to the most severe punishment (10 years). In other words—and as mentioned in the aforementioned letter—both the primary court judge and the appellate court judge have consciously turned a blind eye to the emphasis of Article 134 of the Islamic Penal Code. What 'fair and legal court ruling' is Mohseni Ejei talking about? Political prisoners in Iran are 'hostages'; hostages in the power struggle within the political structure, or hostages to exert pressure on civil society or intimidate political activists and civil actors, or hostages for 'exchanges' with foreign governments. Whenever the 'project' of the judicial and security institutions of the Islamic Republic ends, or whenever these institutions assess the 'cost' of continuing to imprison these prisoners to be greater than the 'benefit', the 'hostage-taking' ends. Homa Hoodfar, a university professor and Iranian-Canadian citizen, who was recently released after several months in prison, is the latest witness. A week after the meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran and Canada, the spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that Hoodfar was released 'for humanitarian reasons, including illness'. Jason Rezaian, an Iranian-American journalist for the Washington Post, is another well-known case. Last December, the Tehran prosecutor announced that this journalist and three other dual-national prisoners were released 'in line with the resolutions of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran and the overall interests of the regime' and 'within the framework of prisoner exchanges'. Their release coincided with the implementation of the JCPOA. Even in the case of the detention of several British and American sailors and their subsequent release, 'Islamic clemency' was mentioned without any legal or judicial basis being cited or scrutinized. Islamic clemency; for the 'non-political'. Occasionally, Ayatollah Khamenei, on various occasions (including the anniversary of the Islamic Revolution or Eid al-Fitr or Ghadir or Eid al-Adha), includes a list of prisoners in his 'amnesty'. He implements this action following the request of the head of the judiciary to realize 'Islamic clemency'. In the detailed list proposed and prepared by the head of the judiciary, individuals accused of 'acts against internal security' are always excluded. In a system where the rights of political defendants have not yet been fulfilled by the government, 'the crime of acting against security' in most cases is a pseudonym for 'political crime'. Thus, in general and usual terms, there is no realization of 'Islamic clemency' for political offenders unless the prisoner requests amnesty and seeks repentance and forgiveness. 'Islamic clemency' and the leaders of the Green Movement. To better understand the concept of 'Islamic clemency' in the Islamic Republic, one can refer to the remarks of the deputy of the judiciary regarding the leaders of the Green Movement. Mohseni Ejei, in response to the house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard—which has continued since February 2011—said: 'If there were no Islamic clemency and considerations of the Supreme National Security Council, the leaders of the sedition and their followers should have been prosecuted as criminals and sentenced to the severest punishment.' In a similar remark, Ahmad Jannati, the Secretary of the Guardian Council, also stated in one of the Friday prayers in the capital that 'if it were not for extraordinary Islamic clemency', the leaders of the Green Movement 'should have been executed.' In other words, as these senior government officials explicitly state, 'Islamic clemency' in the Islamic Republic means the judiciary's avoidance of holding a trial in accordance with the constitutional emphasis, as well as the execution of house arrest without trial. In Article 477 of the Criminal Procedure Code, it is emphasized that if the head of the judiciary deems a definitive ruling issued by any judicial authority to be contrary to clear Islamic law, he may order a retrial and send the case to the Supreme Court to be reviewed in specific branches and the ruling finalized. From this perspective, the request of the parliament members from the head of the judiciary to annul the ruling and reconsider the case against Narges Mohammadi based on 'Islamic clemency'—contrary to what the deputy of the judiciary claims—is entirely feasible and realizable and is not outside the possibilities and emphases of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, the judiciary of the Islamic Republic has left no room for law, fairness, independence, and justice in its dealings with civil activists and political actors. Laws (from the constitution to the criminal procedure code and the Islamic penal code) are entirely a plaything for security institutions and interrogators dominating the revolutionary court judges. The main problem goes back to the point that, as Mohseni Ejei puts it, the accused must 'repent' and 'express remorse' and 'cooperate'. Narges Mohammadi's response is clear: 'I believe in the path I have taken and the work I have done and what I have thought, and I insist on realizing that, which is the realization of human rights, and I am not remorseful.' This is a position that the imprisoned leaders of the Green Movement have also expressed directly and indirectly throughout the 69 months of their illegal imprisonment. There is no 'clemency' at play; a serious challenge continues; on one side stand citizens who are 'demanding' their fundamental rights and those of other Iranians, and on the other side are authoritarian figures who see the realization of human rights as contradictory to their continued undemocratic power.