Note: Ignoring and Addressing Corruption in the Structure of the Iranian Government

Corruption in Iran is institutionalized and structural. The causes of its emergence include legal and extralegal privileges of the ruling class, their lack of accountability to oversight bodies, the prohibition of oversight bodies from monitoring institutions under the leader's supervision, and the absence of freedom of expression and media; however, the causes of its persistence are the methods embedded in the government structure for concealing and justifying it. Additionally, indifference and politicization of these issues have harmed transparency and accountability. Senior officials also show little interest in media coverage of corruption. The famous statement by Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, regarding the 3000 billion toman case is well remembered: "This issue should not be prolonged." When reformists do not react to accusations of purchasing a factory by four wives of reformists (Rasht Electronics), such behaviors, which are prevalent in both factions, naturally continue. In this article, I will refer to several instances of addressing corruption among members of the ruling caste and their close associates: three notable cases are 1) the economic activities of the IRGC, 2) the bankruptcy of Islamic credit institutions, and 3) the Tehran municipality. Without oversight, there are many diverse questions about the reasons and nature of the economic activities of the IRGC. However, aside from those questions that have yet to receive a response from officials, questions can be raised about the formal and technical aspects of the activities of economic companies. One question concerns the oversight of the budgets of companies affiliated with military institutions, including the IRGC; are these companies generally subject to oversight? In this regard, Mojtaba Zolnouri states: "These companies are not devoid of a supervisory system in the sense that the supervisory system has complete oversight over the income and revenue of the mentioned companies, and essentially their income is deposited into a specific account that is governmental, which both the Court of Audit and the hierarchy of the relevant agencies mentioned oversee, but their expenditures are not with the government... The government is essentially aware of the income of companies affiliated with the IRGC because in many cases, the government itself is the contracting party, which knows how much money has been paid, and there is no room for concealment; for example, in many cases, the Ministry of Oil is contracted with the Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters and knows how much money has been paid... The difference in military budgets is that the budgets of the armed forces are discretionary, meaning they spend their revenues at their discretion, but in government budgets, except for approved cases, they have no right to determine, and otherwise, the Court of Audit can take action." (Tabnak, December 15, 2017) When there is no oversight, corruption is not discovered to be countered. The cleanest institutions in Iran are the Shia clergy, the IRGC, the leadership apparatus, and security institutions because there is no oversight over them, and they do not report to anyone. Thus, oversight bodies only know how much budget has been allocated to the IRGC and its affiliated organizations (this is aside from the IRGC's hidden revenues from smuggling), but they cannot know how these funds have been spent. Also, if these institutions have revenues, these revenues do not return to the treasury, and they spend as they wish. This is the alphabet of facilitating corruption that all religious and military bureaucratic institutions have implemented. When there is no oversight, corruption is not discovered to be countered. The cleanest institutions in Iran are the Shia clergy, the IRGC, the leadership apparatus, and security institutions because there is no oversight over them, and they do not report to anyone. With state resources, Hassan Rouhani, upon delivering the budget bill for the year 2018 to the parliament, said: "Six violating cooperatives that held 25 percent of the country's monetary market. At the end of the eleventh government and the beginning of the twelfth government, we made every effort to compensate for the damage caused by these few credit cooperatives in the country, which had troubled people's lives. These cooperatives not only made daily decisions regarding the interest rates of facilities and disrupted this sector but also manipulated the currency, gold, and real estate markets as they wished. The eleventh government sought assistance from the Supreme Leader because 3-4 million people were losing their entire livelihoods. Who were these funds? How difficult it was to deal with these funds. They had been everywhere, and letters came from all organizations saying this person is good; why are you closing their accounts? Strange people came and made recommendations. With the help of the leader, the three branches, and the Supreme National Security Council, the Central Bank was empowered to address this issue, and a great job was done. 98 percent of depositors either received their money or will receive it by the end of this month. We are also trying to identify the assets of the remaining 2 percent and resolve their issues. Solving the problems of 98 percent of depositors was akin to a miracle. A great job was done; the leader, all branches, and the Supreme National Security Council helped. We must not let this incident happen again in our country. The Central Bank has every authority it needs to resolve this issue and prevent it from happening again. These have destroyed the economy and lives of the people. This issue, along with reducing interest rates on facilities, connecting with foreign banks, and increasing bank capital, were four significant steps taken. Today we need to reform the banking system. We need three billion dollars for banking reforms." (Tabnak, December 10, 2017) Rouhani does not mention in this brief explanation: 1) How these six cooperatives came to control 25 percent of the monetary market, 2) Why it was necessary to involve the Supreme Leader to deal with them or resolve their issues? 3) Who were the operators of these six cooperatives, and how close were they to the leadership, the IRGC, and the clergy? 4) Why has it been difficult to deal with these funds? 5) Why has the Central Bank paid for their plunder? 6) What was the miracle: printing money, raising currency prices, or obtaining resources by taking foreigners and dual nationals hostage and extorting Western governments? 7) What exactly will the three billion dollars that he wants for banking reform be spent on? Thamen al-Hojaj, Afzal Toos, Farishtagan, Alborz Iranians, and Arman were five large institutions that were dissolved in the past two years, and their activities came to an end. As a result of the activities of these few institutions, about 25 trillion tomans were attracted from around two million and 280 thousand depositors, and at the time of dissolution, they were present in their financial statements. Despite attracting these figures, ultimately, to respond to their depositors, the Central Bank spent 20 trillion tomans. "Everything is clear" The Tehran municipality during the 12-year tenure of Qalibaf became a private playground for the close associates of the leadership and the IRGC in plundering the resources of Tehran. Majid Farahani stated in a session of the Tehran City Council on January 25, 2018, that there is a 20 trillion toman discrepancy between the revenues and expenditures of the municipality during Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf's mayorship: "Although some say this money was spent on paying debts, it raises the question of whether we do not have accounts that indicate where this 20 trillion tomans went?" (ISNA, January 25, 2018) After such reports or revelations that occur following changes in councils or cabinets or economic and social crises, or have a responsive aspect to questions (without accountability), no follow-up is conducted in oversight and judicial bodies, and the issue is forgotten. In late 2017, Mohammad Ali Najafi, the mayor of Tehran, stated: "At the end of 2016, the municipality signed a contract with one of the police force's companies for the development of performance evaluation indicators for one billion tomans, which may have had a real value of even 10 million tomans... The last payment to this company was made on the first of August, after the elections, and subsequent investigations revealed that on the second of August, another contract was signed with the same company, with the total value of the two contracts being one billion and 430 million tomans... The amount of the two contracts was deposited into a company account affiliated with the police force, but one billion and 257 million tomans of it was transferred to a bank account belonging to the office of one of the previous mayor's deputies, and this money was also "spent on elections." (Shura Online, January 25, 2018) He states: "54 percent of the assets listed in the financial statements of the Tehran municipality's subsidiaries have not been audited... 674 municipal properties have been arbitrarily allocated to individuals and institutions." (Ibid) He also refers to excessive hiring, including the recruitment of about 13,000 people in the municipality in the months leading up to the elections, which has resulted in 426 employees for every 100 posts in the capital's municipality. In the 100-day report of the mayor of Tehran, many instances of mismanagement, inefficiency, and violations are mentioned, such as the drilling of 32 wells for drinking water supply, which is considered a factor in land subsidence in Tehran, and the allocation of part of the land in the Abbasabad area to a military institution. Mehdi Chamran, the chairman of the city council during Qalibaf's mayorship, responds to Najafi's report by saying: "Everything is clear and transparent." (Farda, January 25, 2018) In the two years since the report of these violations, the judiciary has only summoned 30 individuals, and after this action, the case has currently been archived. In examining the issue of the transfer of astronomical properties by the government, a resolution mandated the Ministry of Interior to address this issue and provide a report; in the committee established to investigate this issue, a person was appointed who was on the list of the National Inspection Organization of individuals who had been allocated land from these properties and had a familial relationship with the Minister of Interior. (Mahmoud Soldqi, a member of parliament, Tabnak, March 4, 2018) After such reports or revelations that occur following changes in councils or cabinets or economic and social crises, or have a responsive aspect to questions (without accountability), no follow-up is conducted in oversight and judicial bodies, and the issue is forgotten. The abuses of power that occur in Iran are final, and the abusers and their descendants will benefit from it forever.