Return of US Sanctions with 'Special Discounts' for Friendly Countries!

Before the official announcement of the return of the second round of US sanctions against Iran on Friday, November 2, some news centers and American media, including the Washington Free Beacon and Bloomberg, reported that in addition to Iran's continued access to interbank services known as 'SWIFT', eight Asian countries would also benefit from limited privileges to continue purchasing Iranian oil after the sanctions are formalized. The immediate result of the new decisions from the White House is the adjustment of the psychological factor resulting from the imposition of US sanctions, particularly the reduction in the speed of the decline of the Iranian national currency (rial) against foreign currencies, which had recently taken a new upward trend after several weeks of relative calm. The main goal of the new sanctions is to completely deprive the Islamic Republic of foreign currency revenues from oil and petroleum product sales, which, if normal conditions continued, could reach $35 billion this year according to World Bank forecasts. Recent assessments indicate that after the sanctions are imposed, Iran's crude oil export revenue will decrease to $10 billion next year, equivalent to 700,000 barrels of crude oil exports per day based on current prices. After the July 2015 nuclear agreement and the lifting of nuclear sanctions, Iran's crude oil exports gradually increased from an average of 700,000 barrels per day to 2.2 million barrels per day, making it the third-largest exporter among OPEC member countries after Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The imposition of economic sanctions over the past decades has become the fifth wheel of the foreign policy of Western countries and generally fails to achieve the set goals. The failure of the UN Security Council's nuclear sanctions against Iran from 2006 to 2011, which did not prevent Tehran from continuing unauthorized nuclear activities and conducting ballistic missile tests, is a clear example of the failure of sanctions to achieve their intended objectives. The unilateral sanctions imposed by the US and the EU in 2012 changed the effectiveness of economic and financial sanctions against smaller countries and forced Tehran to accept negotiations and limit its missile and nuclear activities after two years of resistance. The success of the new round of US sanctions against Tehran will first depend on the degree of cooperation from the European Union and, subsequently, the cooperation of countries trading with Iran, particularly oil buyers. The Obama administration, in addition to garnering full support from the EU, which completely halted the daily purchase of 700,000 barrels of Iranian oil, imposed temporary incentive tariffs to attract cooperation from Asian countries, allowing buyer countries to remain outside the scope of US financial penalties if they reduced their imports of Iranian crude oil. In the context of the return of the second round of nuclear sanctions against Iran, the Trump administration, which has so far been somewhat deprived of political support from the EU and is facing resistance from major Iranian oil buyers like China and India, has apparently deemed it necessary to repeat the Obama administration's policy of offering incentive terms to ensure cooperation from oil buyers or trading partners with Iran shortly before November 5, based on recommendations from the Treasury and the State Department. The Trump administration had previously emphasized that the goal of the new round of nuclear sanctions was to bring Iran's oil exports to zero. Undoubtedly, if incentive terms for Iranian oil buyers are renewed in the manner of the Obama administration, even under the most challenging conditions, Iran will still be able to sell between 700,000 to one million barrels of crude oil daily. Acceptance of Iran's continued membership in the SWIFT interbank system, which seems to be the result of a political agreement between Washington and the EU, could also maintain the current limited foreign trade of the Islamic Republic. Thus, if there is no acute internal situation in Iran, the Islamic Republic will have months to choose between the options of 'changing behavior' and accepting the 12 conditions of the US or continuing its current 'resistance policy'. The Trump administration can also reassess the success of its policy of withdrawing from the nuclear agreement with Iran and the results of the sanctions after the elections on November 6 and the subsequent formation of a new Congress. The Trump administration is determined to use both the purchasing power of the US and the unique role of the dollar in global trade as tools to achieve Washington's foreign policy objectives regarding Tehran. In relation to the Islamic Republic, Washington believes that time is running against Tehran's religious government, and the sanctions policy has already achieved its initial objectives even before the official return of the sanctions. The announcement of adding the names of 300 new institutions and individuals to the sanctions list before November 5 is a symbolic message indicating the continuation of increased pressures against the Islamic Republic, while adhering to temporary incentive terms to maximize cooperation from the EU, Asian countries, and Iran's neighbors in implementing the sanctions.