The Courage to Invest in Iran!

Introduction: Ali Motahari, a member of parliament, stated at a conference known as "Parliament of Hope" held at Chaharmahal University in Arak: "Those who profited during the sanctions oppose the JCPOA and want to ensure that foreign investors do not have the courage to invest in Iran." Although this parliament member did not explicitly name the circles he referred to, his insinuation was clearer than a direct mention, as these authoritarian circles centered around the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and affiliated institutions have consistently sounded the alarm of threats and tensions both domestically and abroad in recent years. At the same time, this force, which benefits the most from the isolation of Iran's economy, has insisted on taking over the implementation of the government's large projects. In other words, the media and field threats and tensions complement the IRGC's activities to completely seize and control Iran's economy under the guise of a resistant economy. It should be explained that not only in the current situation but even during the post-revolution period, the fundamental threats to Iran's economy have often been political and military, and this has been one of the main reasons for Iran's economic isolation. Kidnappings, the war with Iraq, extensive tensions with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries, sanctions, and finally interference in the internal affairs of countries such as Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain have only been a glimpse of the problems that have rendered Iran's economy politically unreliable. This lack of reliability has been a factor in the flight of capital, investors, and entrepreneurs. Such a situation is, of course, desirable for authoritarian circles, primarily the IRGC. In such circumstances and in the absence of a powerful private sector, the government's need for the IRGC for a more significant economic role increases. Iran's economic isolation is a condition for implementing a resistant economy and the IRGC's role. Recently, current and former commanders of the IRGC have expressed their interest in executing the leader's directives regarding the implementation of a "resistant economy" in various forms. This is not the first time that the IRGC has actively emerged as an economic player; this has a long history. The IRGC's involvement in various economic affairs, including contracting, banking, and commerce, whether legally or illegally, intensified and gradually expanded after the war. The primary motivation for private sector enterprises to expand economically is to increase market share, improve productivity, and ultimately profit. However, the IRGC's goal of seizing Iran's economy is not limited to increasing profits; it is also clear that other objectives, such as dominating other institutions within the country and exporting the revolution, are also on the agenda of this institution. Although the government has not been negligent in granting large projects to the IRGC, the IRGC commanders are not satisfied with the volume of these grants. Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari has previously expressed this dissatisfaction among IRGC and Basij commanders, stating: "Unfortunately, the government has not welcomed the proposals and actions of the Basij for the resistant economy, and we hope the government will utilize the successful capacity of the Basij and IRGC and the immense capabilities of the people in these areas." Following the New Year message from the leader of the government and the designation of the year 1395 as "Resistant Economy; Action and Practice," the pressure from the IRGC to seize a broader area of Iran's economy has increased. In this context, one of the IRGC commanders, General Jazaeri, stated that any negligence in implementing the leader's directives in the New Year speech and the necessity of outlining a roadmap for the resistant economy and acting upon it would be an unforgivable mistake. This military commander emphasizes: "The main audience of the resistant economy is the respected government; therefore, while announcing the comprehensive readiness of the armed forces and Basij for decisive roles in the resistant economy and realizing the leader's ten proposals, we emphasize that the concrete and experienced model of the armed forces for achieving a resistant economy and economic resistance is available to the government." In other words, this commander claims that the armed forces should be the model for the government's economic management, which is a civilian entity. Furthermore, Hassan Firouzabadi, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, announced that the armed forces, under the command of Ali Khamenei, have entered the economic domain to implement the "resistant economy" plan. He also stated: "In the resistant economy, the IRGC, the police forces, the army, and the General Staff have all engaged in economic work and advanced under the blessed command of the leader." At the same time, the street maneuvering forces of the IRGC and Basij, namely Ansar Hezbollah, issued a statement urging Hassan Rouhani's government not to pursue "made-up interpretations" and to avoid intertwining the resistant economy with the global liberal capitalist economy. In this context, the head of the Basij Organization described the "events" of Hassan Rouhani's trip to Italy and France, including the signing of a contract to purchase 118 Airbus passenger planes, as a "dagger in the body of the resistant economy" and stated that "Western intelligence agencies have spent money to publicize the purchase of the Airbuses." The IRGC's actions to seize Iran's economy are not consistent with the regulations interpreted under Article 44 of the Constitution. However, the Iranian Constitution, as the superior law, and also the lower laws such as the Commercial Law in Iran lack precision and effectiveness. Moreover, supervisory institutions do not have sufficient authority against the IRGC. For example, unlike advanced countries, there are no anti-monopoly and anti-trust laws in Iran; therefore, the IRGC can formally bypass legal obstacles to fulfill its desires. Even if precise laws existed, the IRGC could neutralize them as well. Because in the current situation—regardless of the special relationship between the IRGC and the leader of the government—a significant portion of the body and head of Iran's three branches of government falls within the IRGC's authority. Hence, the IRGC has the opportunity to seize even more of Iran's economy in the absence of an independent and effective judiciary and executive branch. What has happened in recent years indicates that the IRGC's goal is to fragment the private sector in Iran into small contractors and dominate these small units as a large employer. Achieving such a goal would turn the private sector into a parasite and follower of the IRGC. Thus, the IRGC becomes financially and economically independent from the government and other ruling institutions, whether executive or supervisory. The condition for the IRGC's political dominance is also its increasing independence from the government budget and control over economic institutions. The IRGC aims to expand its influence as much as possible before the current leader's death. Such a policy enables it to play a more significant role in the power transition process and gain a larger share of resources during the ambiguous and risky period of power transition.