The Official Birth of 'Political Criminal' in the Islamic Republic

With the Guardian Council's approval of the bill passed by the parliament, the political crime law has been finalized. Now, more than 37 years after the birth of the Islamic Republic, 'political criminal' has been formalized in Iran and has acquired rights. This significant event has occurred while from the very beginning of the establishment of the system, Article 168 of the Constitution emphasized that 'the trial of political and press crimes is public and takes place with the presence of a jury in the courts of justice.' This emphasis is a re-reading of Articles 77 and 79 of the Supplement to the Constitutional Law (ratified in 1906): 'In cases of political and press offenses, juries will be present in the courts' and 'in cases of political and press offenses, if confidentiality of the trial is deemed necessary, it must be done by the unanimous vote of all members of the court.' But what definition does the new law provide for political crime, and what rights does a political criminal have? Who is a political criminal? This important question of who qualifies as a political criminal may be the first step in the judicial confrontation with the accused. For years, security and judicial institutions in the Islamic Republic have violently targeted political activists under the accusation of 'acting against national security' in various forms (from solitary confinement to execution). Judges in revolutionary courts have also avoided conducting public trials with juries by emphasizing the 'security' nature of the charges. The new law also states that 'if the perpetrator intends to harm the foundation of the regime,' they are not considered political criminals. This description leaves investigators and judges, who are subordinate to security institutions, with the discretion to deny political defendants their rights. According to the recent law, only those defendants who 'commit crimes against the management and political institutions or domestic or foreign policies of the country with the motivation to reform the affairs of the country' will be treated as political criminals in legal proceedings. In this law, 'insulting or defaming the heads of the three branches, the head of the Expediency Council, vice presidents, ministers, members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, members of the Assembly of Experts, and members of the Guardian Council due to their responsibilities' is considered a crime. The treatment of political and press activists and critics stems from the narrow-mindedness, autocracy, intolerance, and lack of moderation of the central power. When the head of the judiciary is appointed by the supreme leader, and judges in revolutionary courts are subordinate to investigators and security-intelligence institutions, and investigators act as the repressive arms of the regime, it is difficult to be optimistic about the positive outcomes of the political crime law. Will this part of the law not serve as a pretext for exerting pressure and threatening political activists, civil society actors, and journalists by security and judicial institutions? Will criticism of various pillars and actors of the regime not be treated with the label of 'insult and defamation'? The record of the judiciary of the Islamic Republic and the absence of a jury in the courts for political and press activists have made it easy for informed citizens to answer such questions: 'Yes, unfortunately, it is very likely.' What are the privileges of a political criminal? Based on one of the articles of this law, political defendants/convicts, in addition to enjoying the rights provided for ordinary prisoners under laws and regulations, will have some rights and privileges (including the following): 1. Separation of detention facilities during detention and imprisonment from ordinary criminals. 2. Prohibition of solitary confinement and imprisonment except in cases where the judicial authority fears collusion or considers it necessary for completing investigations; however, in any case, the duration should not exceed 15 days. 3. The right to meet and correspond with first-degree relatives during imprisonment. 4. The right to access books, publications, radio, and television during imprisonment. Although these points may not seem very significant at first glance, they can be considered important privileges for those political and press activists who have been detained and targeted for judicial action over the past 37 years. Among the mentioned list, the 'prohibition of solitary confinement and imprisonment' is very important and valuable; although it is undermined by a significant clause: 'except in cases where the judicial authority fears collusion or considers it necessary for completing investigations.' This consideration opens the door for security institutions to exert power, pressure, and violence against political activists. However, the emphasis that 'the duration (of solitary confinement) should not exceed 15 days' is hopeful and joyful; as there have been and still are activists who have been held in solitary confinement for months after arrest. One step forward, and one 'but'. The political crime law is not without flaws, as, for example, no role is defined for the jury in it. Even Majid Ansari, the Deputy for Parliamentary Affairs of the President, emphasized during the review of the generalities of the bill that the government believes this bill is neither comprehensive nor sufficient. However, as is well known, a bad law is better than lawlessness; the mere fact that the absence of law regarding political crime has now come to an end is a cause for joy. Of course, this law should not become another tool for suppressing critics and should not be misused or ignored by security-judicial institutions. As mentioned, one of the ambiguities and questioning points in the law is that investigators or judges subordinate to security institutions may claim that the accused was politically active 'with the intent to harm the foundation of the regime.' This assessment and opinion mean the end of citizens' rights in the realm of committing political crimes. Although the approval of the political crime law is considered a step forward in today's political and legal atmosphere in Iran, one cannot ignore an important 'but': the lack of an independent and fair judiciary in the Islamic Republic. Unless public opinion and active and effective civil society forces compel security and judicial institutions to better and more fairly observe the law. A situation that could lead to not only reforming practices but also amending and completing the law.