The Old Invention of the Islamic Republic in Social Sciences: Revolution Meaning 'Ruling System'

The strangest and most deceptive joke created by the ruling class in the Islamic Republic is introducing themselves as 'revolutionary' even after 38 years since the regime's establishment. They continue to present themselves as revolutionary, just as they did before the 22nd of Bahman 57, after having monopolized all resources, power, and wealth of the country in a totalitarian manner over the past four decades. Many of the regime's officials who today call themselves revolutionary were either not born or were children in 57. Ali Khamenei seizes every opportunity to emphasize revolutionary criteria in any matter. He refers to the organized attacks on critics carried out by the Basij and plainclothes forces under his control (in cases where the government does not want to use official coercive forces, such as the attacks on the British or Saudi embassies or on electoral gatherings) as revolutionary: 'Do not accuse revolutionary forces of extremism; some like it this way. The revolutionary element, the revolutionary cleric, the revolutionary scholar, the revolutionary youth, the revolutionary teacher at every level should not be accused of extremism; no, this is also a deviation perpetrated by the enemy.' (29 Mehr 1389) However, he is aware that he rules over an established regime and is not the leader of a revolution: 'That Islam can resist global tyrants and destroy the front of domination is one that has established itself as a governing system and possesses military, political, economic, cultural, and media power tools.' (6 Khordad 1395) When the term 'revolutionary student organization' or 'revolutionary clerics' is heard, it should naturally mean a group of students or clerics wanting to overthrow the ruling regime, but in the Islamic Republic's lexicon, these groups are the staunchest supporters of the regime, and the leader of the regime calls for government support for them: 'In schools, in addition to focusing on students' academic matters, the opportunity for them to engage in revolutionary activities should also be properly planned, so that the young generation becomes a revolutionary generation. It has been heard that in some schools, there is opposition to revolutionary activities, which the education system must address.' (1 Ordibehesht 1395); 'Attacking the foundations and institutions of the revolution, including the Revolutionary Guards, the Guardian Council, Hezbollah youth, and revolutionary clerics, is among the current methods of foreigners.' (6 Khordad 1395) If the officials of the Islamic Republic and their supporters are revolutionary, it means that the Pahlavi regime or another regime is still in power in Iran, and only the name of the government has changed. Khamenei has absolute power in Iran and suppresses anyone who opposes him, yet he introduces himself as revolutionary; his supporters and state media also present him as the leader of the revolution while he has led no revolution; it is unclear which revolution they are referring to, as a revolution is against the existing situation, not the existing situation itself. When Khamenei says, 'Today the enemy is mistaken to think of overthrowing the revolution' (28 Bahman 1394), it is clear that by revolution, he means the regime itself. Interestingly, when the regime is taken to mean revolution, one can also talk about the overthrow of the revolution, a term that is a new innovation in social sciences. This is where one can understand the government's opposition to existing social sciences and its efforts for Islamic humanities and social sciences. In Islamic social sciences, it probably makes sense to say 'overthrowing the revolution.' This type of usage of the word revolution pursues four goals: blurring the line between revolutionary and ruling, rendering opposition and being revolutionary meaningless, attracting those who want to be revolutionary but are not fond of supporting a regime, and elevating the supporters and officials of the regime above criticism by labeling critics and opponents as foreigners. Thus, terms like anti-regime, opposition, and critic, which were valued in the years before 57, are rendered worthless in official media and circles close to the government and religious bureaucracy: 'Of course, in this bipolarity [between loyalists to the revolution and the front of imperialism and their like-minded], the majority of the Iranian nation are revolutionary and interested in the revolution and loyal to the Imam and his thoughts and principles.' (5 Esfand 1394) Of course, before Khamenei, Mao, Lenin, Stalin, and the leaders of Cuba and North Korea had also made this invention. When you claim to be revolutionary, you need a revolutionary guerrilla and a partisan fighter in the mountains and fields to fight against the existing government. However, no one is fighting against the existing government in Iran. Qassem Soleimani is a military commander who has been leading the slaughter of Syrian citizens alongside Bashar al-Assad for five years, but the regime's propagandists introduce him as Che Guevara: 'Qassem Soleimani, in a sense, is the Che Guevara of our time, the Che Guevara of a believing Muslim who possesses all the principles of Iranian heroism, and we saw how the people liked him. Qassem Soleimani means Iran, means ideals, means heroism, means struggle, and means the living pulse of the revolution. When these are put together, criticism of the regime takes on a larger and broader meaning and gains a dignity that I feel has now defined our place. Iran and ideals are no longer defined within the borders of this cat and are far beyond our borders.' (Ebrahim Hatami Kia, Tabnak 23 Esfand 1394) These expansionist remarks come from someone who himself is a filmmaker for the regime and burdens the public budget with billions of tomans for political propaganda annually. Khamenei speaks of his expectations from the Assembly of Experts: 'The duty of the Assembly of Experts is to remain revolutionary, think revolutionarily, and act revolutionarily.' (20 Esfand 1394) What does a revolutionary Assembly of Experts mean? A parliament that rebels against the Supreme Leader? Certainly not. A parliament that pledges allegiance to the leader, is completely subordinate to the existing leader, and even takes oversight to mean strengthening and supporting him? Yes, certainly. Thus, revolutionary in this case means being obedient and supportive of the existing Supreme Leader, without any critical or supervisory approach. The Islamic Republic needs to introduce the clerical institution with this characteristic to claim to be revolutionary: 'The Qom seminary must remain a revolutionary seminary and the cradle of the revolution.' (Ali Khamenei, Tabnak 25 Esfand 1394) The meaning of this statement is that the seminary should take to the streets and rebel against Khamenei's government? No. Khamenei's meaning is that the seminary should be anti-revolutionary and defend his government. Therefore, by urging the seminary to be revolutionary, Khamenei wants this institution to be anti-revolutionary. This is, of course, part of the campaign of the Islamic Republic's officials to render words meaningless. This has already happened to terms like integrity, democracy, justice, freedom, and chastity. From Khamenei's perspective, the party forces and the suppression machine are revolutionary. He has always defended these forces and placed them under his protective cover. Even after the attacks on the embassies of Saudi Arabia and Britain, which caused significant damage to the Islamic Republic (in addition to the country), he complained that some individuals in the government labeled them as extremists: 'Do not accuse the faithful, the revolutionary current, the Hezbollah youth of extremism; these are the same people who are present in the field with all their being, with all their sincerity, and where defending the borders is necessary, defending national identity is necessary, and the issue of giving life and blood arises, these are the ones who come to the field. Just because something happens somewhere that is not accepted and approved, immediately pull the Hezbollah youth out, like the case of the Saudi embassy, which was indeed a very bad act, a wrong act, and whoever did it did wrong; we should not weaken the faithful, the revolutionary youth who are revolutionary - because I have a lot of affinity with these youths from a distance and up close - their reasoning and understanding often surpass that of some of the elders, they understand well, analyze well, and identify issues well, and they are the champions of the revolution, the champions of Islam; we should not weaken them on the pretext that an incident has occurred somewhere.' (30 Dey 1394) The anti-revolutionaries, in the precise sense, were those who opposed revolutionary movements in 57. Today, the anti-revolutionaries in the exact sense are the rulers of the Islamic Republic, who even condemn individuals to decades in prison on charges of overthrowing the regime. However, the newly established government uses this trendy term against any individual or group that opposes any policy and behavior of the Islamic Republic. Today, if someone considers the Islamic Republic a corrupt government, or sees it as relying on a suppression machine, or reads its behaviors in nuclear and missile programs as adventurous (which all express reality), they are labeled as anti-revolutionary. The Islamic Republic, in order to have no opponents and to ensure its eternal existence by appropriating 'revolutionary being,' and to justify its suppression machine, introduces itself as revolutionary while holding absolute power. Since the rulers want all the good titles in the world for themselves, they probably cannot give up the title of revolutionary and do not realize that this title conflicts with their other titles. The five characteristics that Khamenei implicitly mentions for being revolutionary - piety, enemy-centricity, tension-creation, power-seeking, and totalitarianism (14 Khordad 1395) - are all not only unrelated to the concept of being revolutionary (overthrowing the established regime in a country) but are merely matters favored by the rulers of the Islamic Republic. The officials of the Islamic Republic do not realize that a revolution was an event in 1357, and after that, there is no longer a 'ruling regime' but rather a regime. Being anti-Western and striving to expand the sphere of influence and global and regional management (imperialistic ambitions) has its own specific name and title, and this title is certainly not 'revolutionary': it is suppression at home and ambition and imperialism abroad, in the same sense that the officials of the Islamic Republic call the expansion of the influence of global powers imperialism.