The Resilience of ISIS Amidst the Disjointed Strategy of Coalition Countries

Assessments from U.S. intelligence agencies indicate that despite billions of dollars spent on military efforts and the deaths of over 10,000 ISIS fighters, the group's capabilities have not changed significantly compared to a year ago when coalition airstrikes began. According to these assessments, ISIS remains strong, with new recruits from abroad filling the ranks of those killed. The Associated Press quotes a U.S. intelligence official stating that the number of ISIS fighters did not show a significant decline last year, with the group maintaining between 20,000 to 30,000 fighters. Airstrike and casualty statistics report from the non-profit research center Airwars, which tracks air operations against ISIS, shows that twelve coalition countries led by the U.S. conducted 5,975 airstrikes against ISIS positions over 366 days (up to August 9, 2015), with 3,664 of these attacks in Iraq and the remainder in Syria. This center's analysis indicates that during this period, nearly 15,000 ISIS militants and between 489 to 1,247 Iraqi and Syrian civilians were killed. The number of military personnel who died from friendly fire is estimated to be between 111 to 184. Based on a report from the U.S. company IHS, known for providing information and analysis for policymakers in defense and security industries, ISIS lost a total of 9% of its territory in the first half of this year despite victories in Palmyra, Syria, and Ramadi, Iraq. This report, released in mid-July, estimates the territory controlled by ISIS at 82,940 square kilometers, roughly the size of Austria. During the mentioned six months, ISIS was forced to retreat in northern Syria near the Turkish border and around the city of Tikrit in Iraq. This retreat in Syria was initially due to the efforts of Kurdish and Sunni groups around the city of Kobani and ultimately ended with the capture of the Tal Abyad crossing, which was the most important communication route between Raqqa, the de facto capital of ISIS, and Turkey. In Iraq, the most significant retreat of ISIS occurred in March with the liberation of Tikrit in Salah ad-Din province. Additionally, ISIS has lost control of key points in the center of Anbar province, which is essentially the supply route between the Syrian border and the city of Ramadi. The capture of Ramadi and its surrounding areas, which strengthens control over Fallujah, is considered a significant advancement for ISIS in Iraq, and the strategic importance of this action far outweighs the territories the group has lost. Despite this, U.S. intelligence analysts do not foresee a bright outlook for pushing back or defeating ISIS in the short term. They believe ISIS is in a favorable financial position and is replenishing its ranks with foreign fighters at the same rate that the U.S. and other coalition countries are eliminating its members. Furthermore, ISIS has expanded its presence in other countries, including Libya, the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, Tunisia, and Afghanistan. In this context, estimates from the CIA, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and other U.S. intelligence agencies do not align with the optimistic statements of retired General John Allen, the White House special envoy for the anti-ISIS coalition and former commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. On Monday, July 27, Allen told a security forum in Aspen, Colorado, that "ISIS is going to lose the war." He continued by stating that ISIS has been contained from a "strategic, operational, and largely tactical perspective," and that over the past year, the territory and population under ISIS control have decreased, a trend that will continue with the closing of the Turkish borders. However, American analysts say it will take more than a decade to drive ISIS from its safe havens and diminish its capabilities, but the complete destruction of the group in the short term is not feasible. This assessment and the continued effective resistance of ISIS in Iraq and Syria raise questions about the group's capabilities and the approach of coalition countries, particularly the U.S., in combating this group, including what the key to ISIS's resilience is, why the strategies of coalition countries and regional actors against ISIS have not been effective, and how this group can be pushed back and ultimately defeated. ISIS has managed to maintain its strength because the international community has not prioritized the fight against the threat posed by this group. ISIS is a threat to Western countries and all Muslim countries in the region, but the approaches to combat it are fragmented and uncoordinated, with no specific country or countries taking the lead and responsibility for the overall fight against it. One of the steadfast principles in any war is unified command and coordination of forces that pursue their intended objectives under its strategy. Evidence shows that the actions taken by regional and extra-regional countries against ISIS in Iraq and Syria lack this foundation. In Iraq, the current strategy of coalition countries is based on training Iraqi army units and providing air support for them in operations, namely bombing ISIS positions. However, this approach has several fundamental flaws. While airstrikes can reduce ISIS's tactical capabilities and disrupt its activities, without ground forces entering the battlefield, the effects of bombing diminish over time. Iraqi military units lack the leadership, strength, and speed necessary to confront ISIS and capitalize on battlefield opportunities, and the ground operations against ISIS are very slow. Airstrikes are a contradictory approach of regional actors. Turkey has recently changed its position regarding ISIS, but over the past year, Turkey, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have variously supported different groups opposing Assad to fight against government and pro-Assad forces. This inevitably and ultimately strengthened ISIS's position in Syria, as Assad's supporters are the only forces fighting ISIS on the ground. Undoubtedly, Turkey's change in policy towards ISIS and the Bashar Assad regime and participation in airstrikes could strengthen the coalition countries' position against ISIS. Ankara, which previously reached a kind of tacit agreement with ISIS and overlooked the group's activities in Turkey and border areas, has now accepted a path of cooperation with coalition countries. Turkey has opened its Incirlik and Diyarbakir air bases and its airspace to American planes, and more importantly, it has the full support of NATO for practical combat against ISIS. At the same time, Turkey has sent a large number of its security and military units to the south of the country, closing a significant portion of its borders adjacent to ISIS positions and arresting many suspected collaborators with this group. Iran also plays a major role in the fight against ISIS. The Revolutionary Guards and Quds Force are responsible for equipping and training the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) or Iraqi militias, while the U.S. is reorganizing and training some units of the Iraqi army and supporting the Peshmerga. The number of casualties among the Revolutionary Guards in Iraq indicates that, unlike American advisors and trainers, their Iranian counterparts are actively participating in operations, and evidence shows that the effectiveness of the militias surpasses that of Iraqi military personnel. Despite this, the use of militias in the long term will harm the sovereignty of the Baghdad government and exacerbate sectarian and religious divisions in the country. In fact, each of the main actors in the region is trying to use ISIS as a tool to undermine their rivals and enemies in the region. The Islamic Republic of Iran views ISIS as a threat to Shia countries and justifies its intervention in Syria by promoting the idea that the Assad regime is fighting terrorism. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and their allies also seek to reduce ISIS's territory in the north and south but consider ISIS a strong enemy of the Assad regime in the process. Beyond military operations, pushing back ISIS and ultimately defeating it also requires simultaneous and coordinated actions. ISIS is not just a military or terrorist group or a state. Airstrikes cannot destroy its informal institutions and disorganized social, political, and economic arrangements. As ISIS's capabilities and infrastructure diminish due to airstrikes, it can politically and ideologically enter the field and present this as the West's unjust war against Islam, potentially strengthening the resilience and resistance of its supporters and fighters. The current approaches of regional and extra-regional countries to combat ISIS are inadequate and have clear weaknesses. ISIS has repeatedly shown that it is adaptable and can adjust to existing conditions. Even after suffering defeats in an operation, it re-emerges with clear flexibility and adaptability or appears in another field. Despite its rigid interpretation of Islam and its brutal actions in its territory, ISIS still has both overt and covert supporters and audiences in the Middle East and beyond. The ideology of ISIS represents pure Islam for its fighters and supporters, and political rivalries and the opinions and beliefs of infidels cannot tarnish it. At the same time, the supporters of this group are not afraid of criticisms from religious scholars, making it difficult to question ISIS's legitimacy from a religious perspective. In the past, ISIS continued to exist as an underground network, and with the experience gained from this, it can survive again if defeated and even utilize its financial and human resources in various locations in the region and beyond, although Western countries are trying to cut off the flow of these resources. Recently, this group has decentralized its network and scattered decision-making centers, considering the allegiance of jihadist groups to ISIS sufficient. This could ensure the survival of ISIS in various forms even with its defeat in Iraq and Syria. Meanwhile, the Middle East environment is also a suitable place for ISIS to continue its existence, as most countries in the region have weak governments and lack the capacity to eradicate terrorist networks and insurgent groups. Despite its strengths in leadership, organization, and tactics, ISIS also has clear weaknesses, including the spread of its fighters over a vast area in Iraq and Syria, internal conflicts between Arab and non-Arab fighters, being landlocked, and irregular financial support. Turkey's active participation in combating ISIS could significantly cut off ISIS's logistical and supply routes and increase its shortcomings. Coalition countries must recognize that ISIS is a serious threat to both regional and extra-regional countries. This group can pose a serious threat to these countries through the terrorist actions of its supporters in the U.S. and Europe. ISIS is responsible for the significant increase in extremism globally. All these concerns should place ISIS at the center of attention for the U.S., especially European countries, necessitating prioritization in combating this threat. In such circumstances, there is hope that leadership and strategy against ISIS will emerge in the international community. The U.S. as a key player and other coalition countries, if they adopt a coherent strategy, have the ability to destroy the overt military organization of ISIS, eliminate its administrative structure, and turn it into an underground group, but the complete destruction of ISIS in the short term will not be feasible. Moreover, the U.S.'s insistence on continuing its approach in Iraq and Syria, which sometimes does not align with the military actions of its allies, will worsen the current situation. The U.S. must acknowledge that its policy in the region has contributed to the emergence of al-Nusra Front and ISIS in Syria. The U.S.'s inaction regarding the Syrian civil war, its blindness to the sectarian policies of Nouri al-Maliki's government in Iraq, and the initial airstrikes in Iraq aimed at assisting Yazidis, Turkmen, and Kurds have fueled the public perception that the U.S. has risen against Sunni Iraqis in cooperation with Iran, thereby strengthening ISIS's position in terms of attracting fighters. Additionally, the U.S. policy towards Syria over the past year has been intertwined with nuclear negotiations with Iran and the success of these negotiations, which is why the U.S. has refrained from providing significant military assistance to opposition groups against the Assad regime. The U.S. has limited its assistance to training and equipping some opposition groups while its allies like Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey have insisted that the U.S. take direct action and prioritize the overthrow of the Assad regime. However, the success of U.S. policy towards ISIS depends on the policies and approaches of its allies in the region. Some regional countries ignore their citizens' contributions to jihadists, and some American experts believe that some of this financial assistance has reached ISIS. Furthermore, Haider al-Abadi, the Prime Minister of Iraq, has not made significant efforts to adopt and implement an inclusive and non-sectarian policy. The fight against ISIS in Iraq is a priority for the U.S., but this approach will not lead anywhere if ISIS is not pushed back in Syria. Eastern Syria is a haven and refuge for ISIS, and this group aids its fighters in Iraq from this area, and without the expulsion of ISIS from this region, securing Iraq will be an illusion. Therefore, it is necessary for the U.S. and other coalition countries to resolve their differences with Arab countries in the region and Turkey and adopt a new strategy to act simultaneously on two fronts against ISIS in Iraq and Syria.