Weaknesses Faced by Iran in Victory Over Aggressors

Iranians expelled the invading Iraqi army from their territory during the eight-year war, but this victory was accompanied by weaknesses. The narratives of Iranians and Iraqis regarding the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) differ significantly. Even among Iranians, there are at least two perspectives: the official narrative of the Islamic Republic and the opposition's narrative, both presenting different accounts of the war. The official literature of the Islamic Republic primarily focuses on victories while ignoring several operations that resulted in defeats. The scope of criticism in this view of the war is also limited, constrained, and conditional. In the perspective of a significant portion of the opposition to the Islamic Republic, the central argument is that the Revolutionary Guards and the popular forces who fought were not trained for war, the military was not given the necessary space to operate, and the war should have ended after the liberation of Khorramshahr. An examination of documents, books, and articles published in Persian and non-Persian languages about the war, as well as the memoirs of Iranian and sometimes Iraqi commanders, analysis of maps and geographical positions, and evaluation of the national capabilities and armed forces of Iran and Iraq before and during the war, along with confronting the claims of victory from both sides, shows that neither of these narratives provides a complete, realistic, fair, and factually accurate account of the battlefield realities. This article, on the occasion of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the beginning of the Iran-Iraq War, attempts to present a third perspective and instead of a note or article, discusses 11 lesser-known points about Iran's weaknesses in the war, a conflict in which Iranians were victorious in the sense that they ultimately expelled the Iraqi invading army from their occupied territory, but they also faced defeats and made mistakes, some of which were strategic, costly, and bloody. 1- An examination of the battlefield during the eight-year Iran-Iraq War shows that neither of the two warring forces was able to capture even one provincial center from the opposing side. Khorramshahr, Bostan, Susangerd, Mehran, Qasr-e Shirin, Faw, and Halabcheh, which were captured by the opposing forces, were not provincial centers. 2- The powerful armed forces of Iran, which had been equipped and trained during the late 1960s and the first seven years of the 1970s, had become a powerful regional army but were severely weakened as a result of a tumultuous 26-month period in 1978, 1979, and 1980. During this time, the Iraqi army was strengthening its military, organizational, and personnel structures. This 26-month period, which began in November 1978 with the deployment of army forces and their tanks to the streets of Iran to confront anti-Shah protests, saw the Shah, as the supporter of this powerful army, effectively contributing to its collapse in the streets. The army, which had practically disintegrated on February 11, 1979, was severely weakened and diminished during the 19 months from February 11, 1979, until the start of the war on September 22, 1980, through a series of actions for which the responsibility ultimately lay with the government led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The powerful armed forces of Iran, which had been equipped and trained during the late 1960s and the first seven years of the 1970s, had become a powerful regional army but were severely weakened as a result of a tumultuous 26-month period in 1978, 1979, and 1980. Executions, forced retirements, or forced migrations of almost all generals and officers of colonel rank and above, the cessation of military maneuvers and exercises, improper maintenance of modern weapons and equipment, the end of military and defense cooperation with powers like the United States and Britain, and even the cancellation of some military purchase contracts, along with the emotional transfer of soldiers and non-commissioned officers to their hometowns, and the discharge of a significant portion of soldiers under service as part of a plan to reduce the duration of military service, all contributed to a shift in the balance of power in favor of the Iraqi army and to the detriment of Iran. This situation may be the main reason for Iraq's attack on Iran. 3- Iraq had a unified command during the war within the government, the Ba'ath Party, the Ministry of Defense, the parliament, and the armed forces, which was embodied in Saddam Hussein as president, head of the Revolutionary Command Council, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In contrast, Iran was in a situation where whispers of the dissolution of its army were heard. Between February 1979 and the start of Abolhassan Banisadr's presidency, there was effectively no commander-in-chief, and Ayatollah Khomeini, as the leader of the revolution, lacked the technical qualifications and time necessary for this position. From the start of Banisadr's presidency in February 1980 until the start of the war in September 1980, and even until June 1981 when Banisadr was removed from his position as president and commander-in-chief, there was effectively a power struggle among Iran's top politicians and statesmen, while the Iraqi army was on the verge of attacking Iran and subsequently invaded and occupied parts of Iranian territory. In 1981, 1982, and 1983, the continued fragmentation of command and the beginning and intensification of disputes between Mohsen Rezai, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, and Colonel Ali Sayad Shirazi, the commander of the army's ground forces, marked the peak of this command split within Iran's main combat forces. Even the appointment of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani as the commander of the war from late 1983 did not fully resolve this issue. Sayad and Rezai had neither full authority nor complete obedience to Rafsanjani, and in some cases, the disputes extended beyond Rafsanjani to Ayatollah Khomeini, who usually recommended that the army and the Revolutionary Guards tolerate each other, albeit with slightly more support for the Guards and addressing their arms requests from the army. The failed Noujeh coup in July 1980, which the opposition to the government calls the national uprising of patriotic officers, contributed to the disintegration of the Iranian army, especially its elite units, including the 92nd Armored Division of Ahvaz, which was tasked with defending against a potential Iraqi invasion in Khuzestan. 4- The failed Noujeh coup in July 1980, which the opposition to the government calls the national uprising of patriotic officers, contributed to the disintegration of the Iranian army, especially its elite units, including the 92nd Armored Division of Ahvaz, which was tasked with defending against a potential Iraqi invasion in Khuzestan. After the coup, the division commander and the commanders of the brigades of this division were arrested, and some officers of the communications branch with the rank of captain were appointed to command armored brigades. In fact, this division was facing a severe command crisis two months before the start of Iraq's attack. 5- The 1979 revolution effectively led to the collapse of Iran's military intelligence structure, including networks for gathering intelligence from within Iraqi territory. Although some military intelligence officers and agents attempted to gather information on Iraqi army movements and transfers in the chaos following the revolution, the Iranian armed forces were organizationally unable to access strategic information about the Iraqi army, which was preparing for an attack on Iran. The limited information available about the Iraqi army's border movements, which was mainly gathered by Iranian gendarmerie posts, was not transmitted systematically to the command hierarchy and the information and operations staff of the general staff of the army. As a result, even a few senior political officials and military commanders in Iran who had suspected an attack by Iraq about one or two months before the invasion had effectively reached the conclusion that it was too late to equip Iran's armed forces and establish a balance of power against the 12 ready divisions of Iraq. Even at this time, there was no consensus among Iranian officials and commanders regarding the seriousness of Iraq's attack. 6- While Iraq was prepared to attack Iran with 12 divisions stationed at the border and a unified command, only a few battalions from the eight divisions of the Iranian army, which had been significantly weakened and diminished as previously mentioned, were stationed near the Iraqi border. Some other battalions were engaged in internal conflicts in Kurdistan, while others were immobilized in the headquarters of their divisions in their respective cities, and even with the start of the war, there was no unified command or decisive authority for the rapid deployment of these divisions to the front lines in the border areas with Iraq. Divisions that were partially dispatched to the border lacked reconnaissance of the conflict axes and, as soon as they disembarked from the train, entered into battle with the invading army. 7- Due to the Islamic Republic's distrust of the army following the revolution, which was exacerbated by the Noujeh coup two months before the start of the war, while Iraq had a unified command, the Iranians arrested, executed, and dismissed commanders of their three armed forces during the war. Due to the Islamic Republic's distrust of the army following the revolution, which was exacerbated by the Noujeh coup two months before the start of the war, while Iraq had a unified command, the Iranians arrested, executed, and dismissed commanders of their three armed forces during the war. Colonel Houshang Sediq, the commander of the air force during the war, was detained under guard in a hospital due to the flight of the head of the air force staff abroad and was subsequently dismissed. Colonel Ali Sayad Shirazi, the most loyal senior officer and commander of the ground forces, was dismissed in 1986 due to the protracted disputes with Mohsen Rezai, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, and Admiral Bahram Afzali, the commander of the Iranian navy, was executed in 1983 on charges of espionage for the Soviet Union. The commanders of Iran's three main combat forces faced this fate while the armed forces were engaged in combat with an external enemy. 8- The new strategy of Mohsen Rezai, the commander of the Revolutionary Guards, in 1987 to open a second front against Iraq in Kurdistan, aimed at reducing the concentration and pressure of the Iraqi army in the southern front, did not yield the desired results. Iraq did not transfer its main units from the south to the Kurdistan front, and when the Iraqi army launched a series of successful attacks in the south in the spring and summer of 1987, Iranian forces on the southern front were insufficient to counter this assault. As a result, Iran retreated from the few areas it had captured in the Halabcheh region and the Darbandikhan dam and attempted to hastily transfer the forces stationed on the Kurdistan front to the south. 9- The existing balance regarding prisoners of war, which was significantly in favor of Iran until the final months of the war, suddenly changed at the end of the war. The Iraqi army, in its four assaults on Faw, Shalamcheh, Talaiyeh, and Hoor, Mousian, and Dehloran, managed to capture thousands of Iranians—estimated at up to twenty thousand soldiers, guards, and Basij members—in just a few days and used them to improve its position in prisoner exchanges. The Iraqi army, in its four assaults on Faw, Shalamcheh, Talaiyeh, and Hoor, Mousian, and Dehloran, managed to capture thousands of Iranians—estimated at up to twenty thousand soldiers, guards, and Basij members—in just a few days and used them to improve its position in prisoner exchanges. 10- The direct presence of commanders of the Revolutionary Guards' combat units at the front lines, disrupting the classic rules of commanders being stationed further from the front, although throughout the years of war was one of the morale-boosting factors for Iranian combat forces and motivated them to fight more effectively, ultimately led to a severe shortage of commanders, especially at the battalion and company levels. At higher levels, this situation, which was also seen as a sign of bravery and sacrifice by commanders, resulted in many commanders of divisions and brigades being killed during the mid-years of the war. The blow that this situation dealt to Iran's combat forces in the later years of the war was such that in the late years of the war, senior Revolutionary Guards commanders stated that even if there were enough Basij and volunteers available to be sent to the front lines, there were not enough battalion and company commanders to lead and organize them. 11- The most significant battleground between Iran and Iraq during the eight-year war should be considered Shalamcheh and the eastern plain of Basra and the northwestern area of Khorramshahr. Despite the major battles fought by both sides in this area, neither achieved a strategic and decisive victory that would lead to the disarmament of the opposing side's will to continue the war. Iraq, in 1980, with the occupation of Khorramshahr and crossing the Karun River, as well as its renewed advance in the last month of the war in this area and reaching the vicinity of Khorramshahr and the Khorramshahr-Ahvaz road, was unable to gain this decisive advantage throughout the war. Iranians, despite successfully conducting Operation Beit al-Muqaddas (the liberation of Khorramshahr) and relatively successful Operation Karbala-5 (in Shalamcheh), were unsuccessful in several other operations in this area, including Ramadan, Karbala-4, Kheibar, and Badr (in Hoor al-Azim and the Majnoon Islands to reach behind the Iraqi front in northern Basra). In fact, neither Iran nor Iraq can claim a decisive victory in the geography and the most important battlefields of the eight-year war.