Why Have They Turned to Demographers This Time?

After the environment, it seems that this time it is the turn of researchers and experts in demography to become new victims of the security and ideological paranoia of the powerful institutions in Iran. Among those arrested is Meimanat Hosseini Chavoshi, an Iranian demographer and researcher at the Public Policy Institute of the National University of Australia, and one of the authors of a research book on "Fertility Trends in Iran" (2009). She is also one of the authors of a comprehensive report titled "Demographic Trends and Status in the Islamic Republic of Iran," published in 2017 by the Strategic Studies Center of the Presidency and the Association of Demographers. This collective research work statistically, analytically, and in detail addresses various aspects of demographic changes and their relationship with society, economy, and the labor market. Newspapers that reported her arrest by the "Unknown Soldiers of the Imam Zaman" at the airport, which usually have access to security files, referred to Ms. Hosseini as an "infiltrator." Although not much data has been published regarding her specific accusations and those of others, the similarity of this approach to what happened to environmental researchers and activists indicates the significant challenges faced by scientific and academic work within an ideological and religious government. Perhaps the public may simply wonder how demography, which deals with statistics and mathematical calculations and is transparent and public everywhere in the world, can be a subject of foreign infiltration, espionage, and sabotage. The answer to this question may lie in the way the officials of the Islamic Republic approach societal changes and their view of science and academia. The Silent Revolution of Demography Demographic changes in Iran have become a subject of conflict and tension between factions within the government and the academic world for several years. Iran's population is now about 80 million (60 million in 1996, 33 million in 1976), and the annual population growth has not exceeded about 1.25 percent, continuing its downward trend over the past three decades, while this index was about 3.7 percent during the decade from 1976 to 1986. This unprecedented growth rate since 1956 has raised many concerns among some officials instead of satisfaction. It should not be forgotten that in the 1960s and 1970s (and later during the 1980s and 1990s), one of the main goals of governments in Iran, like many other developing countries, was to control rapid population growth. This was because desirable economic development and overcoming historical backwardness in various areas of social welfare (universal education, environment, health care, etc.) were impossible with rapid population growth. Comparative studies of demographic changes at the international level also show that countries similar to Iran in various regions of the world have witnessed more or less similar transformations. The results of the eighth national census in 2016 indicate the continuation of structural trends that began in the 1990s in demographic behaviors in Iranian society. This transitional demographic period can rightly be called the silent demographic-social revolution. The Sociological Meaning of Demographic Behaviors The demographic revolution has significant sociological implications as demographic behaviors reflect a new mentality and understanding of social life, family, and gender roles in society. The main signs of this silent demographic revolution are the significant decrease in the average annual population growth rate in Iran and changes in key demographic indicators. In Iran, family sizes have gradually become smaller, the number of births per woman and per family has rapidly decreased, the average age of first marriage has consistently increased, and single living has increasingly become a social reality. The trends of population decline are so significant that even the predicted second population explosion (related to those born in the 1980s) expected for the years 2001-2002 has been very limited. These meaningful changes indicate Iran's transition from a developing society to a society that has matured in terms of demographic behaviors. The decline in the population growth rate has resulted in medium and large families (five or more members) no longer being the main family model, with the average family size decreasing from five members in 1976 to 3.3 members in 2016. Families of five or more members, which constituted about 54 percent of Iranian families in 1976, now make up less than 17 percent in the latest census. Half of the 24 million Iranian families are two or three members. The total fertility rate has also changed from about six children per woman in 1979 to 1.8 children. The consequences of declining fertility include a relative decrease in the young population, which has been an important demographic indicator for Iran over the decades. In the 2016 census, about 10 million individuals aged 20 to 39 (six million men and four million women) were found to be without a formal spouse. These more or less uniform changes clearly indicate structural changes in the mentality and culture of family and individual, as well as the decline of large patriarchal and traditional families in Iranian society. The Ideological Perspective on Demography The issue of population growth in Iran has become an important social and political discussion since the announcement of the results of the 2011 census. New and modern demographic behaviors in Iran have provoked a strong reaction from some government officials. Demographic changes today have become a significant concern for those who criticize the population control policies of the past two decades. Among the persistent opponents of current demographic trends is Ayatollah Khamenei, who has publicly criticized his previous approaches and called for fundamental changes in population policies to encourage women's fertility and increase the number of children. In the past, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad also aligned with Khamenei and spoke of the need to reach a population of 150 or 200 million. However, very few executive officials and those closely involved have echoed this trend. The reason for this is the negative practical consequences of population increase policies in social and economic domains. Despite these internal tensions, the new demographic approach to increase women's fertility has been officially communicated to Rouhani's government by Ayatollah Khamenei. Important Demographic Questions In recent years, experts and researchers, while unable to openly oppose Khamenei's positions, have raised their analyses in various forms or chosen the option of silence. The discussion regarding the future of Iran's population raises important expert questions that are rarely mentioned in the context of government censorship, the propaganda of official institutions, and government media. The first question pertains to Iran's actual population capacity considering the environmental, economic, and social conditions of the country. The next question relates to the specifics and urgency of the demographic danger (aging, risk of not replacing generations, and negative population growth) that proponents of increased fertility speak of. Another question could be about the effectiveness of incentive policies and the real possibility of returning to a period of rapid population growth and changing demographic behaviors in Iran. It can also be asked whether adopting a policy of increasing population at any cost has detrimental consequences. Finally, can it be said that those who today cry "Oh, the population!" are more worried about something else than the population of Iran and its future? A re-examination of what Khamenei and his allies say about demographic issues shows that criticism of changes in the culture and demographic behaviors of Iranian society is motivated, among other things, by ideological concerns. What the silent demographic revolution has brought about is a fundamental transformation in the status of family, gender roles in society, and a refusal to reduce women to the roles of mothers and wives. The preface that Khamenei wrote for the book "Demographic Trends and Status in the Islamic Republic of Iran" clearly reflects this perspective. Contrary to the analyses in this report and without referring to the current disordered state of Iran's population in terms of welfare and human resource development, he has called for lowering the age of marriage, increasing births, promoting the culture of parenting, and Islamic lifestyle. Another reason cited for the population increase policy is Iran's geopolitical position as a Shia country in the region. In the imagination and dreams of some officials, there is a delusion that the greatness and influence of the Islamic Republic have a demographic dimension, and a 120 million Iran will dominate regional geopolitics. Desired Population: Quality or Quantity? The fundamental question regarding population growth in Iran or any other country in the world is the relationship between population quantity and quality. In other words, does having a large but poor and ineffective population also bring power and geopolitical influence to a country? To assess the quality of the population and human resources in Iran, one can refer to well-known indicators used internationally in areas such as health, education, human resources, and social welfare. In the UN reports from the years following 2008, Iran ranks between 80 and 88 in the world regarding human development (2017). Examining the labor market and the educational system may provide good examples for this discussion. 25 percent of Iranian adolescents leave the educational system before completing compulsory education, and some of them become child laborers (about 1.5 million), with street children being just the tip of the iceberg of this significant social problem. The crisis in Iran's labor market and the high unemployment rate among young people, especially graduates of higher education, is another example of the government's failure to meet the needs of modern society. Economic recession, chaos, and managerial incapacity, along with the slow modernization of various economic sectors and inefficiency among parts of the active population, have led Iran to face pathological forms of unemployment and underemployment, especially among higher education graduates and women. The widespread emigration of skilled human resources and brain drain abroad, which has led to the impoverishment of domestic human resources, is one of the consequences of this disordered situation. Environmental and Population Crisis Another aspect that can be examined regarding Iran's actual population capacity is the environmental situation and the water crisis. Over thirty years of mismanagement and widespread chaos in the use of natural resources in a country located in a global dry belt have placed Iran in a very fragile position. According to scientific estimates, currently, 35 percent of the country has an extremely dry climate, and 29 percent is in a dry climate (in total, 65 percent) (UNEP, 1997), and its rainfall does not exceed one-third of the global average. Alongside drought, one of the significant reasons for the damage to Iran's ecosystem is the excessive use of groundwater and rivers beyond permissible limits. Water scarcity or the drying of Lake Urmia and several other small lakes or important historical wetlands and rivers like Zayandeh Rud has occurred due to environmental chaos and excessive exploitation of natural resources. The deep environmental crisis has become one of the significant factors for internal migration and migration between provinces in Iran, meaning that in the coming years, some provinces will become depopulated, and other regions will have to cope with a migrant population, which itself can exacerbate the environmental crisis. What has happened to Iran's environment raises the important question of what nature and environment will remain for future generations if the current trend continues. What effects will population growth of any magnitude have on the environmental situation in Iran, and how will the current and future generations overcome the water crisis? Some may argue that optimal management can overcome Iran's environmental problems. Other countries with difficult climatic conditions have managed to serve their populations intelligently. The problem for Iran is that it has failed its great environmental and social test and has left behind a disastrous record. Those who advocate for increasing fertility and population do not mention the environmental situation, social crises, the disordered state of social welfare, or human resource problems. While the desired population level is a subject that every country should reach some kind of public consensus on based on current and future social and economic data. Decision-making for Future Generations? In such a situation, what rational justification is there for making decisions on behalf of future generations and calling for increased fertility? How can one claim the right to decide for future generations when the current young population does not have a desirable life, opportunities, or a bright future? With what water reserves and environmental resources is the additional future population supposed to be accommodated in Iran? Those who speak of a population capacity of 120 or 150 million for Iran must demonstrate how this population will have access to minimum education, work, and social welfare and how the environment of Iran will accommodate double the current population. The current generation of government officials, due to all their failures and past shortcomings, lacks the necessary competence and legitimacy to make decisions on behalf of future generations. The current generation's duty is perhaps more than anything to repair the damages and strive to improve the quality of the environment, human resources, and social welfare to leave a country with a healthier environment and an acceptable level of development for future generations in today's world. The Ideological War of Religion Against Science and Rationality Now, if we return to the initial question of the article, we may find traces of the reasons for dissatisfaction.