Will Executions Decrease in Iran?

On Saturday, October 10, coinciding with the World Day Against the Death Penalty, the issue of executions has increasingly become a sensitive topic at various social and political levels in Iran. The high number of execution victims in Iran is consistently highlighted in lists of human rights violations. Ahmad Shahid, the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in Iran, has explicitly pointed out this issue and raised concerns about the alarming number of executions in the country. Beyond the accused and condemned individuals anxiously awaiting their turn, and irrespective of the dire conditions of their families, it seems that the top echelons of the Islamic Republic's judiciary are also, for various reasons, attempting to reduce the number of executions in the country. This is particularly relevant given the high percentage of executions related to drug offenses, which has taken on a new dimension. According to official statistics, in recent years, between 60 to 80 percent of executions in Iran have been related to drug offenses. In the spring of last year (1393), Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, then Attorney General and current Deputy of the Judiciary, made a significant and thought-provoking statement, saying, 'Unfortunately, the high number of executions in our country is related to drug trafficking and serious crimes associated with this vile phenomenon. If we can amend existing laws in a way that allows intelligence agencies to punish major leads in these trafficking networks severely and reconsider the rest, the system's objectives regarding drugs will be better achieved.' Ejei indirectly indicated the judiciary's sensitivity and response to the rising number of executions, as well as global human rights protests regarding this issue: 'Iran has shown self-sacrifice and dedication in its fight against drugs, which primarily target European countries, and suffers millions of dollars in losses, but instead of encouragement and cooperation, we are subjected to human rights attacks.' The spokesperson for the judiciary also emphasized that 'the second highest rank of executions in the country relates to Qisas (retribution)', attempting to point out the possibility of pardon and forgiveness alongside Qisas; in other words, emphasizing the judiciary's necessity to execute the requests of the victims' families for Qisas: 'The sacred street has granted the right to the heirs of the deceased to request Qisas, but it has also recommended them to pardon and forgive, and this is an aspect that needs more work both domestically and internationally.' He also added that 'the priority of the Islamic system is to encourage the heirs of the deceased to pardon and forgive.' In December of last year (1393), the Deputy of the Tehran Judiciary made significant remarks, stating that 'the vast majority of executions in our country are related to drug traffickers, and as long as the law does not change, there will be no change, and this requires legislative work.' This senior judicial official of the Islamic Republic (Hamidreza Adabi) added: 'In drug-related cases, there is the possibility of converting punishments, and these punishments are convertible and changeable.' The Human Rights Headquarters of the Judiciary has also, in some of its statements and official positions, clearly attempted to reduce the sensitivity of international organizations regarding the number of executions in the Islamic Republic by referring to the very important issue of drug trafficking and Iran's transit route. At that time, Mohammad Javad Larijani, the secretary of the aforementioned headquarters, also stated in an interview with a Western media outlet that 'no one wants the number of executions to be high. This is a tragic issue that we witness a large number of executions related to drug crimes under the current law. We are trying to change this law, and if we succeed in passing this law in parliament, then eighty percent of executions will be eliminated.' Some gradual changes (including those realized in the new Code of Criminal Procedure that came into effect in July 1394) have created hopes for reducing death sentences. According to this law, in heavy verdicts, the opinion of three judges is required, and subsequently, it is the Supreme Court that, after appeals and requests for reconsideration, will finalize the verdict. This process could mean a reduction in the number of death sentences. Bahman Keshavarz, a lawyer and president of the Iranian Bar Association, considers the new criminal procedure law to have 'many positive innovations' that, of course, should 'try to eliminate and resolve existing weaknesses.' Emadeddin Baghi, a human rights activist, also believes: 'The implementation of these resolutions is a step forward and can be a precursor to presenting and passing a bill to abolish the death penalty for drug offenders, so that with the gradual elimination of this punishment, better laws can be promised.' On a different level, the death penalty is intertwined with the cases of some political, ideological, and security defendants. Regardless of what occurred in the 1980s (which involved the execution of thousands of political opponents in illegal courts); in recent years, there have also been numerous tragic cases of executions of political and ideological prisoners. The execution of Farzad Kamangar (a Kurdish teacher) and four others (including Shirin Alam-Hooli) in May 2010 on charges of membership and collaboration with armed opposition groups against the Islamic Republic is a well-known example. These executions occurred during the massive protests against the official results of the 2009 elections, which faced severe reactions (including strong criticism from Mousavi and Karroubi, leaders of the Green Movement). Other notable cases include the executions of Ali Sarami (January 2010) and Gholamreza Khosravi (June 2014), on charges of Moharebeh (waging war against God) and collaboration with the People's Mojahedin Organization. The execution of 16 individuals in Zahedan prison (November 2013) following the killing of a group of Iranian border guards is another well-known case. The public prosecutor and revolutionary prosecutor of Zahedan emphasized the retaliatory nature of the executions and referred to previous 'warnings', stating: 'In response to the martyrdom of border guards in Saravan County, we executed 16 individuals connected to anti-regime groups.' The execution of Mohsen Amir Aslani (October 2014) on charges of apostasy and heresy in religion and insulting prophets (his different interpretation of the story of the drowning of Prophet Jonah) is also a controversial and bitter case. The issuance of a death sentence for Soheil A'rabi, an active citizen on online social networks on charges of 'insulting the sacred and cursing the Prophet', and the announcement of a death sentence for Mohammad Ali Taheri on charges of apostasy and corruption on earth, a teacher and founder of a mystical circle, are two other well-known and recent cases. In addition to these, several dozen other citizens are under the threat of death sentences on various charges (security, ideological, and political). Shahram Ahmadi is among a group of Sunni prisoners who are in such a situation on charges of Moharebeh and actions against national security and collaboration with anti-regime groups. The ongoing ambiguity and concern regarding these matters are significant evidence of the Islamic Republic's judicial system's abuse of the death penalty against 'others' and dissenters and political and ideological opponents. A ruling whose execution or non-execution, beyond a legal and judicial framework, has a political and security dimension, placing human lives as a plaything in the hands of hardliners dominating security and judicial institutions. What is noteworthy about all these rulings is the failure to adhere to constitutional emphases regarding the basic rights of defendants and the gross violation of the requirements for fair and public trials with the presence of a lawyer, by the Revolutionary Court and the security institutions of the Islamic Republic. Although the new round of relations between Iran and the West may compel the core of power in the Islamic Republic to implement adjustments regarding the execution of political and ideological defendants, concerns about human rights remain valid given the dominance of hardliners over security and judicial institutions.