10 Reasons Why the Upcoming Parliamentary Elections Are Important for Leadership Appointments

On March 7, elections for the Iranian Parliament and the Assembly of Experts are set to take place. Until now, these elections have been deemed insignificant by the public and political forces, as they consider them to be entirely subordinate to the Leader. However, this election cycle has become a significant issue, overshadowing the simultaneous parliamentary elections to some extent. What is the reason for this? The first reason is the widespread rumors regarding the severe illness of Ayatollah Khamenei and the possibility of his death. In this case, the next Assembly of Experts will have to choose his successor. Ayatollah Khamenei has instructed the Assembly of Experts to consider several potential candidates. They have done so and stated that they will only share the names with Ayatollah Khamenei. Undoubtedly, Ayatollah Khamenei will play a more significant role than anyone else in choosing his successor. The second reason is the absolute and unaccountable power of Ayatollah Khamenei. Some, like Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, intend to change the composition of the Assembly of Experts and bring in younger and different forces (for example, Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini) to put Ayatollah Khamenei and his institutions under supervision through the future Assembly of Experts. Although the Assembly of Experts requires 88 representatives, unlike previous periods, 801 individuals have registered as candidates in this cycle—nine times the required number—of which 16 are women. Conservatives consider Hashemi's plan to be an enemy plot pursued by their infiltrators in the regime. Despite the extreme conservatives launching severe attacks on Hashemi regarding the issue of oversight over the leadership, Ayatollah Khamenei stated on March 9, 2001, that 'the leadership itself is not above oversight; let alone the institutions related to the leadership... because governance naturally means the accumulation of power and wealth... it is a necessary and obligatory task and must be.' The third reason relates to the power struggle within the Islamic Republic. The power struggle between conservatives and reformists has now extended to a power struggle with forces that consider themselves moderates—such as Hashemi Rafsanjani, Hassan Rouhani, etc. They constantly repeat the claim that Hassan Rouhani and his allies consider the U.S. to be the 'global village chief' that must be reached an agreement with. The extreme conservatives in the parliament say that the nuclear agreement, which poses many threats to the country, was the first step and that the U.S. 'is seeking to turn all issues into a JCPOA-like situation.' The fourth reason is that Hashemi Rafsanjani has long spoken about 'collectivizing the leadership.' Although the constitution was amended in the last months of Ayatollah Khomeini's life and at the beginning of Ayatollah Khamenei's leadership, removing the collectivization of leadership, Hashemi Rafsanjani has continuously raised this issue, stating that he and Ayatollah Khamenei agreed on the collectivization of leadership when choosing a successor for Ayatollah Khomeini, but the majority of the Assembly of Experts did not accept this opinion. However, there is a possibility for collectivization of leadership in the future. Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, in a sharp message on December 18, 2015, considered Hashemi's plan to be a 'new trick' of the enemies to destroy the unity of the country and the system, and to create a multi-voiced leadership and command of the armed forces. He then added that throughout history and the world, we have not witnessed a collective leadership and command of the armed forces. The fifth reason is that with the nomination of new individuals who have disagreements with Ayatollah Khamenei and conservatives, the Guardian Council will have to disqualify them, and this action will not be without cost. The Guardian Council will certainly disqualify many on various pretexts. Hashemi Rafsanjani stated on December 20, 2015, that the elections for the Assembly of Experts must be cleaner than the parliamentary elections, as Iran's security depends on this, rather than the Guardian Council disqualifying rivals in a 'gang-like' manner to bring the Experts into 'the monopoly of conservatives.' If exclusion or fraud occurs, the result will be 'unacceptable' for the majority of the people, 'it will damage the system,' and 'they will disrupt the stability of the country in a short-sighted manner.' Making the people 'suspicious' of the electoral process in the current conditions is 'dangerous.' Ayatollah Jannati—the Secretary of the Guardian Council, who is primarily responsible for excluding opponents and rivals through 'supervisory oversight'—in response to Hashemi Rafsanjani and other critics of the disqualification of candidates by the Guardian Council, attempted to portray this objection as an American program. In his Friday prayer on December 25, he falsely claimed that he had told the Americans to eliminate the Guardianship of the Jurist and that to eliminate the Guardianship of the Jurist, one must attack the 'supervisory oversight' of the Guardian Council, which protects the Guardianship of the Jurist. Although Fukuyama had made mistakes and mistakenly thought that the Guardian Council was the same as the Assembly of Experts, Khamenei is the head of the Guardian Council, and this council is capable of dismissing the leader; nevertheless, he had not said anything about the 'supervisory oversight' of the Guardian Council. The sixth reason is that Ayatollah Khamenei, by raising the issue of enemy infiltrators after the nuclear agreement, has given his followers the tool to expel, eliminate, and suppress opponents under the titles of American, British, and Israeli infiltrators. Mohammad Reza Naqdi—the head of the Basij—stated on December 17, 2015, that 'America is so close to infiltrating that it might hold Friday prayers.' Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi—the head of the Assembly of Experts, the head of the Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary, and a member of the Guardian Council that disqualifies candidates—stated on the same day that students should not accept English money. Mohseni Ejei—the first deputy of the judiciary—on December 20, 2015, called Hashemi Rafsanjani a hypocrite who speaks the words of America and takes pride in relations with enemies. He then said, 'I promise that with your help, Basijis, we will identify the hypocrites and infiltrators and bring them to the harshest punishment.' Thus, rivals and critics become the infiltrators of the enemies. The seventh reason is that military commanders of the IRGC explicitly express their views on the inclination that should prevail in the future Assembly of Experts, indicating their sense of danger. Major General Mohsen Rezaei stated on December 25, 2015, that America 'is seeking to infiltrate the elections and bring liberal-minded individuals to power and, in the matter of the Experts, wishes to weaken the leadership institution by raising issues like collective leadership and such matters.' Major General Rahim Safavi stated on December 26, 2015, that the members of the future Assembly of Experts should be individuals who stood revolutionarily against the student protests of 1999 and the Green Movement of 2009. The eighth reason is that this election seems to be intertwined with the fate of Hashemi Rafsanjani. He was the most powerful figure in the first decade of the revolution after Ayatollah Khomeini. He ran for president in the 2013 elections, and the Guardian Council disqualified him. Several possibilities are raised about him: a) disqualification by the Guardian Council, b) house arrest (like Ayatollah Montazeri, Engineer Mousavi, and Mehdi Karroubi), c) victory in the elections and regaining the presidency of the Assembly of Experts, d) victory in the elections and leading the minority of the Experts. If Hashemi, Hassan Khomeini, and Hassan Rouhani are approved, they will present a nationwide list for the entire country, with their photos and names at the top. In this case, extreme conservatives will lose. Khamenei and conservatives may be forced to disqualify Hashemi and Hassan Khomeini to prevent this risk. The ninth reason is that domestic opponents, considering the regional situation and the disastrous experiences of Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, do not want Iran to fall into the same horrific situation. They have come to a consensus to participate in the elections and pursue a gradual path of reforms towards democracy. They believe that in the upcoming elections, they will take one more small step forward. That is, even if they do not win, they may at least be able to push the extreme conservative forces aside through the elections. In this case, just as the election of Hassan Rouhani brought significant achievements in foreign policy with the nuclear agreement, perhaps the upcoming elections will also lead to small achievements domestically, contrary to the wishes of Ayatollah Khamenei and his followers. The tenth reason is that Western governments are also closely following the news of Ayatollah Khamenei's illness, and it is very important for them who will succeed him. Will Khamenei's successor have similar views about the West and Western governments? If the composition of the Assembly of Experts changes, will there be pressure on Khamenei to reform his views and change his positions?