1395: A Year with the JCPOA

As 1394 came to an end, about three months had passed since the implementation of the JCPOA. This nuclear agreement was reached a few months earlier in July 1394 between Iran and the P5+1 group. Although both sides considered reaching the nuclear agreement a success, no one expected the path ahead to be smooth and without ups and downs. The year 1395, and its 365 days, testified to this. The JCPOA, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, is a disarmament agreement under which Iran imposed extensive limitations on its nuclear program, and the other side lifted sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. We will review the nuclear domain and the implementation of the JCPOA from this perspective. Iran's commitments: Based on the JCPOA, Iran has undertaken several actions regarding its nuclear program. Among other things, it disabled thousands of its active centrifuges, maintained uranium enrichment at 3.67 percent, or what is referred to as low-enriched uranium, and undertook actions to redesign the Arak heavy water facility. Iran also voluntarily began implementing the Additional Protocol, which allows for greater access for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran's nuclear facilities. This protocol must be ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly within a maximum of eight years after the JCPOA is reached. The IAEA, the most important international body responsible for nuclear issues, was mandated by the P5+1 to continuously review and report on Iran's actions. The agency states that it has increased its human resources by 120 percent to monitor Iran's program. The agency's reports on the implementation of the JCPOA generally concluded that Iran has adhered to its commitments. However, in two reporting periods, the issue of heavy water reserves exceeding the permissible limit of 130 tons became problematic. Earlier in 1394, the U.S. purchased a several-ton shipment from Iran, which became a controversial issue in U.S. politics. At that time, Mark Fitzpatrick, Executive Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Washington, told Radio Farda: "Iran has no need to continue producing heavy water for the U.S. to feel obligated to buy it, and Congress members say the U.S. should no longer make this purchase; the U.S. has made no commitment in this regard, but if Iran continues production and exceeds the limit, who will buy it?" Fitzpatrick's prediction came true, and Iran faced challenges in exporting heavy water, leading to its reserves exceeding the permissible limit, which the agency recorded in its reports. In November 1395, Yukiya Amano warned about this issue at an IAEA Board of Governors meeting. Since then, Iran has addressed this issue. At that time, even U.S. officials emphasized that Iran was seeking to resolve the problem, and according to the U.S. State Department spokesperson, it was significant that Iran had not hidden this issue from the IAEA. Following these warnings, Iran exported its surplus heavy water, including to Oman, and Iranian officials stated that some Europeans were also interested in purchasing this material. Heavy water itself is not dangerous but can be used in a reactor that produces plutonium, which can be used in the production of nuclear weapons. A recent IAEA report, a few weeks before the end of 1395, indicated that Iran had complied with its commitments and that its uranium and heavy water reserves had not exceeded the limits. The commitments of the P5+1: However, the other side of the nuclear agreement involves the implementation of commitments by the counterpart, which included the lifting of sanctions related to the nuclear program. Actions by the six world powers in this regard began months before the JCPOA's implementation and took effect on the day of execution. However, Iran's return to the international economy, growth in investment in various industries, and the willingness of major international banks to cooperate with Iran did not proceed as quickly as expected in Iran. Throughout 1395, numerous criticisms were raised in this regard, including from Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, who criticized both the speed of lifting sanctions in the summer and hinted at the officials of Hassan Rouhani's government. The Supreme Leader's criticism and that of some other officials, particularly conservatives, accused the U.S. of reneging on its commitments while the U.S. had also taken several confidence-building measures in this regard, being the country that imposed the most sanctions. John Kerry, the then Secretary of State, held meetings and discussions with major banks and investors, and the U.S. Treasury Department attempted to clarify the situation regarding cooperation with Iran. Richard Nephew, a former U.S. negotiator on sanctions with Iran, stated that the U.S. government had acted sufficiently in this regard, and although it was important, there was currently a lack of guidance and statements, and banks were reluctant to take steps. Nephew added, "Only Iran can convince banks that the risk is worth it and that there are benefits they can gain from trading with Iran. This will happen over time. I think Iran has significantly harmed its position in this regard. Any statement from the Treasury has coincided with missile tests by Iran or hostile statements against Saudi Arabia. Regardless of whether these actions are right or wrong, the issue is that if you are an international bank, you do not see this situation as stable, and there are not many banks willing to get involved in such a situation." Alongside this atmosphere that Nephew referred to, several other challenges were highlighted by analysts throughout the past year. One was that Iran still faced U.S. primary sanctions that were not related to the nuclear issue. These sanctions limited Iran's use of the dollar in its international transactions. Another problem was Iran's banking system, which Iran sought to improve over the past year, including reaching agreements with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to upgrade standards to eventually remove Iran from the FATF blacklist. This government action faced severe criticism within Iran, with some comparing it to the Treaty of Turkmenchay. However, during the same year, with the lifting of sanctions, Iran increased its oil exports, signed multiple investment agreements in various fields, and, among other things, the U.S. issued licenses for the sale of passenger aircraft from Boeing and Airbus based on the JCPOA. Iran remains dissatisfied with this situation. This atmosphere was exacerbated by the extension of the U.S. sanctions law against Iran, known as the ISA. Although then-President Barack Obama refrained from signing this law, Iranians strongly criticized its extension, stating that if this law were ever implemented, it would violate the JCPOA. The year 1395 ended with a new government in Washington, and Donald Trump, the President of the United States, considers the JCPOA one of the worst agreements the U.S. has negotiated. As a result, doubts have arisen about the future implementation of the JCPOA. Although the promise made during the presidential campaign by Mr. Trump to tear up the agreement on the first day was not fulfilled, senior officials of the new government have emphasized that the JCPOA is under review. Iran has repeatedly stated that this is not a bilateral agreement that the U.S. can unilaterally abandon. Other countries in the P5+1 group have also emphasized this issue. Federica Mogherini, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs, after visiting the U.S. and meeting with officials of the new government, stated that she received assurances that the U.S. would adhere to its commitments in this regard. Although some analysts say that U.S. adherence does not mean that the previous administration's flexible approach will continue. This opinion comes from Dennis Ross, a former special advisor to Hillary Clinton on Middle Eastern and Southwest Asian affairs at the U.S. State Department: "For example, if the missile issue arises, sanctions may be imposed. Because the Security Council has asked Iran not to test ballistic missiles under Resolution 2231. Well, Iran says the resolution talks about ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons, and our goal is not that, so we can test. But the truth is that they are testing ballistic missiles that have the range and capability to carry nuclear weapons. As a result, since the resolution has asked them not to do this, we must work with the other countries in the P5+1 that negotiated the nuclear agreement with Iran to impose sanctions for this behavior." The U.S. adopted a hardline approach in the first weeks of Donald Trump's presidency. In Bahman, following a missile test by Iran, the U.S. Treasury Department placed 25 individuals and entities on its sanctions list, and Michael Flynn, Trump's former national security advisor, issued a formal warning regarding Iran's behavior. Now, it will be the year 1396 that will determine how the continuation of the nuclear agreement will unfold.