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20% Decline in Iran-EU Trade; Imports from Russia Doubled

Jan 25, 2026 January 25, 2026 3 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

Iran's non-oil trade with the EU has declined by 20% in the first half of 2018, with exports down 2% and imports down 19%. In contrast, imports from Russia have doubled, likely due to an oil-for-goods trade agreement. This shift highlights Iran's increasing reliance on Russia amid ongoing U.S. sanctions.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: Iran's trade with the EU is declining while its reliance on Russia is increasing, reflecting the impact of U.S. sanctions.

👥 Key Players

Iranian Government MENTIONED
Regulator and facilitator of trade
"The Iranian government plays a crucial role in shaping trade policies and responding to international sanctions."
European Union MENTIONED
Major trading partner
"The EU has historically been a significant market for Iranian goods, particularly oil, and its trade relations are affected by sanctions."
Russia MENTIONED
Emerging trading partner
"Russia has become a key ally for Iran, especially in the context of U.S. sanctions, and is involved in oil-for-goods trade agreements."
United States MENTIONED
Imposer of sanctions
"U.S. sanctions significantly impact Iran's economy and trade relations, particularly with the EU."

📰 What Happened

Iran's non-oil trade with the EU has decreased by 20% in the first half of 2018, while imports from Russia have doubled due to an oil-for-goods agreement. This reflects Iran's shifting trade dynamics amid ongoing U.S. sanctions.

  • Iran's exports to the EU fell by 2% to $636 million, while imports dropped by 19% to $4.473 billion.
  • Iran's imports from Russia have doubled, reaching $633 million in the same period.

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: The decline in trade with the EU highlights Iran's increasing economic isolation and reliance on alternative partners like Russia.
🌍 Regional: This shift may strengthen Iran-Russia ties, potentially altering regional power dynamics and economic dependencies.
🌐 International: The situation underscores the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions in reshaping global trade patterns and alliances.

📚 Background

Iran's economy has been heavily affected by U.S. sanctions, leading to a search for new trading partners, particularly in the wake of reduced European engagement.

U.S. sanctions on Iran Iran-Russia relations
📡 Source: NEUTRAL
📊 Confidence: 70%
The article references official statistics and reputable news sources, providing a balanced view of the trade situation.

Official statistics from Iran indicate a 20% decline in non-oil trade with the European Union during the first half of the year 1397 (2018). The latest monthly statistics from the Iran Trade Development Organization published on its official website show that Iran's exports to the EU decreased by 2% and imports from the EU dropped by 19%. Iran's exports to Europe in the first six months of this year amounted to $636 million, while imports from the EU reached $4.473 billion. Except for Austria, Switzerland, and Spain, imports from all major European trading partners have decreased. According to international statistics, such as those from the International Energy Agency, Iran's crude oil exports to Europe have nearly halved in recent months due to the reimposition of U.S. sanctions. Last year, Iran exported an average of about 700,000 barrels of oil to Europe and Turkey. Reuters reported on October 15 that no oil from Iran has reached the EU for the month of October. Official Iranian statistics do not include crude oil, gas, and petroleum products, but many crude oil products such as gas condensates, propane, butane, and asphalt are included in the non-oil export basket, which significantly contributes to what Iran claims as non-oil exports. Statistics from the Trade Development Organization show that total Iranian exports (including gas condensates, which are a type of ultra-light crude oil) grew by about 13% in the first half of this year, reaching $23.123 billion. Imports also decreased by 12%, falling to $22.182 billion. While imports from many of Iran's major trading partners such as China, the UAE, South Korea, India, Germany, Turkey, etc., have declined, Tehran's imports from Russia have doubled. This may be attributed to the oil-for-goods trade between Iran and Russia, which has been in effect since November 2017. Over the past year, Iran has delivered 100,000 barrels of oil to Russia daily. Alexander Novak, the Russian Energy Minister, announced two weeks ago that Russia has continuously purchased Iranian oil since November of last year and does not intend to halt this transaction due to U.S. sanctions. Russia is the second-largest oil exporter in the world after Saudi Arabia. Total non-oil bilateral trade between Iran and Russia in the first half of this year reached $633 million, making Russia the ninth-largest exporter of goods to Iran. Iran's non-oil exports to Russia are minimal, and this country does not appear on the list of Iran's top 20 export destinations. A significant point in the non-oil export statistics is the 46% decline in Iran's gas condensate exports. In the first half of this year, Iran had daily gas condensate exports of about 215,000 barrels. This decline is attributed to the commissioning of two phases of the Persian Gulf Star Refinery, which has a processing capacity of 240,000 barrels of gas condensates and produces gasoline and diesel. Iran plans to launch the third phase of this refinery, with a capacity of 120,000 barrels of gas condensates, in the coming months. Despite the increase in non-oil exports, the targeted plan set by the Islamic Republic for the first half of the year has achieved about 75%. Sources: Trade Development Organization, Sputnik News Agency, Reuters, Iranian Ministry of Oil.

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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