20 Years of the Iranian Nuclear File: From the Foreign Ministry to Khamenei's Appointees

More than 20 years ago, in October 2003, the concept of the Islamic Republic's nuclear file emerged in the political landscape. At that time, Hassan Rouhani, the then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council under President Khatami, was responsible for pursuing negotiations; a new development that subsequently became a constant topic in electoral competitions and remains a key indicator for evaluating politicians' promises and performances in Iran. In those years, Rouhani, with the help of Foreign Ministry diplomats like Mohammad Javad Zarif and Hossein Mousavian, managed the first round of nuclear talks and was able to reach agreements with the European troika in Brussels, Paris, and Tehran over about two years. However, the durability of those agreements was not long, and pressures from George W. Bush's administration and opposition from figures like John Bolton, the then U.S. Ambassador to the UN, and Dick Cheney, the Vice President of the United States, ultimately dashed all hopes for resolving the Iranian nuclear file. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, and many expected a radical change in the Islamic Republic's foreign and nuclear policy even before his election victory. During his presidency, with slogans like 'calling UN resolutions scraps of paper' and emphasizing that 'nuclear energy is our inalienable right,' he opened a new chapter in Iran's nuclear program and the global perspective on this issue. During those years, global sanctions were imposed against Iran, and the Islamic Republic's nuclear program developed at an unprecedented pace. However, the responsibility for nuclear negotiations remained with the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, just as it had under Khatami. Initially, Ali Larijani engaged in talks with Mohamed ElBaradei, the then Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and Javier Solana, the then High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the European Union. Larijani presented his famous 'modalities' in discussions with Western countries but ultimately resigned after about two years due to disagreements with Ahmadinejad, without achieving success. After Larijani, Saeed Jalili, appointed as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council by the President, held the responsibility for nuclear negotiations with global powers for about six years. During those years, global sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions were imposed one after another against Iran, while, as senior U.S. negotiators Wendy Sherman and William Burns write in their memoirs, Jalili was philosophizing and lecturing about the values of Islam and the history of East-West struggles during negotiations. Although Abbas Araghchi, as one of the Foreign Ministry diplomats, was present alongside Jalili in the talks, the primary responsibility remained with the Supreme National Security Council, and the Foreign Ministry under Manouchehr Mottaki did not play a direct role in those efforts. The transfer of nuclear negotiations to the Foreign Ministry occurred when Hassan Rouhani, who had initiated the nuclear talks, won the election in 2013 with slogans like 'unlocking the nuclear file with its key' and 'turning the country's economy while spinning the centrifuges.' One of his first actions was to appoint Zarif as Foreign Minister and entrust him with the nuclear file. From that point on, for the first time in a decade, the Supreme National Security Council was sidelined regarding the nuclear file, and Zarif and his colleagues engaged in discussions with their American and European counterparts in Lausanne, Geneva, Vienna, and New York to resolve disputes and reach agreements on Iran's nuclear program. About two years after this team began its work, Iran and the P5+1 reached an agreement on the 'Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action' or JCPOA in the summer of 2015. However, that agreement, like the earlier one during Khatami's presidency, did not last long; although five global powers and Iran are still nominally part of the JCPOA on paper, after Donald Trump's decision in 2018 to withdraw the U.S. from the agreement, practically nothing remained of what Iranian and Western officials had boasted about and spoke of as making the world safer. The situation of Iran in the fifth year after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, negotiations to revive the JCPOA under Rouhani and Shamkhani. However, the Trump administration's tenure was only slightly longer than the JCPOA, and in 2020 Joe Biden came to power, criticizing the previous administration's decision regarding the nuclear agreement with Iran. Since then, Biden has attempted to return the U.S. to the JCPOA by forming a team on this issue; efforts that remain fruitless to this day. However, on the Iranian side, the responsibility for those discussions has remained with the Foreign Ministry, both in the final months of Rouhani's government and in the incomplete three-year term of Ibrahim Raisi's administration. During all these periods, especially during Rouhani's time, some government officials complained about the sabotage of the revival of the JCPOA by certain other officials; complaints that were directed not only at the perennial opponents of any interaction with the West but sometimes specifically referred to senior officials, particularly Ali Shamkhani, the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Mahmoud Vaezi, the head of the President's office during Rouhani's second term, recently stated in an interview with the Etemad newspaper: 'The general line in the Supreme National Security Council and the Secretary himself was that the JCPOA should not be signed and then not revived.' In line with those policies, a media outlet was also launched that created issues by publishing materials citing informed sources. Vaezi, who remains close to Rouhani, further noted that if Shamkhani had aligned with the government, the JCPOA might have been revived. He also revealed that Rouhani had attempted to dismiss Shamkhani five or six times, but due to Ali Khamenei's opposition, this did not happen. Returning to the council or a more prominent role for Khamenei's appointees? In Ibrahim Raisi's government, although the government's focus and attention on reviving the JCPOA were less, the Foreign Ministry still held the responsibility for pursuing the issue. In this context, there was no longer any participation from the Foreign Minister himself in this process, and Ali Bagheri Kani, the political deputy of Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, sat across from Western diplomats in Vienna, Tehran, Doha, and Muscat to discuss what Raisi's government insisted on calling 'sanctions-lifting negotiations.' However, over the past three years, there has been no change in the status of Iran's nuclear program, and both parties remain at the same point they reached in the summer of 2021, just before the end of Rouhani's government. Meanwhile, during this time, Iran managed to resolve one of its main regional issues, namely relations with Saudi Arabia, somewhat quietly, sidelining the Foreign Ministry and with the involvement of Ali Shamkhani, the then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council. Now, following the sudden death of Ibrahim Raisi, several conservative media outlets and journalists in the Foreign Ministry in Iran have reported on the transfer of responsibility for nuclear negotiations to Shamkhani; the military general who now has no responsibility in the Supreme National Security Council and whose only government position is as a political advisor to Ali Khamenei. The publication of this rumor was met with a response from the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Nasser Kanani, the spokesperson for this ministry, stated on Monday, May 27, regarding this matter: 'The tradition of the Foreign Ministry is not to comment on rumors in cyberspace and baseless reports. The sanctions-lifting negotiations are being conducted with the oversight and guidance of the higher authorities of the system, and the negotiating team is utilizing all capacities for success.' In this regard, the Amvaj Media news site reported, citing informed sources, that Shamkhani is practically playing a role similar to the one he had during his time in the Supreme National Security Council regarding the nuclear file, and nothing beyond that. Morteza Khanali Zadeh, a media figure from Ibrahim Raisi's government who accompanied the former president on most of his foreign trips, described the transfer of responsibility for the nuclear file to Shamkhani as merely 'a serious project on social media' and emphasized that Shamkhani had no presence in any negotiations. As the presidential election approaches, which must be held after the sudden death of Ibrahim Raisi, media in Iran are reporting on Ali Shamkhani's intensified efforts to run for president; the former defense minister in Khatami's government, who has distanced himself more from reformists in recent years and has aligned himself closer to the core of the government. In such an environment, and considering the historical role of 'nuclear negotiations' in several presidential elections, it seems unlikely that various politicians will not use their involvement in such processes to enhance their standing among voters. Although recent years of Ali Khamenei's rule have shown that he has consistently sought to expand his direct presence and influence in various foreign policy issues of the Islamic Republic through parallel institutions and trusted figures, further sidelining the government in this matter.