2017: The Echo of a Tumultuous Society

The year 1396 (2017) was undoubtedly a different year for Iranian society compared to all the previous 38 years of the Islamic Republic's history. The rise of public discontent, unprecedented street protests by dissatisfied groups, especially the youth and the impoverished in numerous cities, and the expansion of professional and civil demands are signs of a significant shift within society. Another key point regarding the protests and demands compared to the past is their radicalization and the emergence of new forms of civil activism. Various social groups are openly and more courageously engaging in civil resistance, breaking norms, challenging the religious and political order, and expressing demands for regime change in various forms. The extent of the political and social crisis has become so widespread that many officials and government insiders openly speak of the political crisis, the ineffectiveness of the government, and the prospect of collapse. It seems that fear has shifted from the people and social groups to the power circles. This transformation in the psychology of governance and society may be considered the most significant development of the year 1396. The fundamental upheaval in Iranian society occurred in 1396 after years of civil stagnation, and many of the novel and unexpected dimensions of public protests can be traced back to this phenomenon. The failure of the 1388 (2009) social movement and the significant damage to a crucial part of the civil activist network was a heavy and disorienting psychological blow for those who had come forward with all their might to bring about social changes and alter the country's destiny. The 1388 movement became a pretext for intensifying the repression of civil society and cracking down on organizations, civil associations, and activists in various fields. This civil repression is somewhat a continuation of the same social engineering policy that has been systematically pursued since the early 1380s (2000s). The main goal of social engineering by the government, especially by military-security and judicial institutions, is to comprehensively control independent civil organizations and institutions that, in a conventional society, play a mediating role between official institutions and society. A re-examination of the domestic policies of the Islamic Republic in the past decades shows that in the view of large sections of the government, civil organizations in their various forms are considered a fundamental threat to the Islamic order. They view participation in the public sphere and civil organization negatively and as a danger, approaching it with a security mindset. The fear of the dormant, rebellious, and unpredictable power of civil society has led to its incapacitation and immobilization being placed on the agenda. The ideal model for military-security forces is a society without organizations and civil associations. A large number of political actors in Iran are enamored with one-sided demonstrations and the submissive masses in favor of the government and are unwilling to recognize the independence of civil society and the legitimacy of civil protests. It is not surprising that state-sponsored demonstrations held on February 11 or on other anniversaries are so favored by some officials that they consider these governmental displays a kind of 'referendum' in favor of the Islamic Republic. At the same time, protest demonstrations are always considered 'illegal,' and official institutions are unwilling to concede to the legitimate right of civil society to protest. The systematic repression of human rights organizations, non-governmental and independent associations, labor unions, or non-loyal political parties and dissatisfied or rebellious loyalists, such as the Participation Front, reflects the deep mistrust and reductive view of the government towards civil society. This narrative also applies to large professional and trade organizations, as such organizations are given little opportunity to grow due to their social and political importance. Direct intervention in the elections of large and influential organizations (doctors, lawyers, filmmakers, teachers, journalists...) or labor unions is clear evidence of the policy of controlling and overseeing civil society. Security agencies even view small local civil organizations that address social, environmental, and children's issues with distrust and skepticism, and their existence is tolerated only as long as their effectiveness remains limited and they cannot mobilize large groups around social issues. Another goal of the security and military forces and other repressive institutions in social engineering is to prevent the emergence or growth of influential independent civil figures and activists and their connection with public opinion. For repressive and security agencies, the presence of influential and authoritative figures in civil society and the symbolic role they can play in shaping public opinion on moral, cultural, or political issues is also seen as a significant threat to religious order and the rule of the jurist. The pathological harassment of some civil and human rights activists, such as Narges Mohammadi and Nasrin Sotoudeh, reflects the fear that exists regarding activists and civil activism. The extensive state propaganda around loyal figures who blindly obey the Supreme Leader and embody the ideal government behavior model is part of this policy. Living and deceased examples of these obedient and 'harmless' figures are General Soleimani and 'Martyr Hojaji,' who, according to the government, should become role models for the masses. The great loss of the government in the media war The year 1396 was also a year of media superiority for society over government media. The Islamic Republic has known from the beginning that dominating society and controlling it comprehensively without full oversight of mass media is very difficult. The problem for the Islamic Republic as a religious government is that media control is not limited to the political arena, and a significant part of cultural and social domains also falls victim to government censorship. Major nationwide media is in the hands of the most extremist parts of the government, and for this reason, a large number of people no longer trust them or have completely turned their backs on them. In the absence of influential national media accepted by the public, people turn to various other media that are closer to their mental world, tastes, and needs. The consequence of this situation is the widespread presence of alternative media inside and outside the country, which also has many audiences among the people and somewhat compensates for government censorship and the news vacuum. The unique situation in Iran has led to a media war in various forms, and what has disrupted the rules of the game in recent years is the expansion of the use of new information and communication technologies and the formation of virtual networks that connect people to each other and eliminate the government's comprehensive oversight over society. The influence of new media has progressed to the point that some officials of the Islamic Republic, despite all their criticisms, have become members of these networks and have somewhat legitimized them. However, what noticeably occurred in 1396 was the transformation of these media into the main venue for disseminating news and societal issues and the unprecedented extent of their influence among public opinion, to the extent that some officials are compelled to react to news from social networks in public forums, while others persistently call for closing these networks. The deadlocks of the Islamic Republic A significant difference in the social context of the protests of 1396 compared to the past is the profound multiple crises that have severely struck the credibility and legitimacy of the Islamic system in various domains. On the eve of the fortieth anniversary of the Islamic Republic, there is little to be proud of, and it has faced severe failures in the main areas of governance. Poverty, stagnation, underdevelopment, and economic crisis, constant tensions in international relations, widespread corruption, social and environmental harms, and public discontent have created a kind of blatant disintegration of the system. Even in the realm of ethics and spirituality, which constituted the primary goal of the Islamic Republic as a religious government, the results have been very negative and shocking. The legacy of the religious government for Iranian society is a significant moral collapse and the prevalence of religious hypocrisy. The current widespread corruption is just one sign of this historical moral bankruptcy and the discrediting of government religion and clergy, and the emptying of religion of spirituality and ethics. Iranian society, due to the systematic repression of organizations and civil figures, lacks conventional means and avenues to form critical dialogue or protest against the existing conditions. In such a situation, civil activists and dissidents are inevitably seeking new forms of activism, protest, and civil communication. Thus, disillusioned and angry social groups take every opportunity for street protests and norm-breaking actions. Girls who remove their hijabs in protest, angry youths who take to the streets against poverty, discrimination, and injustice, workers who strike in protest against their living conditions, and people who have lost all trust in this government are all signs of a society in turmoil. A society that is fed up with government inefficiency, deep discrimination and injustice, economic crisis, environmental degradation, poverty, insult, humiliation, and moral decline. If, despite these significant divides in the crisis-ridden society of Iran, the government can still remain standing, it is primarily due to the opposition's inability within Iran and the weakness of civil organizations. Large segments of the Iranian population have been conveying their messages of dissatisfaction, deep frustration, and anger in various languages for over twenty years through elections, protest votes, or abstaining from elections, demonstrations, norm-breaking, cultural and civil resistance, and turning away from government media and propaganda. The main power holders have also shown through their behavior and interactions that they lack the ability to hear and understand this clear message and its social and political significance. Ayatollah Khamenei's remarks in response to the actions of young girls and women protesting against mandatory hijab, or his analysis of last year's events in his Nowruz speech in Mashhad, is a clear display of the deep gap between dissatisfied public opinion and leaders detached from the realities of society. This approach to a rebellious society was neither a good ending for the year 1396 nor a good beginning for 1397. All these are signs of a society without dialogue and trapped in a deadlock imposed on Iranian society by the Islamic government and the clergy in power.