50 Years After the Suppression of the Prague Spring

At 10 PM on August 20, 1968, military forces from the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia, destroying the hopes of Alexander Dubcek, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, who sought a democratic, just, and modern party for his country's future. Dubcek envisioned the dream and ideal of 'socialism with a human face.' Following the military invasion of Russian tanks, the people of Czechoslovakia resorted to civil and non-violent resistance, peacefully organizing widespread protests. However, these protests were a futile effort, as the number of suppressing soldiers exceeded that of the peaceful and freedom-seeking protesters. The Warsaw Pact soldiers violently ended the Prague Spring of 1968. 150 protesters were killed by military forces, and hundreds were injured. The Prague Spring, on one hand, marked the peak of the reformist movement led by Alexander Dubcek, and on the other hand, the Warsaw Pact military forces ruthlessly suppressed that movement. The Prague Spring initially represented an attempt to end the political frost between socialist dictatorships and the free capitalist countries of the West. During this period of détente, efforts were made to normalize international relations between the capitalist West and socialism in Czechoslovakia, efforts that had actually begun with Stalin's death in 1953 and were brought to an end by Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at that historical juncture. Dubcek's reformist movement aimed for deep social, economic, and political transformations. Although there were critics before him who fought against Stalinist policies from within the Eastern Bloc, Dubcek sought democratic socialism and a third way, a path between socialism and capitalism that bore similarities to social democratic movements in Western Europe. A month after coming to power, he abolished press censorship, leading to a wave of new media in Czechoslovakia. In April of that year, just four months after taking power, Dubcek permitted freedom of expression and assembly, allowing for the possibility of privatizing small and medium enterprises. Dubcek's goal was to soften the claim of absolute rule by the Soviet Communist Party. For instance, while travel to Western countries was very difficult in the Eastern Bloc, travel to Western capitalist countries was suddenly allowed during the Prague Spring. Following these top-down reforms and fundamental criticisms, intellectuals, especially the youth of Czechoslovakia, became hopeful that the country would soon emerge from the shadow of Soviet power. Václav Havel and Pavel Kohout, one of the famous Czech poets, were considered activists of this movement. The Soviet Communist Party was unwilling to accept and tolerate democratic changes in Czechoslovakia. The Kremlin feared a reformist movement in the Eastern Bloc and was concerned that such a movement could spread throughout the Eastern Bloc. A number of leading intellectuals seized the opportunity and published the '2000 Words Manifesto' on June 27, 1968. Ludvik Vaculik, a Czech writer, and 67 other intellectuals signed this manifesto, which was one of the most important texts of the democratic movement, serving as a reckoning for intellectuals with 20 years of communist rule. The '2000 Words Manifesto' contained a very important point stating that the process of democratization in the country was only possible outside the framework of the communist government, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the communist regime. On the same night the manifesto was published, Brezhnev contacted Dubcek and demanded that 'counter-revolutionary forces' be suppressed. However, Dubcek resolutely refused to obey Brezhnev. The publication of this manifesto was provocative for Moscow, and the totalitarian leaders of the Soviet Union feared failure and the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc. The newspaper Pravda, the organ of the Soviet Communist Party, labeled the '2000 Words Manifesto' as an anti-revolutionary text and severely criticized the 'subversive forces' aiming to overthrow Moscow's leadership, threatening them with destruction. Subsequently, a significant portion of the Soviet leadership ordered that the Czechoslovak government be brought back into line with Moscow's political agenda through military force. They openly discussed military intervention. On the other hand, the leaders of the freedom movement issued orders for civil disobedience on radio programs to make Russian soldiers realize the futility of obeying Moscow. The soldiers and officers of the Warsaw Pact suppressed the peaceful resistance of the Czechoslovak people and stifled Dubcek's reformist movement in its infancy. Dubcek and his other companions were kidnapped to Moscow, where he was forced to sign the 'Moscow Protocol.' This was the method the Russian leaders used to legitimize their military presence in Czechoslovakia, a method of totalitarian violence. Leonid Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, subsequently justified the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia, defending this military action as a confrontation with 'the threat to socialism.' The decision-making stages for military intervention were outlined by Professor Stefan Karner, a war research specialist teaching at the University of Graz, who concluded that Moscow's decision to attack Czechoslovakia was made very early. Karner primarily addresses various aspects of some criticisms of the Soviet regime and subsequently the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party's decision to suppress the democratic movement. He writes that the first criticisms of personality cults in the Soviet Union after Stalin's death were also prevalent in Czechoslovakia. Economic reforms and political discussions in Czechoslovakia had begun in 1957. From that year onward, the head of the Czechoslovak government, Antonin Novotny, initiated economic reforms and gradually sidelined Stalinists from government positions. The government's attempt was to gradually open up the space for liberalism. For example, Czechoslovak television aired discussions on freedom of expression in live programs in collaboration with Austrian television, such that the Soviet Communist Party was unable to stop these types of intellectual developments at that time. Finally, due to immense pressures, Novotny resigned from his position as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia on January 5, 1968, and Dubcek came to power. Dubcek was a romantic socialist idealist who did not obey the directives given to him from Moscow. For instance, in March 1968, a Russian military delegation invited him to Moscow, but he refused to go to Russia. Both from internal pro-Soviet forces and from the Communist Party of Germany and the Soviet Union, Dubcek faced immense pressure. According to Professor Karner, the plan to arrest reform leaders was laid out in March 1968. Identified political activists were listed, and a list of 1,030 names was given to General Vladimir Yankov, who was supposed to arrest all political activists along with Russian tanks, in a Stalinist manner. After the list of 1,030 names became public, General Yankov committed suicide. Instead of a new wave of arrests, thousands of political prisoners were pardoned and released with Dubcek's approval. This move strengthened the reformist movement, and it should be noted that at this time even the Ministry of Interior of Czechoslovakia no longer collaborated with the Soviet security organization, the KGB. On the other hand, on April 10, 1968, at a meeting of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, it was decided that 'we will not lose Czechoslovakia.' The meaning of this theory was clear: military attack. Russian Marshal Ivan Yakubovsky, commander of the Warsaw Pact armies, began military preparations immediately after April 10, 1968, consulting with Polish, East German, and Hungarian soldiers. The Warsaw Pact initially conducted military maneuvers. Austrian researcher Professor Karner writes that the goal of these maneuvers was, at that time, the occupation of Czechoslovakia. On June 19, 1968, one of the largest military maneuvers of the Warsaw Pact took place in Czechoslovakia, and especially the East German security organization prepared new lists for the arrest of Czechoslovak political activists. These lists were used for 'cleansing' after the Prague Spring was concluded. In France, the student movement of 68 carried out its largest activities in Western Europe in support of Dubcek, followed by student movements in other European countries defending Dubcek's reforms. There were many discussions about creating a social democratic party in Czechoslovakia. This historical phenomenon particularly terrified Leonid Brezhnev and other state officials in Moscow. In fact, the 'Iron Curtain' of the Eastern Bloc had been shaken. The East German Communist Party was the first party to label this reformist movement as 'counter-revolution' before Pravda did. Professor Karner divides the decision-making stages of the Soviet Central Committee for military intervention into four parts: 1. The stage of 'attention to the historical problem,' which actually concluded on March 23, 1968, in the city of Dresden following various consultations among Warsaw Pact officials in Germany. On that day, Czechoslovak officials were ordered to prevent the continuation of the reformist movement. 2. The new stage of pressures on the Czechoslovak government, which lasted until mid-June. 3. The next stage lasted from mid-June to mid-July. Brezhnev exerted serious pressure on Dubcek during this period, and the bitter game of military invasion fell in mid-July. At that time, directives from the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Poland were given to push back the democratic movement and restore Soviet rule in Czechoslovakia, which aimed to re-establish dictatorship in the country. 4. Professor Karner's research shows that on July 17, decisions for preparing the military invasion were already made by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. On July 22, Brezhnev ordered the Soviet Defense Minister to plan necessary actions for the post-invasion phase, and therefore it was intended to jointly find a 'political solution' with Dubcek. However, Dubcek was unwilling to cooperate with the Soviet dictatorship. Even Tito, the head of the Yugoslav government, visited Prague on August 9 to support Dubcek and stayed in Prague until August 11. But on August 13, Brezhnev spoke to Dubcek on the phone and criticized him for not stopping the 'counter-revolutionaries' and not sidelining the reformists. The Soviet Union even prevented the UN Secretary-General from meeting Dubcek. The suppression of the Prague Spring freedom movement immediately gained global dimensions; the United States used this historical crisis to strengthen NATO. Of course, the socialist bloc and the totalitarian dictatorship of the Soviet Union have joined the dustbin of history. Perhaps one can conclude from this historical occurrence in one sentence that totalitarian dictatorships are incapable of serious reforms within their governance, and the process of democracy must be advanced outside the confines of government.