70% of Students in a Border City Want to Become 'Fuel Smugglers'

70% of students in a border city in Iran have declared their preferred future job as 'fuel smugglers.' On Wednesday, May 29, the state news agency IRIB published a report on smuggling and corruption levels in the Islamic Republic, presenting unprecedented information and statistics. The report references various aspects of smuggling across Iran and the involvement of official entities in the smuggling of goods, explicitly stating that many hands in Iran are 'tainted' by smuggling. Much of the data in this report comes from an interview between an IRIB reporter and Habibollah Haghighi, head of the Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, and Mohammad Baqer Olfat, Deputy for Prevention of the Judiciary. Mr. Haghighi mentioned the enormous profits from smuggling, stating that the 'taboo' surrounding this issue in Iran has diminished to the extent that 70% of students in a border city have written in their essays that they want to engage in 'fuel smuggling' in the future. This official did not mention the name of the border city, but he attributed such a mindset among students to the expansion of smuggling phenomena in Iran, especially in border cities and entry points. Previously, the local website 'Zeryan' reported, citing the newspaper 'Ebtekar,' that many high school and middle school students in the city of Baneh drop out to engage in smuggling or related jobs. 'Zeryan' added that students in Baneh, observing the fates of their surroundings, especially educated individuals from Baneh, drop out of school and enter the job market, believing that money is better than knowledge. Knowledge is becoming increasingly marginalized. Smuggling is 'profitable' and 'low-risk.' Habibollah Haghighi, in this interview, spoke about the 'profitability' of smuggling, adding that 'if someone attempts to import goods in the smuggling sector 10 times, even if they get caught five times, smuggling is still profitable.' This official also identified the low 'risk' of smuggling as a factor in its expansion, stating, 'The entry routes to the country have opened up so much that some people across the borders guarantee the import and delivery of smuggled goods to traders inside the country.' Haghighi mentioned the existence of 67 tax exemptions for actors in various sectors as another factor contributing to the expansion of smuggling in Iran, stating, 'In the world, exemptions are only at the level of convention exemptions, which do not exceed four to five cases.' The head of the Anti-Smuggling Headquarters criticized the extent to which importers exceed these privileges, saying that under these exemptions, 'a ship with four sailors can import a maximum of three duty-free trucks in each period, but what actually happens is that ships unload at least 30 trucks under this exemption cover.' This official explicitly stated that 'none of these restrictions are observed; it was once intended that a maximum of 3% of border transactions would be conducted through border markets, but this has now reached 30%.' Haghighi also referred to supervisory, administrative, and organizational limitations in the expansion of smuggling, stating, 'Every day, 4,000 containers enter and exit through Shahid Rajaei Port, which, with one X-ray machine, can only check 200 containers if it is not broken.' According to this official, every day, 3,800 containers 'enter and exit through Rajaei Port without the slightest inspection facilities.' Haghighi stated, 'By rough calculation, it can be said that annually 10,000 containers with a high margin of error are moved only from Shahid Rajaei Terminal, and this is just the situation at Shahid Rajaei Port.' He added, 'If this situation is generalized to 150 other customs, then the volume of smuggling loopholes in Iran becomes apparent.' This official also named regional, political pressures, parliament representatives, and governors as factors creating 'gaps' for the entry of goods into Iran. Free zones are also mentioned as another entry point for smuggling, as these areas are 'defined so broadly that they are difficult to control.' Additionally, 'the lack of appropriate control infrastructure' at entry points has been reported as a factor rendering tariff processes ineffective in the country's import system. 'Only 3% of smuggled goods are discovered in Iran.' Mohammad Mahdi Raiszadeh, Secretary-General of the Iranian Textile Association, also reported in this report that every hour 'three 10-ton containers of clothing, leather, and shoes are smuggled' into the country. Raiszadeh, based on customs reports, stated that clothing imports amount to five to seven million dollars, but 'customs in China and the UAE report clothing exports to Iran at over 750 million dollars, indicating that this discrepancy comes through other routes.' According to the Anti-Smuggling Headquarters statistics, up to 25 billion dollars worth of goods are smuggled into the country annually, with 10% of this amount being clothing, shoes, and leather. Currently, in the most optimistic scenario, if the amount of smuggled goods in the country is considered to be 15 billion dollars, only 3% of this amount, equivalent to 420 million dollars, is discovered. Of this amount, only 0.25% or 41 million dollars leads to fines, and the total fines paid do not exceed 16 million dollars, which is why officials say smuggling in Iran is 'very profitable.' 'Respectable white-collar criminals who have normalized smuggling.' Mohammad Baqer Olfat, Deputy for Prevention of the Judiciary, also pointed to the impact of smuggling on production units, stating that 60% of the reason for the closure of these units is due to the 'chaotic situation of smuggling in the country.' Olfat stated that 'there is no point in our vast country where there is no activity by smugglers, from the border even outside the border to urban docks, distribution markets, and consumption centers, the arena of committing smuggling crimes exists.' According to him, 'white-collar criminals or respectable individuals play a role in the smuggling process, which is the main factor in normalizing this phenomenon and the ineffectiveness of laws.' This official added, 'While today, discovered smuggled goods ultimately end up in the domestic market through responsible institutions, one cannot expect deterrent effects of smuggling on national production and unemployment.' Olfat explicitly stated, 'It can be confidently said that there is no healthy trade in the country; today, if the police mobilize all their forces to combat smuggling and judges do not handle any cases other than smuggling, they will definitely not be able to cope with the volume of cases in this area.' According to statistics, there are currently 150 customs at Iran's land, sea, and air borders where goods are smuggled, and annually one billion orders are registered in customs for imports. The 'very complex' process of registering and ordering goods, along with the 'lack of a comprehensive information bank,' has resulted in a lack of comprehensive control from the stage of order registration, entry, loading, storage, supply, sale, and financial circulation in Iran. Smuggling of goods and currency is considered one of the most important manifestations of economic and financial corruption in Iran, which, despite numerous legal obstacles and warnings from officials, continues to increase every year. Many political and economic experts consider the phenomenon of goods smuggling to be a result of the 'systematic corruption' that the Islamic Republic and its supervisory institutions are afflicted with. On April 22, Alireza Jamshidi, head of the Organization for Trade Regulations, explicitly stated in a television program that the 'mafia of power and wealth' hinders cooperation with this organization. Jamshidi said, 'Large and organized smugglers in the country are in a safe haven, but when dealing with some cases, one can only cry.' Jamshidi also added, 'There is no national determination and serious belief to combat smuggling in the country, and the mafia of wealth and power is intertwined in executive and governing sectors.' According to him, 'Large smugglers operate so systematically, complexly, and organized that usually those who should be caught do not get caught.' This official emphasized that 'if 170 customs in the country have smuggling problems, serious decisions must be made, and 100 of them should be closed.' While acknowledging the 'taboo' of smuggling by smugglers and consumers is introduced as one of the cultural strategies to combat smuggling in Iran, several officials from the Anti-Smuggling Headquarters say that currently, not only does smuggling in Iran have no 'taboo,' but it has also become a 'value' and 'job.'