9 Points on the Inauguration Ceremony of Rouhani's Presidency

The inauguration ceremony of Hassan Rouhani's presidency was finally held by the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, an event that was notably surrounded by ambiguity and questions. The ceremony was significant due to the composition of the invitees and the speeches of the top two figures in the political system (the Leader and the President). From these angles, nine points are briefly outlined below. 1. The Significant Absence of Khatami: The absence of the reformist president Khatami was palpable at the inauguration. Khatami is considered one of Rouhani's main supporters and a key factor in his success in the 2017 presidential election. The organizers' decision not to invite Khatami, undoubtedly coordinated with the Leader's office, indicates the continuation of restrictions against him until further notice and the ongoing dissatisfaction of the Supreme Leader with the former president. Ayatollah Khamenei not only insists on the house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement, which has now exceeded 2361 days, but also emphasizes the restrictions against Khatami, making his anger over Khatami's position during the 2009 presidential election evident. Despite all of Khatami's recent attempts at reconciliation and his positive messages to the Leader's office, Ayatollah Khamenei shows that he has both a confrontational approach and a reluctance to step back from his authoritarian and vindictive positions. 2. Ahmadinejad's Strange Presence: In stark contrast to Khatami, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presence at the inauguration was noteworthy. Following Ahmadinejad's defiance against the Supreme Leader's 'recommendation' not to run in the presidential election, his disqualification by the Guardian Council, and the recent events (the arrest of Baghaei and Ahmadinejad's and Mashaei's sharp statements), his absence could have been expected. Contrary to this expectation, however, the controversial former president attended the ceremony. Although the organizers did not assign him a special place, Ahmadinejad's mere presence at the event indicates the central power's efforts to keep him within the framework of the regime's 'insiders.' Ahmadinejad's entanglement with the '2009 electoral coup' and the bloody events that followed are significant reasons for the political system's leadership's patience with his antics and adventures. Although Ahmadinejad and Mashaei have shown their potential for 'deviation from the center,' the outcome of the relationship between this 'band' and the core of power in the Islamic Republic is not very predictable. 3. Neglect of Hashemi Rafsanjani: The inauguration ceremony of Rouhani's presidency was the first such event held after the establishment of the Islamic Republic without any sign of Hashemi Rafsanjani, a man who was considered one of the three main and influential players in the system until his death (January 2017). Not only was there no sign of Rafsanjani himself, but neither the Supreme Leader nor Rouhani found it necessary to mention him. While Khamenei's silence was not surprising, Rouhani's neglect was astonishing, especially considering that Rafsanjani had been an important spiritual supporter of Rouhani since the 2013 presidential election. Rouhani is visibly trying to fill the void left by Rafsanjani, but it is clear that he lacks Rafsanjani's weight and credibility in the political power structure, especially with respect to the system's first figure. 4. The Absence of Molavi Abdolhamid: The prominent Sunni figure in Iran, Molavi Abdolhamid, was one of the notable absentees at the inauguration. He was not invited to the ceremony despite being a supporter of election-oriented processes and a promoter of interaction and moderation, as well as an opponent of violence and terrorism. The organizers' indifference—specifically the Leader's office—toward Molavi Abdolhamid occurred while Ayatollah Khamenei stated at the ceremony: 'Everything we have comes from the unity of the people, from the unity of the people among themselves and with the officials and executors of the country's affairs; maintain this unity. The people have different tastes and opinions; let them live peacefully together.' However, it seems that his reference to different tastes and his advice to Rouhani to pay attention to critics and opponents were aimed at safeguarding the conservative camp. Otherwise, a logical and expected counterpart to the political system's leadership's claim would have been the invitation of the foremost figure of the Sunni community in Iran to the inauguration ceremony. Ayatollah Khamenei, however, demonstrated how significant the gap is between his words and claims on one hand and his managerial conduct and political actions on the other. 5. Censorship of Reformists at the Ceremony: Apart from those reformists who play roles within the political power structure and have legal standing, no well-known reformist activists from civil society or members of reformist parties were present at the inauguration. With some leniency, two individuals can be mentioned. First, Ali Akbar Mohtashami, head of the committee to protect Mir Hossein Mousavi's votes in the 2009 election; Mohtashami was one of the protesters against the conduct and result of that election and called for its annulment. Later, he distanced himself from Mousavi and Karroubi. Thus, in September 2014, he was among those who were allowed to visit and meet the Supreme Leader after his surgery. The second individual is Mohammad Salamati, the secretary-general of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization; a political activist known for his moderate positions and being on the 'right' side of this political group, which was declared dissolved by the Revolutionary Court after the 2009 election. Salamati has been one of the political activists who expressed minimal protest and reaction to the electoral coup of 2009 and the bloody events that followed. The absence of well-known reformists indicates the continued disregard and estrangement of the core power from reformists, limiting their scope of action and the quality of their participation in political processes. 6. The Supreme Leader and Interaction with the World: In his remarks, Ayatollah Khamenei asked Hassan Rouhani to pay attention to three major orientations; one of which was 'broad interaction with the world.' His emphasis on the importance of creating 'broad and extensive communications with other nations and governments and cooperating with them' was significant and reflected the unavoidable realities that have plagued the political authority. The critical economic situation, stemming from the protracted post-JCPOA period and the strictness of the White House, as well as the economic woes related to eight years of ineffective management by Ahmadinejad and his associates, has made the necessity for foreign investment and interaction with the world palpable for those in power. Thus, not only Rouhani but also even moderate and pragmatic conservatives (like Ali Larijani, the Speaker of Parliament) and now even the Supreme Leader himself emphasize the need for deepening interaction and cooperation with the world. However, this does not prevent the top of the political system from forgetting the 'enemy' (his favorite and important keyword). Thus, not only did he repeatedly emphasize this concept and word (enemy) during the inauguration, but in the third orientation, he warned Rouhani to 'appear with firmness and power against every hegemon; today, the most aggressive and shameless regime is that of the United States of America.' The question of what balance the Islamic Republic will reach between confronting Washington and interacting with the world is indeed a difficult one, and it seems unlikely that the leadership of the system has an answer for it. 7. Religious Despotism and Democracy: The Supreme Leader described the inauguration as a 'symbol of democracy' at the beginning of his remarks. He once again characterized the numerous elections in Iran as an important sign of democracy in the Islamic Republic. While Ayatollah Khamenei referred to the holding of five Assembly of Experts elections, he did not mention that six clerics appointed by him approve or reject the candidates at the very first step, creating a two-stage election process. Furthermore, he did not mention the scripted and show-like nature of this Assembly, which is responsible for supervising the Leader's performance. The Supreme Leader also predictably did not refer to the Guardian Council's oversight in elections or the lack of freedom and security for independent and critical parties and media. He did not mention that more than 2361 days have passed since the continued house arrest without trial of two candidates protesting the results of the 2009 presidential election. Ayatollah Khamenei also stated that 'the new generation has not seen the dictatorship before the revolution'; however, he did not mention his extensive legal and extralegal powers and those of his subordinate institutions, nor did he acknowledge the bloody suppression of civil protests after the 2009 election or the ongoing restrictions, threats, and repression against human rights activists and democracy advocates in Iran. The despotism and lawlessness of the absolute clerical rule in the Islamic Republic today manifest not only in the continued house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement despite their old age and illness but also in the extralegal influence in the arrangement of cabinet ministers. However, Ayatollah Khamenei claims to have established democracy in Iran, asserting that holding elections as one of the prerequisites of democracy is sufficient to present and prove such a claim. 8. No Celebration or Tension: The Supreme Leader's remarks at the inauguration, however, did not include extremism or excessive calm and were neither particularly celebratory nor contentious. He attempted to express some degree of solidarity with the process and outcome of the recent elections indirectly while not praising the elected president. Comparing Ayatollah Khamenei's speech at Ahmadinejad's inauguration in 2009 with the recent one reveals a significant and noticeable distance and clarifies the type of perspective and positions of the system's first figure. The differences in views and approaches between Ayatollah Khamenei and Rouhani have manifested themselves in recent years, especially during the elections and the past weeks, from the criticisms and sharp reactions of the Leader to some of the senior IRGC officials' blunt statements against the government and even legal-security actions against Rouhani's brother. However, as he did not find it necessary to congratulate Rouhani in the inauguration decree, Ayatollah Khamenei also saw no need to praise the elected president in his speech. Yet, the first figure of the system avoided adopting a biting and sarcastic tone against Rouhani and his policies. It seems that independent of the fatigue and exhaustion resulting from the prolonged illness of the Supreme Leader, achieving some form of implicit agreement regarding the composition of Rouhani's upcoming cabinet has been a significant reason for the content and form of Ayatollah Khamenei's recent speech. 9. Rouhani's Moderate Remarks: The President also focused on maximum moderation in his speech at the inauguration. Rouhani, who has faced serious challenges in recent weeks (from the UNESCO 2030 document to the arrest of his brother), aimed to deliver a vague and uncontroversial speech based on the strategy he has adopted. He did not mention Hashemi Rafsanjani, nor did he indirectly refer to the demands of his supporters in the elections (especially regarding lifting the house arrest), nor did he make any special or provocative remarks regarding the prerequisites for political and cultural development, except to emphasize that 'the voice of the people' should be heard and that all ethnicities and social groups should participate in managing affairs. It seems that based on the trend Rouhani has designed for interaction with the central power (the leadership and the security-military forces around him), at least at this stage (the introduction of the cabinet), he is trying to prevent the emergence of new challenges. The composition of the new cabinet will clarify Rouhani's political design and strategy for the next four years, a period that will coincide with the continued illness of the Supreme Leader; it is not far-fetched to think that Rouhani is considering the 'turning point' of selecting the third leader in his interactions with the core of power and in the path he has envisioned.