A Look at the Implementation of the JCPOA from a Non-Economic Perspective

A brief yet significant statement from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released on October 15 indicates Iran's entry into a new phase of relations with the agency and the end of the transparency period concerning its nuclear activities suspected of having military dimensions. This also confirms the progress along the roadmap signed on July 14 between Yukiya Amano and Ali Akbar Salehi in Vienna. The groundwork for signing the JCPOA between Iran and the group known as 1+5 was only established when the roadmap was signed in Vienna. Although the end of transparency in the released statement does not mean the completion of all commitments outlined in the signed roadmap, it signifies Iran's entry into this phase. Confirmation of the end of commitments could and should be included in the next report from the IAEA Director General to the Board of Governors, which will be published on December 15. This report will effectively be Amano's last report on this matter. The next steps and economic results of the JCPOA require an examination of the current recession in the domestic market, which, according to Masoud Khansari, head of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, is the deepest recession in the past 30 years. Additionally, the International Monetary Fund's report predicts that after negative growth rates of 5.8% and 1.7% in the past two years, the Iranian economy may only show signs of relative improvement next year. The head of the government, in response to a letter from four warning ministers regarding the ongoing economic crisis and the possibility of its intensification next year, acknowledged on Tuesday that the equivalent rial amount of Iran's funds that will be released in the future has already been received and spent by the Central Bank, and that in the short term, the livelihood of the people and the urban economy will not change. The release of Iran's funds, which has raised many doubts regarding its amount, will only occur after Iran fulfills its commitments and not on the day the JCPOA is implemented. Regarding the date and time of the release of the blocked funds, the head of the Iranian government believes that Iran will complete its commitments by the end of the year, whereas the IAEA Director General had independently predicted that the completion of the JCPOA would likely occur around the end of next spring - February or March. Thus, no miracles can be expected shortly from the implementation of the JCPOA. In the medium term, what the JCPOA can offer Iran and its people is finding and stabilizing a starting point for moving away from the nature of a protest-oriented, ideologically driven, and revolutionarily influenced governance, and consequently, gradually approaching the nature of a conventional, law-abiding political system that is interested in developing cooperation with regional countries and reconciling with the global community. What is currently happening in Iran is a continuation of the struggle between the pragmatists in the government, who seek to continue down the path that the JCPOA can initiate, and the conservatives and military figures who view the JCPOA as imposed and relentlessly seek to distance themselves from its potential results using every opportunity and tool available. The active military-political presence in four regional countries, the formation of the recent military axis between Tehran and Moscow to increase presence in Syria, warnings about conducting new missile tests (which could be considered violations of Iran's commitments under the JCPOA), and the televised display of underground ballistic missile silos just a day before the JCPOA's implementation are merely symbols of the ongoing internal struggle to either follow or distance from the path that the JCPOA has provided. To achieve medium- and long-term results from the JCPOA, the Iranian political authority must distance itself from the current duality and replace its challenging behaviors both domestically and internationally with the lawful behaviors of a conventional political system. If the domestic market in Iran does not respond positively to the implementation of the JCPOA in the short term, the reason lies in the continuation of the status quo and the internal struggles among the branches of the government, which have directed domestic capital towards speculative economics rather than productive investment, and have only satisfied foreign business partners with the sale of goods and short-term profit-taking. The normalization of the political structure governing Iran and its lawfulness must lead to a transition from a state-controlled economy to a market economy, and a fundamental confrontation with administrative corruption that has placed Iran among the most corrupt administrative entities in the world. To achieve medium-term results from the JCPOA, investor security and the freedom of capital transfer must be guaranteed, and the current banking system, which has been transformed into an extravagant currency exchange system guided by the government and exclusive to rent-seekers, must be regulated and aligned with the global monetary system. The JCPOA could mark the beginning of the end of the current nature of Iran's political governance in foreign relations and a genuine joining of the global community, and domestically, it could lead to a reconciliation between the government and society, acceptance of individual rights and social freedoms, acknowledgment of the people's right to real participation in political power, independence of the judiciary, and the lawfulness of the government. Alternatively, in complete opposition to this expectation, a retreat from the JCPOA, which is a historical compromise document with the global community, could render the two years of past efforts completely futile.