A Look at the Rise and Fall of the Second Khordad Movement

The Second Khordad Movement of 1997 has entered its twentieth anniversary while the term "reformism" is still measured among individuals in layers of power with degrees of "opposition" and "hostility." Among them, there are many who believe that the reformist movement in Iran has never acted in accordance with what occurred in other parts of the world. Perhaps examining the formation of the Second Khordad Movement will not be without impact on better understanding the results obtained from it. After Mohammad Khatami resigned from the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance on May 24, 1992, individuals closely associated with him held regular meetings with him to discuss various topics, including religious intellectualism. Saeed Hajarian, Mostafa Tajzadeh, and Hadi Khaniki were among the prominent figures in Khatami's inner circle who considered themselves loyal to the Islamic Republic and believed that there was a different viewpoint from the official perspective that needed to be culturally articulated and introduced. Undoubtedly, the discussions of this group played a significant role in shaping what became known as reformism. Reza Alijani, a political activist residing in France, describes the role of this group and others in what these gatherings contributed to the reformist thought in the Islamic Republic in an interview with Radio Farda. "In various places, the idea of the need for reforms matured within the power structure, meaning those who were part of the authorities (though not the top officials) were aware of the changing reality of society. This reality affects mentality. Now, this mentality, meaning those who form the intellectual and cultural-political segment of society, was a broad spectrum that included individuals from the 'Ayin' group. Those outside of power, such as the magazines Iran Farda, Adineh, Donya-ye Sokhan, Payam Emruz, and Payam Hajar, all contained and carried the idea of change, meaning that this situation is not right and needs to change, especially the society's need for political and cultural development. Within the power structure, there was also the Strategic Research Center, the Kian magazine, and the Salam newspaper. It seems that all of these grasped the pulse of the time correctly. Each is effective in its own place. This circle is effective at higher levels. It is effective within the power structure and encourages Mr. Mir Hossein Mousavi and Khatami to run for candidacy, which is very effective, but this should be seen within a larger wave." On November 1, 1996, after Mir Hossein Mousavi announced his refusal to run for the seventh presidential election, no one expected a fervent election. However, on January 13, when the Combatant Clergy Association announced Mohammad Khatami, the former Minister of Culture, as their candidate, and on February 1, this presence was officially confirmed, many people, especially Khatami's supporters, believed that Khatami might not win this election, but his presence would heat up the election and add excitement to it. Meanwhile, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, the candidate supported by the right-wing faction, had entered the competition, and everyone considered him the frontrunner for victory. Sadegh Zibakalam, a professor of political science at the University of Tehran, recalls in a short documentary titled "Second Khordad" the atmosphere of that time: "I remember one day in 1996, I was with Dr. Bashiriyeh, Tajzadeh, Hajarian, and Mohsen Aminzadeh when the upcoming elections were discussed. Mr. Tajzadeh said, 'It's not that we think a miracle will happen in this election. Our strategy is to participate in this election with all our might. Otherwise, we have no expectation of winning. The left will win. Not at all.' I also said, 'I think so too.' This conversation took place in December and January... We were discussing that our maximum vote would be three or four million.' However, this atmosphere of despair regarding victory changed less than a month before Khordad 2, and with field surveys conducted by some institutions, including security agencies, it became clear that the ruling establishment's prediction regarding their preferred candidate, Ali Akbar Nategh Nouri, would not materialize. After that, naturally, the tide turned, and twenty million votes were cast for Mohammad Khatami. Khatami himself stated in the documentary 'Second Khordad' that he did not expect to receive such a high number of votes from the people. Reza Alijani, regarding the atmosphere that emerged shortly before the June 1997 elections, in which contrary to expectations, Mohammad Khatami had a greater chance of winning the presidential election, tells Radio Farda: 'This arose from invisible changes that occurred deep within Iranian society. When the Iranian Revolution took place, 55% of Iranian society was non-urban and 45% was urban, but when this event occurred, about 60% of Iranian society was urban. The changing ratio of urban to non-urban populations, the increase in literacy and higher education... At the time of the revolution, we had about 120,000 students, but at this point, we have about two million or even more students. The social presence of women, which is a broad issue, has made half of society more aware, more demanding, and more participatory than before. The growth of communication media, the large number of Iranian immigrants abroad, which activated foreign media, and the messages that were pumped into the closed Iranian society from abroad all indicate that Iranian society has undergone changes at its depths that the power structure is unaware of and does not see. I believe that if the repression of the 1980s had not occurred, we would have seen Khordad 2 in 1986, not 1997. That is, Iranian society was ready ten years earlier. This revolution had taken place deep within society. The waves on this ocean were, in fact, Khordad 2. And that unseen society was now visible at the ballot box, meaning the majority of society wanted political development, economic development, a more open space, and political plurality, while a minority represented traditional, aggressive culture, desiring tension with the world and a closed societal space and a specific lifestyle. In fact, Khordad 2 and Mr. Khatami became a symbol and an opportunity for the majority of society, and the dormant civil society was seen at the ballot box with a very significant margin, meaning Khatami received three times the votes of Mr. Nategh Nouri. It was a big 'no,' a shock to the power structure, but it showed that there was a second society that official propaganda did not allow to be seen. After that, we saw that the supervisory oversight became stricter, attacks on press freedom and the media space increased, and essentially the majority of the modern middle class of society was seen in contrast to a minority that maintained itself with oil money, repression, and supervisory oversight.' In any case, with his victory in the seventh presidential election, Mohammad Khatami marked a series of victories for the reformist movement. In fact, after this victory, the reformists won in three consecutive elections (the first city council elections in 1999, the sixth parliamentary elections in 2000, and the eighth presidential election in 2001), attracting the attention of political and social analysts in Iran. However, after this, they lost their social acceptance and experienced shocking and continuous defeats in several subsequent elections (the second city council elections in 2001, the seventh parliamentary elections in 2003, and the ninth presidential election in 2005). The reasons for these defeats were largely attributed to Khatami's failure to fulfill his electoral promises. Thus, Khatami's reformist governments faced ongoing opposition from right-wing government factions and public criticism, and as he himself said, every nine days a crisis was created for his government. However, all of this did not prevent him from making serious efforts to create the infrastructure for a civil society. He held the city and village council elections, which were stipulated in the constitution of the Islamic Republic, for the first time, and cultural, artistic, and political activities were conducted in a more open atmosphere than in previous and subsequent governments. At the same time, the opposing faction, while continuously criticizing his Minister of Interior, Abdullah Nouri, who was a key figure in his cabinet, removed him from office through a vote of no confidence after an impeachment. His Minister of Culture, Mohajerani, was also impeached once but managed to regain confidence after defending his performance. Another significant event was the Berlin Conference. During this conference, the Heinrich Böll Foundation in Germany invited 17 reformists, journalists, and national-religious figures, including Akbar Ganji, Ezzatollah Sahabi, Mehrangiz Kar, Yousefi Ashkouri, Ali Afshari, and Mahmoud Dowlatabadi. This conference was considered the beginning of the connection between reformists inside and the opposition outside. During the speeches, members of the Iranian Workers' Communist Party protested vehemently, and one of them exposed himself partially. On the other hand, despite coinciding with the month of Muharram, the Iranian state television broadcasted a 30-minute excerpt from the conference for two consecutive nights, and the newspapers opposing reform demanded their trial. Participants in the conference were arrested upon their return, and two weeks later, a widespread suspension of reformist newspapers began, along with the arrest of several prominent journalists. Another important event during Khatami's presidency was the beginning of the protests on July 9, 1999, known as the attack on Tehran University dormitories. The incident began with protests from a group of Tehran University students regarding the suspension of the Salam newspaper, which was met with a severe reaction from security forces. On the second day, the security forces of the Islamic Republic attacked the students' dormitories, beating many students. This security response led to a widespread protest from various sectors, especially academics, which was severely suppressed, and opponents were imprisoned. Perhaps the most important issue during Khatami's presidency was the occurrence of a series of murders of several writers and political activists carried out by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence. This incident was halted with the arrest of Saeed Imami, an agent of the Ministry of Intelligence, and a circle of his associates, and later, Saeed Imami allegedly committed suicide in prison under suspicious circumstances. In these murders, writers such as Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh and Mohammad Mokhtari, and political activists including Dariush and Parvaneh Forouhar were killed. Another significant issue was the amendment of the Press Law, which was unilaterally removed from the open session of parliament following a letter from the Supreme Leader to Mahdi Karroubi, the then Speaker of Parliament, which was interpreted by him as a religious decree. This turned the parliament into a scene of verbal conflict between the majority representatives and minority representatives, which ultimately was archived with Karroubi's remarks. Khatami's second presidential term was accompanied by his efforts to pass dual bills to amend the election law and clarify the powers of the presidency, which were repeatedly rejected by the Guardian Council for being contrary to Sharia and the constitution. The widespread disqualification of reformist candidates in the seventh parliamentary elections and the subsequent decline in public support, which showed the lowest participation in the city and village council elections in 2001, were among the factors that led to the gradual resurgence of the conservatives. Taghi Rahmani, a political activist residing in France, elaborates on the public's disillusionment with the reformists and its reasons, stating: 'The gap between reformists in the sixth parliament widened significantly and became apparent, and on the other hand, the organized right-wing assault was calculated. The radical right entered the field, and the traditional right retreated, leading to Mr. Ahmadinejad's emergence, and the right-wing, with its security forces and judiciary, confronted the reformists head-on. During a period when the ideology of confrontation was not the dominant ideology among reformists and intellectuals, but rather a kind of caution, these two factors caused the people to become somewhat fearful and disillusioned. The divisions among reformists, the divisions among the elites; those who trusted the elites became disillusioned, and the organized pressure from the right added to the cause.' The suspicious death of Canadian journalist Zahra Kazemi, the human rights file of Iran, and the critical condition of political activist Akbar Ganji diminished Khatami's efforts to change the global perception of Iran. The decline of the movement known as Second Khordad began due to the unfulfilled promises of the reformists and intensified with Khatami's explicit admissions of his commitment to the principles of the Islamic Republic. However, one may never consider the people's desire and enthusiasm for reforms to be over. The banning of Mr. Khatami from the media and the high vote for Hassan Rouhani in the first round of his presidential election after Khatami's endorsement of him indicate the persistence of this enthusiasm. In this context, what did the student movement do for Second Khordad?