A Note from Ali Afshari: Khatami and July 18, 1999

The eighteenth anniversary of the authoritarian attack on Tehran University dormitories has sparked new discussions regarding the role of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami in that significant political event. The events of July 18 and the ongoing public discourse surrounding it, which has now taken on a ritualistic aspect for the student movement and advocates of academic freedoms, are inherently controversial. Each anniversary provides an opportunity to highlight new aspects of the horrific destruction of students' rooms and to emphasize the necessity of seeking justice and healing the wounds that still afflict the university. The July 18 protest movement and the tragedy that followed the brutal response to students' protest slogans and the reckoning with the student movement's confrontation with religious tyranny still have many untold issues, and over the past 16 years, some have appropriated it. Those who were either marginally involved in that historical event or were victims of government repression and the security apparatus's scenario to attribute this movement to external forces have been misrepresented in public perception as having played a central role. It is clear from both the night of the incident and the organization of the protest movement which individuals and groups were involved and where the majority of students' sympathies lay. This article will revisit the relationship between Seyyed Mohammad Khatami and July 18. The previous paragraph only briefly alludes to the victimization of July 18 and, more broadly, the significant issue of the distortion of contemporary Iranian historical realities and the lack of mechanisms capable of effectively countering the erroneous reconstruction of historical events or at least enlightening influential media. However, Khatami's weak performance does not equate to opposing students' demands or siding with the Revolutionary Guards. He supported students' demands and protests within the university and resisted the Revolutionary Guards' demands for control of the city for several days. As a result, 24 Revolutionary Guards commanders issued a harsh and provocative letter that exemplified the illegal military intervention in politics, openly threatening him. Khatami stated in a speech in Hamedan a few days after the government march on July 23 that the attack on Tehran University dormitories was a price for pursuing the chain murders, implicitly indicating who organized that tragedy. The statements of Major General Hassan Firouzabadi, the former commander of the Armed Forces General Staff, initiated the narrative that claimed the Revolutionary Guards intervened at the behest of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami and took control of Tehran's security and dealt with the protesters. As someone who was a firsthand observer of those tumultuous days and was present during all the significant events, I find the above statements to be incorrect, independent of the evaluation of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami's performance in the July 18 protest movement. In fact, Firouzabadi has constructed a false narrative by selectively recounting and framing parts of the reality, distorting history. The trial of Khatami and the authoritarian defenders of Farhad Nazari, the commander of the police unit that breached the university's boundaries and destroyed students' rooms, also claimed at that time that the attack on Tehran University dormitories was carried out under the orders and approval of the then Minister of Interior, Seyyed Abdolhossein Mousavi Lari. Their argument was based on the delegation of the Supreme Leader's authority in managing the police to the Minister of Interior. However, the realities and the actual power structure indicated that this delegation was nominal, and senior police officials paid no heed to the views and management style of the Minister of Interior, actively obstructing the government's plans, especially regarding the security of peaceful protest gatherings. Farhad Nazari later went further and, during the handling of his charges, which were dismissed with the judiciary's bias, called for the trial of Seyyed Mohammad Khatami! The reasons for rejecting Firouzabadi's claims will be elaborated upon. As someone who was aware of the activities of various governing institutions and the National Security Council's involvement in the university dormitory tragedy, I attended a National Security Council meeting during that time and had numerous discussions and negotiations with officials from that institution's secretariat. I witnessed the desire and will of senior and mid-level officials of the Revolutionary Guards to take control of security in Tehran. The Basij Student Organization, particularly the Tehran Basij, led by figures like Alireza Zakani and Mardani, advanced the Revolutionary Guards' plans. However, senior Revolutionary Guards officials did not have a consensus at that time. Major General Rahim Safavi, the then-commander of the Revolutionary Guards, along with his deputies, held a harsh stance against the protest movement, viewing student activists with suspicion and calling for the protests to cease. However, Hossein Alaei, the then-head of the Revolutionary Guards' Joint Staff, opposed this approach and believed in the necessity of the Revolutionary Guards' cooperation with students' demands while maintaining national security and countering chaos. Consequently, from the very first day of the protests, the Revolutionary Guards adopted an aggressive stance and criticized the government for not quelling the protests and not declaring a state of emergency in managing Tehran. However, Khatami's government resisted from Friday to Saturday, July 9 to 22, and refused to let the Revolutionary Guards take control. Khatami's overall direction focused on supporting students' demands. The most significant support for students came from the Ministry of Science at that time, followed by the Ministry of Interior, particularly its political deputy, Mostafa Tajzadeh, who was active. Dr. Mostafa Moien, the Minister of Science, officially resigned in front of students in protest against the tragedy that occurred. At that time, the students' demands in the July 18 protest movement were merely university-related and limited to the tragedy that had occurred. Apologies to students and the university, defending the integrity of the university, the publication of Salam newspaper, the dismissal of Heydatollah Lotfian, the then-commander of the police, and the punishment of those responsible for the attack on the university dormitories constituted the main demands, which were rational and defensible under those circumstances and did not have an extreme nature. Demands and requests outside this framework had no correlation with the student movement and were fueled by a heterogeneous group of political opponents, troublemakers, angry students, victims of state violence in Iran after the revolution, and infiltrators of the authoritarian regime. Naturally, anger and frustration from the depth of the tragedy and disrespect towards students and the university also led some to amplify the protest movement and turn it into a political change movement. However, this approach, due to its unrealistic handling and lack of a plan, took on a blind protest character and ultimately fueled chaos and disorder. Unfortunately, when the protest movement faced an internal challenge and some veered towards blind street protests, Khatami lost the initiative and became reactive. In this context, the chaos narrative in conservative media became so prominent that it turned into the main issue for the National Security Council. In this atmosphere, the temporary delegation of control of Tehran to the Revolutionary Guards was approved in the National Security Council, where half of the members had non-reformist inclinations. In fact, this resolution was imposed on Khatami and was legally communicated to the office of the Supreme Leader by the council's president and, after his approval, was conveyed to the Revolutionary Guards' command. Therefore, the Revolutionary Guards' presence was not at Khatami's invitation but rather a result of pressure from the Revolutionary Guards and allied forces and favorable conditions for imposing their demands and plans. However, the National Security Council approved that the end of student protests would occur through a popular march centered on the students' legal demands and restoring calm to the city. Dr. Mostafa Moien was supposed to be the speaker. However, again under pressure from the Revolutionary Guards and authoritarian circles, the march was changed at the last moment, and Hassan Rouhani, who at that time held positions aligned with the repressive structure and anti-reform movement, became the speaker, and in a way, conservatives took over that program, resulting in the government march on July 23, where the students were accused of the reversal of events! The July 18 protest movement was unsuccessful, and in addition to the unmet demands, uncovering the truth of this case and dealing with its distortion has become a historical demand. The Revolutionary Guards are among the main accused in this significant historical case. Therefore, considering this reality, one can understand why every year a large volume of false narratives about July 18 is disseminated by authoritarian figures and efforts are made to embed the government's propaganda in distorting this historical case. Firouzabadi's statements are also noteworthy in this context.