Ahmad Khomeini: Commander or Decision-Maker of the 1988 Death Feast

The release of an audio file containing the remarks of Ayatollah Montazeri during a meeting with the executive committee responsible for the unforgettable crime of the mass executions of political prisoners in 1988 has once again brought Ahmad Khomeini's role into public focus. The hasty and angry reactions from Ahmad Khomeini's supporters and relatives indicate that contrary to their claims, the aforementioned tape has added a new dimension to that crime, and instead of responding, they have resorted to deflection, cleansing the issue, and creating distractions. In fact, their reactions are a repetition of past accusations and security-related practices, containing no new points. The orchestrated environment and targeted actions to create a security narrative linking the timing of the audio file's release with the activities of the People's Mojahedin Organization in regional recruitment and the presence of some former Saudi officials demonstrate the vulnerability of the regime and those involved in the 1988 mass executions, who are trying to impose a police state by violating freedom of expression and denying the opportunity for investigation and addressing a case that remains open in the public eye. These issues do not logically connect and even their temporal overlap does not fit the norms of political practice, which usually includes short timeframes of a few days. Ayatollah Montazeri's explicit criticisms of the 1988 executions during meetings with judicial officials have added more seriousness to the investigation of the case and the pursuit of justice and truth. Although much information has been published, including the memoirs of political prisoners and political figures of the Islamic Republic, there is still no complete and comprehensive narrative of what transpired, and the necessary documentation has not been observed. The number of victims remains disputed. However, information regarding the decision-making and implementation of the horrific policy is significantly greater than data concerning the background and pre-decision stages. In fact, the ambiguities and dark spots are more related to the commanders and the decision-making process. From the perspective of Ayatollah Montazeri and his close associates, as well as some political forces and former members of the Revolutionary Guard and Ministry of Intelligence who defended him, Ahmad Khomeini is accused of being the commander, director, and orchestrator of the 1988 mass executions, actively managing the process from start to finish. However, Ahmad Khomeini and his past and present defenders reject this claim, placing the primary responsibility on Ayatollah Khomeini. They defend the decision absolutely and comprehensively, not denying the involvement of Ayatollah Khomeini's household and the officials at Jamaran. The crux of the dispute revolves around the extent of Ahmad Khomeini's participation in the great crime of 1988. Although Ayatollah Montazeri's speculation is a thought-provoking hypothesis, in light of the available information, the likelihood that Ahmad Khomeini was the commander and mastermind of this heinous crime while his father was unaware seems weak. An examination of Ayatollah Khomeini's character and positions, particularly his authoritarian approach, indicates that he had no hesitation in resorting to violence when necessary. In Ayatollah Khomeini's discourse, anything that obstructs the continuity of the Islamic Republic and jeopardizes its interests must be removed without restriction. His actions demonstrate that he would not shy away from anything he deemed beneficial for Islam and the revolution. The statement 'Preserving the regime is the most important obligation' opened the door for the use of violent and unethical methods to eliminate threats during his leadership. Ayatollah Montazeri speculates that both letters attributed to Ayatollah Khomeini regarding the 1988 massacre were written and influenced by Ahmad Khomeini. Although the second letter, which contains a question from Ayatollah Abdolkarim Mousavi Ardebili, the then-head of the judiciary, posed by Ahmad Khomeini and the response from the founder of the Islamic Republic, are both written in the same handwriting, there is no conclusive evidence to definitively attribute the first letter to Ahmad Khomeini. While this possibility cannot be dismissed, the likelihood that Ayatollah Khomeini himself issued such an order is supported by more corroborating evidence. According to Ahmad Khomeini's defenders, the executioners, including the central committee and provincial committees, as well as other judicial, security, and prison officials, stated that the most follow-up for the swift execution of the prisoners' sentences came from Ahmad Khomeini. An examination of the existing evidence and a content analysis of the published information and memoirs of officials and individuals involved in the matter suggest that Ayatollah Montazeri's view regarding Ahmad Khomeini's special role is more accurate in terms of decision-making and execution follow-up. In other words, it is difficult to label him as the main commander of the incident. Ayatollah Khomeini most likely held the highest authority in command, decision-making, and issuing orders. Multiple accounts of Ayatollah Khomeini's defense of the 1988 executions, both in messages and meetings with regime leaders, weaken the notion of his ignorance or non-involvement in the matter. However, it is illogical to assume that he would have suddenly replaced the existing judicial and security practices. Especially since two months after the killings, he called for a return to previous practices in dealing with political prisoners. In fact, his mindset had already been prepared for such decision-making based on reports and information. Decision-making is a far more critical stage than the decision itself. Decisions are not made in a vacuum. This is where the finger of accusation points toward Ahmad Khomeini, who was trusted by his father and held a unique position in obtaining information and contacts with Ayatollah Khomeini. Of course, the Ministry of Intelligence and the then-Minister Mohammad Reyshahri are also serious candidates in shaping Ayatollah Khomeini's mindset and his approval for the issuance of the aforementioned order. However, these two are not mutually exclusive and, like their cooperation in the case of Seyyed Mahdi Hashemi and the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri from the vice leadership, they may have been coordinated and in agreement in this regard as well. Ayatollah Khomeini's decision-making was influenced by the opinions of his close associates and particularly the framing of issues by his trusted officials. For example, the memory of Saeed Hajarian regarding the formation of the Ministry of Intelligence is enlightening. Initially, based on the consensus of the parliament and the main power circle, the country's security apparatus was supposed to be organized under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. They had also obtained Ayatollah Khomeini's initial approval. Saeed Hajarian, due to his presence in the inner circle, managed to meet with Ayatollah Khomeini. His explanations regarding the erroneous actions accompanying intelligence work that could be attributed to the Supreme Leader led Ayatollah Khomeini to agree to its ministerial status. During the executions, if someone from his trusted channels had explained the risks of this decision and the unreality of the threats, it is possible that he would not have deemed the widespread and unjustified use of violence necessary. However, as previously explained, Ayatollah Khomeini had no doubts about the use of violence, but at the same time, he had his own assessments and acted based on calculations. The most significant document that could consider Ahmad Khomeini as influential in decision-making and guiding Ayatollah Khomeini towards issuing the order for the crime is the 'Letter of Suffering.' Ahmad Khomeini wrote the Letter of Suffering in May 1989 addressed to Ayatollah Montazeri. Although he attempted to explain the reasons for his father's disagreements with Ayatollah Montazeri and consequently his removal from the vice leadership, the text clearly shows that the writer is more than an observer; he is an intervener who played an active role in shaping the events and confrontations between the parties. Ahmad Khomeini explicitly defends the 1988 executions in the Letter of Suffering, and the level and extent of his defense far exceed mere representation or justification of his father's decision. In fact, he describes a will that united him and Ayatollah Khomeini in the bloody purge of political prisoners, most of whom belonged to the People's Mojahedin Organization. His active role in the matter is more evident in a part of the letter where, in response to Ayatollah Montazeri's objection that the judges of the Islamic Republic are making mistakes and that they are not like the sacred Ardebili who entrusted human lives to them, he states: 'Of course, you know that I consider the intelligence personnel and the prosecutors who are fighting against the counter-revolutionaries to be like the sacred Ardebili, and I believe that if the sacred Ardebili were in power and wanted to implement God's command, he would not have acted better than these people. Moreover, does the fact that the intelligence and Revolutionary Guard personnel are not like the sacred Ardebili mean that we should suspend God's commands and consider everyone as irreligious? Should all judges be like the sacred Ardebili, so that if they are not, the judicial organization lacks legitimacy? Furthermore, if the sacred Ardebili were involved in the case of Mehdi Hashemi, would he have acted differently than the intelligence and prosecutor's personnel?' A sharp and vindictive view towards the People's Mojahedin Organization is evident throughout the Letter of Suffering. Ahmad Khomeini, considering his previous experience and temporary support for the organization, explains the current and past conflicts as follows: 'After the revolution, like you today, I thought that it was possible to attract the Mojahedin and liberals and other groups involved in the struggle. I approached them. I repeatedly told the late martyr Dr. Beheshti and Messrs. Hashemi and Khamenei that if you reach a decision, I will act accordingly, but I believe that these groups can be attracted. It wasn't long before I realized that these groups had deceived me.' Ahmad Khomeini had a good relationship with the People's Mojahedin Organization in 1978 and 1979. At the memorial ceremony for Ayatollah Taleghani, he embraced Massoud Rajavi after the speech. After the attack on the Mojahedin's rally in Amjadieh, Ahmad Khomeini strongly criticized the disruptors and the group known as Hezbollah. After 1980, Ahmad Khomeini gradually became one of the main supporters of violence against opponents. Ayatollah Khomeini, in response to those who claimed that the dismissal of Asadollah Lajevardi, 'the symbol of violence against political prisoners,' was Ahmad Khomeini's doing, stated that 'Ahmad considered Lajevardi's presence necessary for Evin Prison and deemed his dismissal a catastrophe.' After Khamenei's leadership, Ahmad Khomeini's positions gradually became critical, and he protested against actions he had once defended. Ahmad Khomeini's variable political behavior in different periods after the ambiguous points of the revolution's history is notable. However, Ahmad Khomeini did not possess a strong and well-formed character. His fascination with politics and ideological traditionalism, along with being a trusted figure of the revolution's leader, provided him with an opportunity to be at the center of power, and perhaps this issue intensified his desire for power and governance. However, he had a tendency towards authoritarianism and forceful approaches from the beginning. Hojjat al-Islam Hassan Lahouti, in recounting Ahmad Khomeini's revolutionary background, referred to his efforts in burning cinema curtains in Qom before the revolution. Therefore, it seems the most probable scenario regarding Ahmad Khomeini's role in the 1988 executions is that of decision-making and follow-up to expedite the execution of decisions. Ahmad Khomeini and other facilitators and encouragers of Ayatollah Khomeini, considering the Mojahedin's Operation Eternal Light, likely maneuvered on issues such as the transfer of news regarding front developments, the emergence of tensions and movements in prisons led by elements aligned with the Mojahedin, the initiation of activities by some Mojahedin supporters in society, the creation of movements to incite chaos and rebellion in cities, the continuous dissemination of messages from the Mojahedin through their affiliated radios, and inciting and provoking the people to revolt. Since the Eternal Light operation failed on August 7, and widespread and uncontrollable unrest was not reported in prisons or any cities during that period, these claims appear to be pessimistic and unrealistic speculations. After the Mojahedin's heavy defeat, they no longer had the capacity to pose a serious threat to the regime. Therefore, there was no longer a basis for carrying out executions that began after the end of Operation Mersad. However, it seems that utilizing the atmosphere for revenge and eradicating political opponents and the authoritarian perspective in governing the country was the main reason for creating the environment for issuing the order for the aforementioned crime. The limitation of victims to members of the People's Mojahedin Organization is another reality that undermines the justification for the killings under the guise of 'changing the Mojahedin's status from an internal opposition group to a foreign occupying army.' The massacre of thousands is also not a decision that could be made within a few days and required extensive prior arrangements. Although Ahmad Khomeini's acknowledgment that the People's Mojahedin had deceived him could psychologically explain potential reasons for vindictiveness and revenge, probing into the issues of that era, especially his and his group's attempts to seize or influence the institution of the Supreme Leader in the post-Khomeini period, indicates that the matter went beyond personal grievances. Ahmad Khomeini, throughout the Letter of Suffering, presents the People's Mojahedin Organization as a symbol of evil and an unending conspiracy against the revolution and the regime, attempting to attribute any criticism or objection to the regime's actions and policies to their machinations; thus, in a situation where he was aware of his father's serious illness and anticipated his imminent death, he may have had plans and goals for succession.