Ahmadinejad Against 'Dictatorship'

A note by Morteza Kazemian -- It seems ironic; Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's explicit and public protest against the judiciary and dictatorship. The person whose declaration of victory in the 2009 presidential election became a turning point in the history of the Islamic Republic, leading to a bloody crackdown on citizens, is now positioned as an opposition figure alongside his allies, openly criticizing senior judicial officials. Ahmadinejad, standing beside his accused deputy (Hamid Baghaei) and Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei (who is also now an accused), has increasingly set aside niceties with the main power players. The Ahmadinejad-Mashaei group is attempting to present and promote itself as a 'third current' between the two traditional and main political currents in the Islamic Republic. In the noticeable vacuum created by the chronic suppression of real opposition, they are trying to label themselves as 'neither reformist nor principlist' and continue to promote themselves as an alternative in the media. 'The best defense is an attack!' There are numerous serious questions and ambiguities regarding Ahmadinejad's managerial record; serious allegations related to financial abuses, extravagant spending, and inefficiency, which range from the Babak Zanjani case to the Mehr housing project. The over $50 billion debt of the National Iranian Oil Company to the Central Bank and other banks is just one prominent and very important witness. The prosecutor of the Court of Audit has also reported the issuance of seven definitive sentences against Ahmadinejad (in five oil-related cases and two non-oil cases) and has revealed his 48 trillion tomans of misconduct. In such a situation, and simultaneously with public dissatisfaction with the judiciary's performance and the spread of various rumors against the family of the head of the judiciary, Ahmadinejad and his companions have defined the best defense as 'attack' and have pursued it boldly. From 'sit-ins' to fiery interviews, Ahmadinejad, Mashaei, and Baghaei are trying to create a safe margin for themselves by stirring public opinion and arousing sympathy among socially dissatisfied layers regarding the current situation. Ahmadinejad, Mashaei, and Baghaei are engaged in sharp criticism against the judiciary. Ahmadinejad himself has spoken in a new and unprecedented interview about the lack of justice and fairness in the judiciary and criticized the violation of human and legal rights of the accused. In a sense, he has relied on 'truthful' words that seek a 'false' goal and intention. While he criticizes the illegal treatment of his friends, he turned a blind eye to the suppression of fundamental rights of citizens during his presidency -- especially after the controversial and ambiguous 2009 election. The fundamental and legal rights of Ahmadinejad and his colleagues and allies are preserved and presumed; but why did he, as the head of the executive branch and responsible for enforcing the constitution, not take effective steps to uphold the fundamental and civil rights of Iranians (especially the 'Green' protesters against the 2009 election results)? This is the same point that Nasrin Sotoudeh, a human rights lawyer, referred to in an open and critical letter to Ahmadinejad; Sotoudeh wrote: 'Your story and that of your friends, which in civil language is called 'sit-in', is your right. But you have forgotten that in the trials of your election protesters, justice was trampled much more than this. In those days when people were sent in groups to show trials for the crime of 'doubting the election' without legal procedures, and the display of that was broadcast on television at night, how did you not see that blatant injustice?' Ahmadinejad not only remained silent in the face of the bloody suppression of thousands of protesting citizens but also called them 'dust and debris' and later appointed one of the key perpetrators of illegal and inhumane treatment of protesters, Judge Mortezaei, as the head of the Anti-Smuggling Goods and Currency Headquarters and the head of the Social Security Organization. However, in the days of being pushed out of the central power, Ahmadinejad now speaks of the 'dictatorship of the judiciary'. Where does this audacity come from? The audacity of Ahmadinejad, Mashaei, and Baghaei to attack the head of the judiciary and its spokesperson (Mohseni Ejei) and their direct and indirect criticisms of the core of power in the Islamic Republic stem from two undeniable issues: first, the collection of information and documents that the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei group has from rival factions within the political power structure. Very important data that was sufficiently gathered during Ahmadinejad's tenure at the Ministry of Intelligence and is used as an important tool for threatening rivals and extracting concessions from them. Secondly, what connects Ahmadinejad personally to the 2009 presidential election; the connection between his victory and the will of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. Ayatollah Khamenei did not wait for the Guardian Council's opinion after the 2009 'election coup' and quickly -- despite serious ambiguities and questions about the 11 million vote gap between Ahmadinejad and Mousavi -- declared him the elected president. He even emphasized that Ahmadinejad's views were closer to his own than Rafsanjani's. On another level, one must also recall the series of 'give-and-take' agreements Ahmadinejad had with the top of the political system and the central power during his presidency; where he was linked to data related to many security issues (from nuclear and missile projects to military intervention in Syria and even circumventing sanctions and smuggling goods and special costs of the leadership's office). 'One cannot plan for what one has done oneself.' Based on what has been said, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has given a person and a group the opportunity to remain active in the power bloc that has now turned into a 'strange evil'. After the emergence of the 'Green Movement', Ayatollah Khamenei called his critics and even the silent agents of the regime 'blind' and criticized them. He must now answer for the political actions of Ahmadinejad, who he himself created a broad field for his presidency. It is noteworthy that despite all of Ahmadinejad's 'decentralizing' actions and his rebellions (including announcing his candidacy for the 2017 presidential election despite the leader's recommendations and prohibitions), Ayatollah Khamenei has still retained him in the Expediency Council; a significant privilege to control a rebellious player. Ahmadinejad, while apparently speaking of the 'Leader of the Revolution' and keeping his picture on his desk during interviews, simultaneously targets the appointed leadership at the head of the judiciary with the sharpest criticisms and speaks of the 'dictatorship of the judiciary'. Just as Mashaei questions and criticizes him without naming the first person of the regime. In the face of this situation, the central power is trying to prevent further adventurism and threatening actions by Ahmadinejad through bribery and threats simultaneously. On one hand, he is retained in the Expediency Council, and on the other hand, Mashaei also receives a judicial summons. One cannot plan for what one has done oneself; the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic must pay the cost of his 'blindness' in elevating Ahmadinejad and giving him space for the time being. Burned players or a critical juncture? It is a reality: Ahmadinejad has gained some appeal in certain social layers based on his bizarre spending -- based on his astronomical and several hundred billion dollar government revenues from oil and gas. However, the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei group is grossly miscalculating their social standing and popularity. The noticeable lack of citizens' support for his 'sit-in' allies is an important witness to this claim. His disqualification in the last election did not spark a wave of protest in society either. Ahmadinejad and his allies, however, are determined to pursue their political-ideological objectives and continue their presence in the political arena. Despite the end of their work for the core of power and the prevention of their return to high and effective levels of governance, the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei group is trying to keep themselves relevant for 'critical junctures'. From this perspective, although the threat circle against Ahmadinejad's allies has become more serious and tighter, reaching even to Mashaei's summons, they are sufficiently motivated and bold to continue their active presence and actions in society, especially to promote themselves in the media. Thus, despite the lack of effective and serious social support for the Ahmadinejad-Mashaei group, they should still be regarded as part of the political players in today's Iran -- especially in 'critical junctures'.