Ahmadinejad, Economic Mafia, and Judicial Crisis

The case of the NAJA Cooperation Foundation is one of the significant challenges for the judiciary and also an opportunity to understand the developments related to the intertwining of this institution with political wills. Mohseni Eje'i denied the arrest of Ismail Ahmadinejad, the former commander of the police force, but his presence in a television program broadcasted on the first channel of state television cast doubt on Mohseni Eje'i's claim. Ahmadinejad announced that he had been interrogated by the court. Accordingly, he may have faced short-term and house arrest or been issued bail or an oath obligation. Previously, Brigadier General Montazer al-Mahdi, the social deputy and spokesperson for the police, had reported the existence of violations within the NAJA Cooperation Foundation and claimed that the mentioned case was opened at the end of Ahmadinejad's management and was submitted to the judiciary for review. His statements revealed the incorrectness of Mohseni Eje'i's position, who had claimed ignorance of the violations in the NAJA Cooperation Foundation and had conditionalized the investigation. Therefore, it is possible that Ahmadinejad's departure from the police command was not natural and was related to the mentioned economic corruption. This is not the first time Ahmadinejad's name has come up regarding corruption. Previously, in connection with the oil sales case and the failure to deposit its revenues into the oil company's account, the police force was mentioned alongside economic corruptors in the tenth government. However, what gives this case a special status and sheds light on the relationship between the judiciary and political influences are Ahmadinejad's claims. In a strange statement during the television program, he claimed that not only had he been threatened for not pursuing the economic corruption case in the NAJA Cooperation Foundation, but also that the powerful behind-the-scenes figures had altered the judicial process and changed the judge of the case with money. He attributed the financial abuse problem to the Ghodr Investment Company as one of the subsidiaries of the foundation and stated: 'We spoke with the officials of this company and stated that their actions were wrong and that they should return the assets, but since it was profitable for them and they had to pay tens of billions of tomans in profits, they did not cease their actions and we referred the matter to the judiciary. ... In the middle of the case review, the judge was removed, and the matter was left unresolved, after which they began to create a narrative and said that the NAJA Foundation was going bankrupt, and they threatened us that they had filmed us to let the people know and to rush to Bank Qavamin to withdraw their money. ... They acknowledged that they would publish the film to threaten us on social media.' He continued: 'I had lost hope in the court, so I wrote a letter to the head of the judiciary asking him to read it; he read it carefully and said, 'Is it possible to transfer a judge in the middle of a case review and doing work?' However, at his order, the case was sent to a special judge for review, and the case was also referred from the public prosecutor's office to the military. ... Those who had previously threatened us with the release of the film spread rumors about my imprisonment and informed the media. ... Because they claimed that the transaction had my permission, the judge of the case has sent letters twice to me, and I have responded in writing, which has not resulted in summons or imprisonment.' From his words, it can be concluded that the perpetrators and agents of the mentioned violations have so much influence and power in the judiciary that they have been able to change the judge of the case! Accordingly, it is possible that the court ruling may be issued in line with the desires of those who have misused public assets and illegally withdrawn from the deposits of retired and active members of the police force. Ahmadinejad has seriously questioned the real and legal structure of the police force and, on the other hand, the justice of the judiciary. When the commander of the NAJA does not have the security to deal with violations and corruption, and according to his claim, judges in the judiciary are changed by the influence of behind-the-scenes corrupt factors, it can be concluded that the crisis of the judiciary and its contamination with political interventions has intensified and deepened. Essentially, Ahmadinejad warned that the economic mafia has taken control of the judiciary. Since Ahmadinejad is politically aligned with the ruling faction in the judiciary and both belong to the dominant power and appointed institutions, this conflict and the media coverage by state television is a strange occurrence. Ahmadinejad is an old member of the Revolutionary Guards affiliated with the right-wing faction, who later aligned himself with the third-line conservatism discourse and has always been in line with the leadership. In the past, such issues have arisen between elected and appointed institutions or factions that did not have strong backing in the government. However, this is the first time that a high-ranking security and police official has made serious accusations against the judiciary with the green light from state television. The judiciary has not yet reacted to Ahmadinejad's claims. Therefore, the outcome of the judicial misconduct case in the NAJA Cooperation Foundation is another test for the judiciary and also an opportunity to understand the new equations governing the judiciary. Until now, the main branches of the judiciary have been tools for consolidating power and advancing the political agendas of the power sector, especially in controlling elected institutions. The government's approach to combating economic corruption has also been engineered by this power and has been railroaded in the desired direction. In some cases, efforts have been made to divert the judicial process by establishing incompetent courts. However, it now seems that a rift has emerged within the dominant power and appointed institutions, and the use of judicial and state television levers is no longer in the hands of a single faction. Of course, this conclusion is speculative and not definitive. The course of developments in the case and the outcome for Ahmadinejad will clarify the accuracy and extent of its alignment with reality. The usual formula of immunity for high-ranking figures and punishment for low-ranking agents may be applied. However, the expansion of economic corruption within the government can confront the controlled judicial management with a crisis, and this time the legitimacy of the judiciary may be challenged not only by reformists, the opposition, and civil society forces but also by a section of forces affiliated with appointed institutions.