Ahmadinejad's Aspirations for a Putin and Erdogan Model in Iran

The victory of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the Turkish referendum on Sunday positioned the authoritarian president of that country in the mold of Vladimir Putin, the strongman of Russia, while the president of Iran is under the authority of the 'Supreme Leader' and executes his wishes: a role that Ahmadinejad has been striving to change for several years. Ahmadinejad is not an opposition figure to the Islamic Republic; he is a paradox within it, with a different perspective on how to manage today's Iranian society. He is a product of the Islamic government, having grown up within it, and he knows his stature well in comparison to all the men of the Islamic government of Iran. Ahmadinejad's difference from others lies in his eagerness to play in a higher weight class. He is not a dreamer who has lost his way; he is a bold pragmatist who sees his power and greatness in the weakness and smallness of the political system's officials in Iran. Before challenging Ali Khamenei, Ahmadinejad confronted Hashemi Rafsanjani and, after defeating him in the electoral competition, shattered the pillar that had been built in people's minds about him. Ahmadinejad would intentionally arrive late to meetings to elevate Hashemi before the 'president.' He belongs to the lower layers of society and, as the president of the ninth and tenth governments, has witnessed from both external and internal perspectives that the Islamic government in Iran has been stagnant for years. Ahmadinejad is thinking of changing the way the Islamic government is run and merging responsibilities and concentrating power in the hands of one president. Ahmadinejad's promise of 'spring' has found an answer in the 'spring' circle to the question of how, if today in many large and small countries, people have turned their backs on conventional political figures and washed their hands of conventional politicians, can it be rationally accepted that the religious government of Iran, after 38 years of monotony and imposition, has not ignited the thirst for change within society? On the day of registration for the twelfth presidential election, Ahmadinejad repeated the word 'spring' three times to emphasize the concept of structural changes in the political systems of the three Arab countries of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya. On October 5, 2012, while addressing the topic of Mahdi and the conditions for his emergence, he first chanted 'Long live spring' in front of the leaders of several observing countries present at the United Nations General Assembly. At that time, one year had passed since the 'Arab Spring.' During those days, Ahmadinejad's relations as the head of government with the leader of the Islamic government over the division of power were completely cold and in a 'critical situation.' On April 28 of the previous year, Ahmadinejad intended to replace Heydar Moslehi, the then Minister of Intelligence, whose ministry was one of the four traditional areas of influence of the Supreme Leader in the government. Following Ahmadinejad's eleven-day absence and house arrest, the differences between the president and the Supreme Leader became clearer than ever. In February of the following year, upon returning from a controversial trip to Egypt, where the government had changed during the 'Arab Spring,' Ahmadinejad and his close aide, Mashai, were welcomed at Tehran airport with 'spring' slogans. Conservatives deemed this display suspicious and a maneuver by government agents. Again, during the February 22 rally, Ahmadinejad repeated the slogan 'Long live spring' three times during a live televised ceremony and was predictably met with severe criticism from conservatives. Ahmadinejad is the only president who has challenged the limitless power and authority of the Supreme Leader in the 38 years of the Islamic Republic's existence. One of the most memorable confrontations between Ahmadinejad and the leader of the Islamic government was Khamenei's recourse to 'supreme decree' to dismiss Esfandiar Mashai from the vice presidency, and then reinstating Mashai just hours after his forced resignation by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, this time as the president's chief of staff! Khamenei's targeting is done discreetly. Ahmadinejad strongly suspects that he will be disqualified during the vetting process of the Guardian Council: a fate that Hamid Baqai also anticipates, and which had also caught Esfandiar Rahim Mashai in the previous election. For this reason, his main goal is not direct participation in the elections, as the responsibility for vetting names and introducing final candidates is entrusted to the leader's appointees in the Guardian Council - it is to challenge the leader and the structure of the government in a war of attrition. Ali Khamenei knows his rival well from eight years of political interaction and administrative-executive work and is aware of Ahmadinejad's ultimate goal and intent. Therefore, he wants to isolate him and keep him out of sight by any means. With this mindset and in order to firmly establish his seemingly private 'instruction' and 'recommendation' to Ahmadinejad not to participate in the elections, Khamenei subsequently made the issue public (official) to close off any bargaining path for him, but Ahmadinejad entered through the window behind Baqai and registered. On Tuesday, October 25 of last year, Khamenei said: 'Well, yes, a person, a gentleman came to me, and I, considering his own interests and the interests of the country, told him that you should not participate in such a matter. We said we do not consider it appropriate for you to participate. Now someone says why didn't he say this over the loudspeaker? Well, this is also behind the loudspeaker... I know if you enter this issue, it will be harmful to you. It is also harmful to the country. I tell you not to enter. I do not consider it appropriate.' Khamenei's intention in blocking Ahmadinejad's entry into the electoral arena is not to avoid 'bipolarity,' which, in the event of a final confrontation between Ebrahim Raisi and Hassan Rouhani, would create an unavoidable situation and repeat the display of 'the people's option against the system's option.' Khamenei seeks Ahmadinejad's isolation and even removal, knowing well that the former president does not adhere to the written and unwritten contracts of the Supreme Leader's government. Ahmadinejad is not satisfied with moving in the shadow of another and being in the second line. He sees himself in the mold of Putin and Erdogan, not in the dimensions of Rouhani and Khatami. Ahmadinejad's intent during his two presidential terms was to gain more power for a position that Mohammad Khatami referred to as the 'system's water carrier' in reference to its limited powers. The Islamic president of Iran, unlike other presidents from the ballot box in the major countries of the region, is not in charge of the work; he is dependent on it and inevitably has to keep an eye on the 'guidelines of the leadership.' Ahmadinejad, as an instinctive wave rider, aims to ignite the community's thirst for changing the structure of the aging Islamic regime and the stagnant Iran, just as Ruhollah Khomeini once played with the powerful army of the Shah and won.