Ainhorne: A Two-Stage Lifting of Sanctions is a Wise Process

Multiple technical aspects are considered one of the reasons for the prolonged negotiations between Iran and the six countries. About ten years ago, when Iran was negotiating with three European countries, its nuclear program was much more limited than today. Today, not only has the number of Iran's active centrifuges been reported to be around 9,000, but facilities such as the heavy water plant in Arak, Natanz, and the underground facility in Fordow are also part of the equation. To achieve a comprehensive and final agreement between Iran and the six countries, analysts have suggested various ways to the negotiators. Some believe that Iran's nuclear program should be severely limited, while others, like Israel and some American lawmakers, argue that the program should be completely dismantled. Another group of observers takes a more moderate approach and believes that by imposing restrictions on Tehran's nuclear program, a path can be paved for verification. Regarding the technical aspects that are currently challenging and the prospects for reaching a comprehensive and final agreement, Radio Farda spoke with Robert Einhorn, a senior analyst at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Einhorn previously worked on disarmament issues during the Bill Clinton administration and was a special advisor to the Barack Obama administration on disarmament and arms control. Mr. Einhorn, before we delve into the final days of negotiations, I want to take a look back at the past year. What is your assessment of this year since Iran and the 5+1 signed the Joint Action Plan? I believe both sides have shown some flexibility on certain tough issues and have proposed initiatives to reach a solution. However, some key issues remain unresolved, particularly the scope of uranium enrichment in Iran and the timeline for lifting sanctions. In this regard, I think Iran has shown stubbornness in reducing its enrichment capacity for the duration of the comprehensive agreement, and this seems to be the main obstacle in this process. In Muscat, Abbas Araghchi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, said that although discussions have been held with the parties on all challenges, the key issue has been sanctions. After this statement, some analysts said that the reason for this remark is that in the event of a failure in negotiations, Iran would blame the other side for the failure. What is your opinion on this? Are sanctions the most challenging issue? Sanctions are clearly very important. Lifting sanctions, if I don't say it's the most important, is one of the most significant motivations for Iran to negotiate. Therefore, I understand that this is an important issue for them. However, I think it is important to be realistic about how these sanctions are lifted. The U.S. approach is that sanctions will be lifted in two stages. First, the U.S. will suspend its unilateral sanctions, and after Iran shows that it is adhering to its commitments, the government will go to Congress and request a vote to lift the sanctions related to Iran's nuclear program. I think this is a practical approach. If the U.S. government goes to Congress from the very beginning and asks for permanent lifting of sanctions, Congress will not agree. Congress will say that we first want Iran to leave a record of compliance with its commitments. In the early stages, Iran probably has not responded to the International Atomic Energy Agency's concerns about its past nuclear activities, and before Iran does this and satisfies the Agency, I think it is unimaginable that Congress will vote positively to lift all sanctions. Therefore, I think the two-stage approach that the U.S. has proposed for lifting sanctions is a wise process. I believe there is no other way to reach an agreement. Before we get into the technical issues, you mentioned Congress and are well aware of the atmosphere in Washington. What impact do you think the recent midterm elections and the Republican takeover of the legislative bodies will have on the negotiations? We know that a significant number of senators and members of the House of Representatives have had many criticisms of these negotiations, and these criticisms will continue from many of them. And you know that starting in January, in the new calendar year, Republicans will take control of Congress, which will create challenges. However, I do not think this will be an obstacle to reaching and implementing an agreement. I think the U.S. government is seeking a suitable agreement, and if it sees that the conditions it wants are met, it will finalize the agreement. And if the government believes that finalizing the agreement is in the interest of the U.S., Congress has no way to prevent it. In January, when Congress becomes Republican-majority, representatives can make it difficult, but they cannot block the agreement, especially since the executive branch has its ways, and if the agreement is based on the initial suspension of sanctions, the executive can implement this suspension without going to Congress. In any case, there are tactics that the Senate or the House of Representatives can use to obstruct the government, such as holding hearings on the subject or voting on new laws, but the President also has the power to veto, and Congress must have a two-thirds majority vote in both chambers to override the veto, which will be difficult. Let's return to the technical issues of a potential agreement. The timeline of the agreement has been another issue that has been described as challenging. For other countries, this time has varied. For example, in the case of South Africa, it took 7 years for the Agency to confirm the peaceful nature of this program. What do you think is a realistic number of years for Iran? I believe the duration of the agreement should not depend on the time it takes for the Agency to announce a definitive result regarding the nature of Iran's nuclear program and its compliance with its commitments. This is only one of the factors. The issue is that there is a very low level of trust between the international community and Iran. Iran has had activities in the past, alongside its possibly military aspects, which I refer to as violations of its commitments under the safeguards that the UN Security Council and the Board of Governors of the Agency have also confirmed. Therefore, Iran must regain this trust, and this will not happen overnight and will take time. Time is needed for Iran to comply with its commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I think it will take about 15 years for restrictions to be imposed, for example, in the area of enrichment and specific monitoring actions. However, I think it is important to note that these 15 years will not harm Iran's civilian nuclear program. During this time, Iran will enrich but at a lower level. However, this level will be sufficient to fuel several of its research reactors. During this timeframe, Iran can also import fuel for the Bushehr power plant from Russia. The contract for this import expires in 2021, but the Russians are willing to extend it. Thus, Iran can generate electricity in Bushehr, which is needed for the Iranian people, and this will be both economical and secure. And during these 15 years, Iran will not sacrifice itself. After that, if it wants, it can develop its program and produce fuel domestically. When you talked about past activities, we moved past the military aspect, and I want to return to it. Solving this issue, although it is between Iran and the Agency, has a direct impact on negotiations with the 5+1. Two solutions have been proposed in this regard: one is that the Agency should not announce final confirmation before it has received answers to all questions in this regard, and the second approach is that instead of delving into all the details of the past, it should focus on the present and try to have precise oversight of the current status of this program. What is your opinion on this? First, Iran must cooperate much more than it has done so far in this regard. It is clear that the Agency is still not satisfied with its questions regarding past activities. At the same time, I must say that practically, I do not think the Agency has the capacity to receive all the information related to Iran's past activities. Based on information I have personally seen, I believe that Iran has engaged in research, testing, and acquiring equipment related to nuclear weapons production in the past. I do not think Iran is prepared to admit to this, especially given the fatwa of Iran's leader in this regard, admitting to this is a difficult task for this country. As a result, I do not expect the Agency to obtain all the answers. However, it is very important for Iran to cooperate in this regard, and it is crucial that it allows access to certain locations where there is suspicion of these activities, and more importantly, that Iran allows access to some nuclear scientists who are believed to have been active in these past activities. And this access should not be a one-time thing; the Agency should have continuous access to speak with these individuals. This will be the most important means of building trust, showing that Iran is not continuing these activities and will not do so in the future. Iran says that national interests are the reason for not issuing this permit. Alongside the claim that the safety of scientists is the reason for not disclosing their identities, it says that access to certain locations is problematic because these sites are related to Iran's defense programs, which could jeopardize national security. In your opinion, if there is no access, will it hinder the final conclusion about Iran's nuclear program? I think the issue of not allowing access to military sites is incorrect. I participated in negotiations when the U.S. was negotiating with the former Soviet Union and then Russia regarding arms limitations. The U.S. and Russia managed to reach an agreement for verification that allowed us to enter military facilities without disclosing sensitive information that was unrelated to this agreement. For example, under this agreement, the U.S. and Russia could ask each other to separate their missile warheads for counting. For this purpose, the solution that was considered was very simple: a cloth was placed over the warheads so that the other side could not precisely understand the technology of these warheads. Nevertheless, verification was carried out. I am not saying that in the case of Iran, such intrusive actions should be taken, but in the history of arms negotiations, there are numerous examples of how managed access to facilities can be conducted without disclosing information unrelated to the agreement. Therefore, I think it is a mistake for the Iranians to say that military facilities are inaccessible. Mr. Einhorn, as a final question, I want to ask you about the December 3 deadline. As we approach this deadline, it is not clear what the outcome will be. What is your prediction for that day? I do not think it is possible to reach a comprehensive agreement by December 3. We are very close to December 3, and we do not know what has happened in the Muscat talks. However, it seems clear to me that they have not made significant progress. We will have to see what happens in the coming days. I hope that the negotiators can somehow reach an agreement on the key parameters of a comprehensive agreement. However, I cannot imagine that there is enough time to reach a comprehensive agreement. It is possible that the parties may extend the talks for a short time. The most important issue for me is whether the parties will agree on some key issues before agreeing to extend discussions on these topics. Therefore, you do not think about the failure of negotiations at all... In theory, it is possible that on December 3 or a day or two before that, the parties may announce that they have not been able to narrow the gap in opinions and have decided to end the negotiations. However, I do not think this will happen. I believe the parties are genuinely seeking to reach a solution. However, so far, the solution they have negotiated has not been sufficiently responsive and has not reduced the differences, but no one wants to leave the negotiating table at this stage. I may be wrong, but the possibility of ending negotiations on December 3 does not exist.