Ali Motahari and the Emergence of Protest-Oriented Conservatism

Ali Motahari's speech on January 21 in the parliament became controversial. His remarks criticizing the government's approach regarding the events of December 30 and emphasizing the illegality of the house arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Zahra Rahnavard led to his speech being cut short and the public session of the parliament being suspended. Following a commotion involving nearly 20 representatives, including Hosseini from Qasr-e Shirin, Naeimi from Astara, Akbari from Karaj, Karimi Qodosi from Mashhad, Aghamohammadi from Khorramabad, Ansari from Abadan, and Bashiri from Pakdasht, Mohammad Abutalebi, the deputy speaker of the parliament, did not allow Motahari to finish his speech, and ultimately, after a physical altercation with some representatives, Motahari was forced to leave the podium. Abutalebi's actions were contrary to the internal regulations of the parliament and Article 86 of the Constitution. Motahari is not the first representative whose speech aimed at fulfilling his representative duties in the Islamic Republic has been interrupted and attacked by hardline representatives. Before him, representatives such as engineer Mehdi Bazargan, engineer Ali Akbar Moeinfar, and Shar'aspand had experienced similar and harsher encounters. Although Motahari had previously called for the lifting of the house arrest and declared it illegal during his tenure in the ninth parliament, this time the tone and nature of his protest were more intense. The atmosphere surrounding the choice between 'lifting the house arrest' or 'legal prosecution' has created a renewed public discourse on the freedom of the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement since December 7 of this year, increasing the sensitivity of hardline conservatives towards defending the rights of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard from the parliament podium and its public broadcast through national radio. Motahari's sharp criticism of the government's commemoration of December 30 this year and his comparison of the divisive narrative of this day to 'Yawm al-Shaytan' caused hardline representatives to lose control. From their perspective, Motahari's words contradicted the leader's laudatory remarks about December 30. Thus, Motahari's words resonated and had an impact beyond a normal parliamentary speech, creating a wave in the political arena. However, it is unclear whether this wave will remain sustainable. Nonetheless, this event has implications that, if not impossible to deny, are difficult to overlook in the political landscape of the country. The following will attempt to analyze several significant consequences of Motahari's unfinished speech in parliament. Motahari's speech and the controversy surrounding it alone neutralized all the effects of the government's program commemorating the anniversary of December 30 and the government's claim regarding the death of the Green Movement, which it refers to as sedition. The angry and fearful reaction of some hardline representatives and defenders of absolute rule showcased the government's vulnerability to the renewed activism of the Green Movement and the lifting of the house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard. Motahari clearly demonstrated that the various measures taken by the government to forget and eliminate the Green Movement and its symbolic leaders have not been effective. It also clarified that society did not move past the Green Movement in the 2013 elections, and contrary to the views of some reformist figures, the file of the 2009 electoral crisis is not only not closed but remains open in the public eye. The representatives' reactions and Abutalebi's conduct were more defensive and indicative of weakness. Motahari increasingly highlighted his political stance, which now carries significantly more weight than that of an individual in the specific political conditions of Iran. He is a unique phenomenon that does not fit into any of the political factions of the government and has a distinctive behavior, although he is currently a strategic ally of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. In his political evolution, Motahari has reached a point where, within the framework of the legal structure of the Islamic Republic and the interpretation of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, he calls for attention to the political rights of the people and tolerates critics. In the past, he was a supporter of political authoritarianism, but now he insists on opening the constrained political space. His insistence on lifting the house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard, which is accompanied by remarkable courage, does not mean his agreement with their political strategies. Motahari does not view their actions as flawless and calls for a balanced approach to both sides of the electoral dispute of 2009. Over time, his positions have increasingly aligned with those of the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement and distanced him from hardline conservatives. Motahari is not seeking absolute defense of people's rights. He also does not align with conventional democracy but supports a modified Islamic Republic close to political justice. However, the unintended consequences of his conflict and friction with the dominant power and authoritarian forces practically contribute to the democracy-seeking movement and the opening of political space in Iran. Of course, his positions in the cultural and civil domains and his tireless demand for strict regulations on women's dress and the closed cultural space place him in a position as a supporter of the ruling structure in the social and cultural sphere. This contradiction creates a kind of confusion among civil society forces in their engagement with him. However, his contradictory behaviors in the political and cultural arenas, especially his audacity in expressing critical views from the parliament podium, have formed a new current of protesters against the existing situation within the regime. Although there are no other political elites in this current besides Motahari, the current conditions in Iran have led to a certain temporary favor towards him in society. Motahari is a principled conservative and has specific principles and frameworks for his behavior, which he does not deviate from, and he is willing to sacrifice his interests. He is not a pragmatist. Therefore, Ali Motahari currently has the potential to form a party of conservative critics of the current situation and could even be a suitable option for reformist conservatism. He also tries to be critical of the government's dual policies in other areas, such as Shia-Sunni unity. However, it is natural that the favor towards Motahari is limited to the political realm, and his views in the cultural and intellectual domains face serious opposition among reformists, progressives, and civil society forces. The tightening of the political space for Rouhani Ali Motahari's activities and his criticism of Rouhani for not taking action in his position as head of the National Security Council for the freedom of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard have created problems for the moderate government and for Rouhani himself, making them more vulnerable to criticism for their indifference to the situation of the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement. Protests against moderate reformists, especially the close circle of Mohammad Khatami and representatives affiliated with reformists, are also on the rise. If there is a perception among the dominant factions of the government that with Rouhani's presidency the files of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard and their political strategies would be closed, the events that occurred in response to Motahari's speech and recent movements in society indicate the fallacy of this calculation. Not only is Hassan Rouhani and his moderate program not a substitute for the Green Movement, but they are increasingly under criticism and are being evaluated and criticized in light of the views and conduct of the symbolic leaders of the Green Movement. Furthermore, the atmosphere created and the impact of Ali Motahari's actions in disrupting the government's anti-Green Movement measures indicate potential capacity in this area. This situation is unfavorable for those reformist forces within the government and Rouhani's close circle who consider the issue of house arrest secondary and trivial and evaluate only middle-ground solutions that ensure a win-win for both sides as feasible. Motahari more explicitly criticized Rouhani for employing methods similar to Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in justifying the government's economic performance. Given the intensification of destructive and harassing confrontations, one can speculate that pressures on Ali Motahari will increase. His demand for addressing violations in parliament and his procedural warnings are unlikely to bear fruit; on the contrary, opponents are in a better position to bring his case before the parliamentary supervisory board and at least issue a warning or reprimand to him. Additionally, hardline conservatives are trying to expand their attacks to pave the way for his disqualification in the upcoming parliamentary elections. However, such an event is not yet certain and depends on the political configuration of future elections, the balance of power, and Ali Motahari's future behaviors. But it would not be incorrect to say that the regime's tolerance for accepting him in the official sphere is nearing its end. The government would not mind positioning him as a believer in the regime at the border with the opposition.