Ali Shariati: Radical Revolutionary or Freedom-Seeking Intellectual?

The thought constructed by Ali Shariati, an Islamic intellectual and revolutionary figure, not only influenced students and intellectuals of his time but also maintained its impact for years after his death. Was his thought aligned with democracy and freedom or contrary to it? What role did this perspective play in the 1979 Revolution and the formation of the Islamic government? It is not Shariati himself but Shariatiism; not a personality but a school of thought that lies at the center of this question. Reza Alijani, a writer and national-religious activist, defends this school of thought and mentions its continued influence among parts of today's youth. However, Ata Hodeshtian, a professor of political science and philosophy at the University of YUMF in Switzerland, considers Shariati's views hasty and sees his intellectualism as largely confined to the boundaries of Islam. Forty years after Ali Shariati's death, we discuss these views in this week's program. Hodeshtian: I will start the discussion with you and the question that some critics mention regarding Dr. Shariati, that he did not draw from primary sources of intellectualism, being an oral intellectual who left no significant written work, and what remains of him is mainly a collection of notes gathered by his students from his speeches, which contain some epistemological errors. What do you think about this? And do you think if this criticism is valid, could some of Shariati's less reliable teachings have been passed on to the next generation? Hodeshtian: Let me say that the points you raise have a place for response and discussion. For instance, the very notion of 'oral intellectual' is a very important topic. Shariati was more of a speaker and a theologian, and one cannot challenge him on this issue because many thinkers before him, who were also very influential, like Socrates, Hegel, and others—though they cannot be compared to him—were also oral. Socrates did not write at all. However, orality resonates more deeply with us Iranians and Easterners. I think our nature has not been very compatible with writing, counting, and the rationalism that Western thought created. In other words, my perception is that the general temperament and prevailing culture in Iranian society lean more towards oral culture. From this perspective, Shariati can be re-evaluated. The second point is whether he left a legacy or not? This is something that a specialist in Islam, which I am not, should address in comparison with other Islamic works... But Mr. Hodeshtian, the legacy that Shariati likely left on the generation after him and on what was present during his lifetime—although he passed away before the revolution—does not limit itself to Islam. I don't think it can be summarized in Islam. Hodeshtian: Absolutely. One of his legacies is the promotion of hasty thinking. That is, fundamentally, Shariati introduced hastiness and politicization into thought, and it was here that, as Dariush Shayegan put it, one can theoretically confront him as someone who ideologized Islam and brought it to the table of people, setting the stage for future social and political movements. Now compare this with someone like Soroush, who is more thought-provoking than Dr. Ali Shariati. Shariati belonged to an era that sought to bring heaven to earth. In fact, Shariati made the sacred common, and it is here that the transfer of this thought—the transfer of the sacred to the earth—was not pleasing to the next generation. Allow me to hear Mr. Alijani's opinion as well. Mr. Alijani! Hodeshtian lists hastiness and politicization in thought as characteristics of Dr. Shariati. What is your response? Reza Alijani: I do not consider this image to be a complete one; there is a bit of historical anachronism in it. Shariati was in a time of turbulence and haste. It was an era of revolutions and coups. Ironically, Shariati was someone who criticized haste and, in a time of rapidity, actually invited people from politics to culture. The plan that Shariati had in mind and with which he returned to Iran, and as he predicted, was arrested at the border and spent several months in prison, was not a hasty political plan but a cultural one. Of course, I accept that during that turbulent time—Shariati himself was not hasty in Mashhad, but in Tehran, alongside the growth of the guerrilla movement in Iran, he became more agitated and radicalized, and after his release from prison, he returned to his previous rhythm. However, overall, our generation engaged with Shariati in a self-service manner. We did not take our 'what should we do' from Shariati. We took a bit of an anti-oppression, anti-class, anti-hypocrisy, and anti-classical clericalism culture from Shariati. Shariati was critical of short-term revolutions. He said that I consider any short-term revolution a disaster. If we hurry and reach our destination sooner, we will even lose our privileges before the revolution. These are Shariati's exact words, but my generation did not like or even see these words of Shariati at all because we were caught up in the guerrilla approach that was prevalent at that time and later in the mass mobilization and social mobilization of Mr. Khomeini. Therefore, if we want to be a bit more tied to reality, Shariati himself wanted to pull the handbrake on haste, but at the same time, due to his anti-oppression culture, he unwittingly became a teacher of the revolution; someone who was himself opposed to short-term revolutions. Hodeshtian: We see that Mr. Alijani emphasizes that Shariati was critical of short-term revolutions; I will briefly explain that our discussion today is not about Dr. Ali Shariati himself, but about his thoughts and the impact of these thoughts on Iranian society. However, in contrast to what Mr. Alijani said, there are groups of critics who believe that he, with his prophetic and poetic tone and his firmness, invited the youth to a revolution of the type of the Islamic Revolution, the consequences of which were not very clear. Here, we must ask what the real role of Shariati's thought was in what happened in 1979, in your opinion? Hodeshtian: Let me say that the first point is that many thinkers before us and before Shariati had discourses, but their impact was somewhat different from what they said. For example, Shariati himself, as our dear friend Mr. Alijani said, was not a person of hasty movement, but strangely, the impact he left was not so. For instance, at Hosseiniyeh Ershad, when students came and sat down—well, we belong to that era—and listened to the speeches, they encountered the announcements of the Fadaian Khalq guerrillas or the Mojahedin Khalq, mostly the Mojahedin Khalq. As a result, the transfer of this matter from Shariati to the Fadaian guerrilla, which actually moves hastily in Iranian society, is very justifiable through what Shariati was offering and because of his passionate and exciting thought, which is more about speech and enthusiasm than thought-provoking. The second point regarding your question is that, in any case, he played an important role. I think it is fundamentally impossible to overlook Shariati's role in shaping or paving the way for the Islamic Revolution with any justification. Every revolution has unpredictable aspects. No one predicted the existence of a dictatorial Khomeini. Shariati played a very important role in the youth rebellion and in reviving Islam, which had somewhat been marginalized from the time of Reza Shah's coup until the era of Mohammad Reza Shah, and in reviving and ideologizing it, bringing it to the streets and making it a guiding principle; in fact, Shariati had a very important role. Mr. Alijani, Mr. Hodeshtian says that 'the role of Shariati's thought in reviving Islam'; I will ask you this way: did the thought that Shariati presented as a—if we can say—doctrinal intellectual provide a new and absolutely adorned face of Islam? In the sense that in the work of beautifying Islam and heroizing figures like Abu Dharr, was it said—that as some criticisms have been raised—that this caused people, students, and even intellectuals at that moment to turn a blind eye to parts or interpretations of Islam that were not actually compatible with freedom and democracy? Alijani: Look, I think this cliché was created in the 1990s. In the 1970s, Shariati was accused by revolutionaries of being a compromiser rather than a revolutionary. In one of Shariati's speeches at Hosseiniyeh Ershad, which was also published under the title 'Relying on Religion', a sister of the Rezai family stands on the balcony and says, 'Mr. Shariati, now is not the time for words; it is time for action.' Shariati pauses and says, 'No, in fact, we have not spoken until now; we have only lamented.' The criticism that the Mojahedin have on Shariati, the criticism that revolutionary forces have on Shariati even accuse him of collaborating with SAVAK. This is a later image, and I think we should not fall into the ideological trap of reformists who want to rewrite their role in the government and throw it on Shariati, but this does not mean that Shariati did not play a role in the revolution. You see, the culture of returning to religion was something that was happening throughout the region, and now we see it at its peak; that is, we see it in ISIS and so on. With the failure of various tendencies, religion gradually began to rise. The primary cause of the revolution, in my opinion, is the Shah himself, that is, someone who wanted to pursue ambitious economic development, even beyond the capacity of the country's economic infrastructure, without the slightest opening for political development. But if we go down, all the forces of that time, almost all tendencies—national, national-religious, leftist, and traditional—all took up arms; even before Shariati. In that same atmosphere, ironically, I think Shariati has a paradoxical role. I do not say he is not ideological because everyone has an ideology, and religion is inherently ideological, but Shariati's radicalism and romanticism also poured gasoline on this fire, and Shariati had a paradoxical role. That is, what should be done and Shariati's strategy was the denial of revolution, but Shariati's literature was inciting literature. But let us accept that the Iranian Revolution was a syncretic revolution. All intellectuals, a large majority of Iranian intellectuals were involved in it, but they were in the minority, and the traditional society and clergy were in the majority. This syncretic revolution later showed itself in a syncretic constitution. Ironically, the positive aspects of that constitution were the remnants of those intellectuals, of which Shariati was one. The national and leftist forces were also among them, and in any case, they had a progressive anti-despotism culture that did not enter the constitution. The third chapter of the constitution and the denial of torture were written under the influence of intellectuals. In any case, if there were no intellectual space, we would have had a worse constitution now. Therefore, the role and impact that the collection of intellectuals, and perhaps at the forefront Shariati, had in the revolution, I think was a facilitating role towards a progressive outlook, not a reactionary role, and what we later saw in the Islamic Republic went towards a kind of religious despotism. Mr. Hodeshtian, now if I want to emphasize part of Mr. Alijani's remarks that focus on the progressive outlook; on the one hand, we see that Shariati in our time speaks of concepts like 'Shura' or 'Bay'ah' or refers to 'Shia' as a party. These have been considered by some as a romantic or unrealistic approach to politics. Even some have said that this was a populist approach to the issue of politics. Then, how do you see this in contrast to the progressive outlook that Mr. Alijani believes intellectuals, led by Shariati, were able to inject into the Iranian revolution? Hodeshtian: I have some doubts about Mr. Alijani's remarks. I mean, there is no doubt about the role of intellectuals in the initial foundation of the revolution. But my impression is that dear Mr. Alijani is trying to remove the religious aspect from Shariati's intellectualism and place intellectualism more in a secular context, which is also a reading of Shariati. What remains of Shariati and was influential and became influential at the beginning of the revolution was indeed the religiousness of his intellectualism and his discourses. That is, Islam must have the primary place. Now this Islam also has human and non-repressive dimensions; it is evident. That is why Shariati's followers today are not supporters of the regime. In this regard, I think there is a bit of confusion, and he tries to downplay this religious aspect. In other words, I think the point of connection between the ruling system and Dr. Ali Shariati is indeed this religious aspect of his and the revival of religion. This is the point that connects to your question. The aspect of 'party' in the sense that I understand, and even at the time when I read Shariati's works, [is that] this party was not meant as an organized party. It was a community that was moving and making a statement against a repressive monarchical regime from the perspective of those who looked at that regime at that time. But I emphasize again that what was taken from Shariati during the revolution was indeed his religiousness.