Ali Shariati: The Ideologue of the Repressive Regime

On the occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Ali Shariati's death, Morteza Kazemian, a political analyst residing in France, and Majid Mohammadi, a sociologist residing in the United States, published a commentary on Shariati's beliefs and the impact of his thoughts in Radio Farda. Shariati has rightly been called the ideologue of the bloody and violent revolution of 1979 (with thousands killed). His works and ideas were widely circulated among revolutionary Muslim youth and seminaries in the years 1976 and 1977. Hundreds of thousands of copies of his speeches and tens of thousands of copies of his recorded talks were passed around among the revolutionary Muslim generation like precious paper. The revolutionary Islam or Shia Islamism he presented prepared the minds of the youth to destroy the existing political, social, and cultural conditions to replace it with a dream Islamic and revolutionary regime. However, he was not only the ideologue of the 1979 revolution (or at least one of them) but also the ideologue of the Islamic Republic as a regime of repression and terror. No one has Islamized censorship, selection, enmity with the West and political and economic liberalism, denial of the rule of law, denial of the rotation of elites, denial of cultural and artistic freedoms, state centralization and government-centricity, herd mentality, interference in private life, deathism, authoritarianism, and daily and comprehensive repression like he did. This aspect of his influence has received less attention because Shariati's staunch admirers and followers, many of whom have been victims of this regime, do not want to consider his ideas entirely or partially responsible for the existing regime of terror and repression. However, if Sayyid Qutb was the ideologue of terror among Sunnis (and his works were also of interest to Khamenei and Shariati), Shariati was both the ideologue of terror and the ideologue of repression in the conditions following the establishment of the Islamic regime. Motahari and Mesbah, as the ideologues of the Islamic Republic during Khomeini and Khamenei's era, did not add new points to Shariati's discourse of terror and repression. In this writing, I will place the foundations of the Islamic Republic against Shariati's intellectual foundations and show how close these two are to each other. The Islamic Republic is based on four intellectual foundations that Shariati was a serious proponent of and made relentless efforts to promote: 1. Opposition to the West, capitalism, and liberalism. Shariati, as an Islamist socialist, was an enemy of the capitalist system, political liberalism, free markets, and the states and societies based on them. This enmity was so intense that it bordered on hatred (very close to Khamenei's and the Hezbollah's rhetoric) in all his works, which are mainly political propaganda and sermons. Although he studied in France, he has never expressed gratitude for the freedoms and institutions of Western society in any of his writings or speeches. He was among those Western thinkers who had a particular animosity towards the liberal and individualistic foundations of their own society. He played a significant role in sowing the seeds of hatred and contempt for Western civilization among Iranians. Colonialism and imperialism were terms that the left and later Islamists used to express their hatred for the West. The Western states' opposition to the communist empire (which was embodied in wars like Korea and Vietnam), the cooperation of Western states with developing dictatorships (to sell their products and prevent the spread of communism and regional stability), and the trade and investment of Western companies in these countries were labeled as colonialism and imperialism by the left and Islamists. The essence of these three activities was international stability, the expansion of trade and free markets, and democracy, which had no value for the left and Islamism. Like all Islamists, Shariati did not consider Western civilization a suitable environment for learning science, transferring technology, rationality, institution-building, media freedom, democracy, and tolerance; instead, he turned to a romantic shepherding and pastoralism (anti-machine and anti-consumption, a return to tribal times) whose products today are evident not in the welfare, comfort, and freedom of Iranians but in the ambitions and totalitarianism of the Islamic Republic (compared to the economic development of South Korea and Japan). 2. Islamic identity. Shariati reduces human identity to its religious identity. Despite claiming to be a sociologist, his speeches and political propaganda show no trace of diverse human identities such as national identity, sexual identity, gender identity, professional identity, ethnic and linguistic identity, and identities arising from membership in civil institutions. He rejects all these identities under the title of non-Islamic 'isms.' This reduction of man to his religious identity is a very important part of the revolutionary mobilization program and the construction of Shia and Sunni Islamism. Islamists train their followers to consider their only identity as belonging to this specific religion and to be prepared to regard the 'other' as different and commit any crime against individuals with other identities. The most important aspect of this identity formation was 'Islamization.' Shariati worked on the Islamization of the revolution, society, and politics, and the Islamic Republic has been working on other forms of Islamization for four decades, which is somehow a continuation of his ideological program. In this regard, he Islamicized fundamental Marxist ideas that were trendy in the 1960s and 1970s, such as dialectical debate, a class-based view of society, historicism, opposition to capitalism and free markets, coercive distribution of wealth, revolution, alienation, and mass creation (like interpreting 'Ummah' and 'Nas' as 'creation' or 'ijtihad' as 'permanent revolution' or the class interpretation of 'Qasitin,' 'Marqin,' and 'Nakis'in and the story of Abel and Cain) to attract youth to revolutionary Islam and incite them against the existing situation. He also Islamicized some ideas of French existentialism, such as humanism, self-awareness, and opposition to rationalism and positivism. In this regard, there is no fundamental difference between him and hundreds of clerics and non-clerics who sought to Islamize education, universities, science and art, and the economy. They were all engaged in a common work program. Shariati and other Islamists changed the name of committed Marxist art, science, and technology to Shia-based art, science, and technology (the responsibility of being Shia, pp. 6-12) and paved the way for revolutionary and religious legitimacy for censorship, selection, and violation of individual rights (with 'commanding good and forbidding wrong'). Shariati's critique of Marxism was not from the perspective of religious freedom, individual freedoms, or rational foundations like cost-benefit and analytical philosophy but from the viewpoint of religious beliefs (denial of materialism). He saw Marxism as a political rival to his ideology, not as an inhuman ideology. The self-awareness of the individual in Shariati's program was not aimed at creating motivation for scientific and professional advancement and striving to increase social capital and community wealth but at denying the West and opposing the channels of wealth production in society. 3. Implementation of Shariati. Shariati promoted a return to Islam and, more precisely, a return to the early Islam. What was the content of early Islam for Shariati? The acquisition of political power by the Prophet of Islam and his companions and the provision of guidelines for individuals and society. This content is embodied in the works of jurists as the jurisprudence of the Prophet. For Islamists, early Islam could not have any content other than political dominance and expansionism besides jurisprudence, and for this reason, the clergy has clung to jurisprudence to this extent. His followers may say that Shariati did not mean the revival of jurisprudence. However, what he does is precisely the revival of the sovereignty of jurisprudence. Islam and, in general, religions are neither ethics nor philosophy (including political philosophy), and their essence is a set of beliefs and instructions manifested in their theology and jurisprudence. Shariati promoted a return to Islam and, more precisely, a return to early Islam. What was the content of early Islam for Shariati? The acquisition of political power by the Prophet of Islam and his companions and the provision of guidelines for individuals and society. This content is embodied in the works of jurists as the jurisprudence of the Prophet. No one can demand a revival of Islam and a return to early Islam while setting aside its jurisprudence and theology rooted in the Quran and Hadith. Shariati places religious governance above jurisprudence but does not set aside jurisprudence. How can someone who emphasizes 'commanding good and forbidding wrong' (Shia as a complete party, p. 21) set aside Shariati in his system? Shariati's criticisms of traditional religious figures are not criticisms of 'commanding good and forbidding wrong'; they are criticisms of the methods of those who do not believe in revolutionary Islam and do not see 'commanding good' as part of a larger program. Isn't 'commanding good and forbidding wrong' today part of a larger program, namely the continuation of authoritarian and totalitarian religious governance and Shia imperialism in the Islamic Republic? It is possible that Shariati did not envision the implementation of cutting off hands and feet and fingers, stoning, or killing apostates, and this stems from his and others' indifference among religious intellectuals to the demands of clerics, not from deceiving the people by the clergy. Clerics have always sought the implementation of Shariati without any reduction. Beyond this, does the pursuit of Shariati's implementation by most of his followers in the Islamic Republic or at least the lack of opposition to it by nearly all of his followers not mean that Shariati is also part of the revival of the project of returning to Islamic self? How many of Shariati's students have explicitly opposed whipping those who eat during Ramadan (an act of humanity labeled as breaking the fast), or whipping those who drink alcohol, or not adhering to mandatory hijab? Is the Islamic identity, which is mainly restrictions imposed on women, something that most of Shariati's admirers do not oppose? 4. Revolutionary violence. The terror, execution, imprisonment, and torture of the revolutionary government in the post-revolution period and by governments that consider themselves revolutionary are justified by revolutionary violence. Muslims justify this violence with jihad and martyrdom. If Shariati opposed these behaviors, he should have manifested his opposition to the totalitarianism of Eastern European communist governments. In principle, the violation of freedom was not an issue for him. Did Shariati, who cries out for the suffering of people under capitalist systems, ever say a word about the oppression of hundreds of millions under the rule of communist governments? He considered such repressive systems revolutionary and thus granted them a blank check. Shariati is a full-fledged jihadist and martyr (the terms jihad and martyrdom are mentioned hundreds of times in his works in their revolutionary meaning, such as Shia as a complete party, p. 105). Can the responsibility of Shia clerics be considered the Shia revolution (the responsibility of being Shia, p. 50) but remove the terror and repression of the 'counter-revolution' from this chessboard? How did Shia Islamists gain power in the Shia Islamic revolution? Through free, fair, and competitive elections or by burning cinemas and executing people on the roof of the Refah school? Shariati is one of the originators of religious democracy in the style of the Islamic Republic in his book 'Imam and the Imam'; his understanding of democracy is the election of the first to third caliphs in a tribal society. His theory of permanent revolution is embodied in the leadership of the Supreme Leader. The idea of Hezbollah as a revolutionary group is first presented in Shariati's works to Iranian society (Shia as a complete party, p. 12). The revolutionary violence of this party or group is justified by the religious argument that in a predominantly religious society, one must enter politics through the lens of religion and ensure public support for terror and repression by denying secularism and liberalism. Religious reformists, after four decades, although they have realized the effectiveness and usefulness of secularism in power, still cannot distance themselves from the mass appeal of their ideas among the religious with Quranic and religious expressions (Shariati's specter still looms over them). Shariati considers the greatest vices of today's world to be 'global Zionism' and 'international imperialism' and Westernization and capitalism (Shia as a complete party, p. 80). At the same time, he calls for 'forbidding wrong.' The result of this view for his audience is nothing other than inviting individuals to the destruction of the United States and Israel and domestic secularists. What difference does this kind of rhetoric have from Khamenei and Mesbah Yazdi? His difference with these two lies in his pioneering role, not in the content of these beliefs. Do the Shia and Sunni Islamists who today lead Islamic movements and governments in the Middle East and North Africa and sow the seeds of terror in Europe and America believe in anything other than the above foundations? Did even one of Shariati's followers oppose the confiscations, book burnings, and executions of 1979 and 1980 that targeted secular and liberal academics and managers and experts of executive bodies? Can a society based on rationality, science, tolerance, coexistence, fundamental rights, and democracy be built with the above ideas? If the experience of the Islamic Republic and the realization of all the above ideas had not existed, perhaps there would have been room for suspicion and optimism.