All Brothers of Presidents

As the 2017 presidential elections approach in Iran, news of the abuse of power and corruption involving Hossein Fereydoun, the brother of Hassan Rouhani, has become a daily topic for government critics in recent months. Some of these reports are credible (such as the abuse of power in registering for a doctoral degree at the National University by transferring him from Guilan University without his presence at the interview), while others are unverifiable or have not been adjudicated in court (such as allegations of collusion in currency sales and bribes taken by him and his family members both inside and outside the country, and his name being mentioned in various banking corruption cases by judicial officials like the spokesperson for the judiciary and the head of the Tehran Revolutionary Court). Opponents of Rouhani's government use the background and actions of Hassan Rouhani's brother alongside issues like Mehr housing, astronomical salaries, and the JCPOA to target the government. Although Hossein Fereydoun was previously the governor of Karaj and Nishapur, the ambassador of the Islamic Republic in Malaysia, and a member of the Islamic Republic's delegation to the United Nations, the public became familiar with him when he appeared alongside his brother in the 2013 election campaigns or was seen in photos fanning his brother. Later, he was repeatedly referred to as a member of the negotiating team and a trusted aide of the President during the nuclear negotiations. He has even been seen in cabinet meetings without holding any specific position in the cabinet. Photos of his son abroad, taking intimate pictures with girls like other young people in Western countries, have been published. Hassan Rouhani sends him as his representative to visit and greet various individuals (from clerics close to Khamenei to Mostafa Tajzadeh and Mehdi Karroubi) and to visit government centers. In the Islamic Republic, government leaders usually justify appointing their brothers to high-ranking positions by claiming they trust them. This justification is rooted in the principles of nepotism in Iran. This is how the ruling class in Iran has gathered a network of familial and clique-based relationships. One of the traditions that Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani established during his presidency (after the abolition of the prime ministership) was that close relatives of the head of state, especially brothers, would attain high positions. During his term, his brother (Mohammad Hashemi, head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting), relatives of his wife (Hossein Marashi, vice president), son (Mehdi, head of the National Organization for the Optimization of Fuel Consumption), daughters (Faezeh, a member of parliament and head of the Women's Sports Federation, and Fatemeh, head of the Special Diseases Foundation), and dozens of more distant family members held positions in government and public offices. After his presidency and during his chairmanship of the Expediency Discernment Council, another son, Mohsen Hashemi, was the CEO of the Tehran Metro for 13 years. Besides high-ranking officials, the Rafsanjani family seized every opportunity to appropriate public resources. During a research trip to the shores of Sistan and Baluchestan province (supported by the Fisheries Organization), I encountered one of Rafsanjani's cousins who had come to purchase fishing facilities for this province. Mahmoud Hashemi Rafsanjani, the younger brother of Akbar Hashemi, was the district governor of Kahrizak in Qom before the establishment of the Islamic Republic and was appointed governor on March 19, 1979. After a year of service as the governor of Qom, he requested a transfer and was briefly assigned to manage the confidential documents department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was later given responsibility for the Middle East section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the coming of Ahmadinejad's government, he retired. There is no information available about the official job of Ahmad Hashemi Rafsanjani, another brother of Akbar Hashemi, but he visited various government and public institutions, and news of his visits was published in the media. There is no information available about the activities of another brother of Akbar Hashemi, Qassem. Khatami appointed his brother Ali to the position of head of his office. Another brother and his nephew (Mohammad Reza Tabesh) were members of parliament. Before Mohammad Khatami's election to the presidency and the sixth parliamentary elections, even reformist activists had not heard of his brother Mohammad Reza, who suddenly became a candidate for election and vice president of parliament. These brothers did not have independent political or professional identities and were only known in the shadow of their brothers. Therefore, with the departure of their brothers, they also faded into the background. Ahmadinejad appointed his only brother Davood (formerly of the intelligence services) to the position of head of oversight at the presidential institution and his son-in-law Mehdi Khorshidi to the position of secretary of the President's Advisory Council and head of the National Standards Organization (other family members were also not left out). Rouhani also appointed his brother (Hossein Fereydoun) as a special assistant to the President. This network of familial relationships is corrupting even without being proven in court that they have plundered public resources and abused power. None of these individuals reached their respective positions based on merit, and their transactions and relationships with centers of power and the quasi-public and private sectors have also not been transparent. Although Ali Khamenei is remembered as a figure distinct from corruption and nepotism and abuse of power in Iran (or some do not mention him at all in this regard), his brothers have also occupied various government and quasi-government positions: Hassan has been a senior manager at the Ministry of Oil in various governments; Mohammad is the head of the Mulla Sadra Foundation, which receives billions of tomans in government budget annually. He was also a member of parliament for eight years. His other brother, Hadi, was a member of parliament for 16 years. The Larijani brothers are another example of this tradition of brotherly nepotism. If we look at the records of the four brothers of the four presidents in high positions in the country, we can observe three commonalities and differences among them over the past 28 years: 1. These brothers did not have independent political or professional identities and were only known in the shadow of their brothers. Therefore, with the departure of their brothers, they also faded into the background. In recent years, there has been no mention of Ali Khatami, Mohammad Hashemi, and Davood Ahmadinejad (except for the last stroke in December 2016). Even Mohammad Reza Khatami, who was once the secretary-general of the Participation Front, is completely absent due to pressures on his brother (as one of the leaders of the sedition). The same fate awaits Hossein Fereydoun after Hassan Rouhani's term ends. 2. Mohammad Hashemi and Ali and Mohammad Reza Khatami were not security figures (as far as we know), but Davood Ahmadinejad was one of the security forces of the IRGC. Hossein Fereydoun also has a very close relationship with security forces and worked in the Ministry of Intelligence before 2013. The reason for this transformation is that Akbar Hashemi and Mohammad Khatami were not security figures themselves, but Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hassan Rouhani were more military and security figures than political figures before their presidency. It seems that the increasing militarization and security of the government structure has also extended to the presidency. 3. The unprecedented increase in financial and banking corruption in the last decade has also affected the presidential elections (in preparing resources for campaigns) and the presidency. Mohammad Hashemi, Ali Khatami, and Davood Ahmadinejad have been less accused of economic and financial matters (abuse of power is a characteristic of all Islamic Republic managers without exception), but Hossein Fereydoun behaves in such a way that these accusations easily catch up with him, and he does not seem to fear this issue much.