Amano's 'Positive' Report and Threats to the JCPOA in the Coming Months

Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has released a very positive quarterly report regarding Iran's compliance with its commitments under the nuclear agreement. Although this makes it harder for the new U.S. administration to continue its criticisms, the survival of the JCPOA depends on internal and external events in the coming months. Three days before the unofficial release of the IAEA's quarterly report on the JCPOA, Amano, in an exclusive interview with the Financial Times, discussed aspects of the nuclear agreement, the agency's limitations, the imperfections of the agreement, and the necessity of preserving it. He stated that if President Rouhani fails in the Iranian presidential elections, maintaining the JCPOA will become difficult. Despite some observers criticizing the new format of the agency's reports on Iran's nuclear activities, which avoid details and only mention general points, the new and very soft statement from the agency indicates not only full compliance by Iran but also that in two specific cases, Iran has gone beyond its obligations. One of these cases is the permissible amount of Iran's heavy water reserves, which was reported to be slightly above the declared amount in the previous report in November last year, and the other is the uranium reserves enriched to about 3.6%, which is of greater sensitivity and importance than heavy water. The latest report from Amano indicates that Iran's heavy water reserves are currently around 124 tons, while Iran is permitted to maintain up to 130 tons of heavy water at any time. In the November 8 report last year, the agency stated that Iran's heavy water reserves had exceeded the permissible limit, but according to the latest report, four days after the U.S. elections, Iran exported 11 tons of its heavy water. Regarding the Arak heavy water reactor, whose core had previously been removed and the remaining cavity filled with concrete, the new statement indicates a complete halt in work and Iran's abstention from producing raw uranium fuel pellets. The future of the Arak heavy water reactor is currently uncertain, pending the unlikely resumption of work by expensive Chinese experts, and the renewed readiness of the U.S. to continue participation in a triangle of cooperation with China and Iran for the design and construction of a new reactor. Concurrently with the unofficial release of the agency's new report, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, stated in an interview published by ISNA that 'Chinese experts' receive $200 per hour for their work, while the fate of the Arak heavy water reactor's design is currently ambiguous, and the agency's report confirms the complete halt of work at Arak. The agency's statement regarding Iran's enriched uranium reserves at 3.6% indicates a revision in how the product remaining after enrichment in centrifuges is evaluated (enrichment waste), suggesting a reduction of reserves below the permissible limit of 300 kilograms. With the intensification of the new U.S. administration's opposition to the Islamic Republic and the nuclear agreement, the Islamic Republic, which had previously announced its intention to produce nuclear fuel for ships and submarines, reported on January 25 of this year the injection of UF6 (uranium gas) into advanced centrifuges known as IR-8. The Islamic Republic is only permitted to enrich uranium using the old IR-1 type centrifuges according to JCPOA commitments, and this action could be interpreted as a clear violation of the JCPOA provisions. The latest agency report indicates that contrary to what was published in Iranian media, only one new type of centrifuge has been tested with uranium gas injection, and uranium enrichment has not been carried out with it. Overall, Amano's positive report indicates that since the previous statement, the actions of the Islamic Republic have exceeded the commitments laid out in the JCPOA without any discernible violations. The rise of the Trump administration in the U.S. and its challenging positions towards the Islamic Republic, along with White House staff's opposition to the nuclear agreement and the portrayal of Iran's governance as a threat to regional peace, have placed Iran's political leadership in front of two different strategic thoughts: 1- Continuing engagement with the international community, increasing flexibility with neighbors, and a gradual shift towards a 'normal state,' with the expectation of a softening of U.S. positions. 2- A reciprocal and proportional movement with the new U.S. administration in the chess game of relations between the two countries, turning to hardline policies, resistance, and bearing costs in the hope that sustainable results will be clearer than compromise and change. The fate of these two options will be determined after the presidential elections in Iran next May, depending on whether Hassan Rouhani, the architect of the nuclear agreement, is defeated or re-elected. Amano, in an interview on February 24 with the Financial Times, emphasized the negative impact of Iran's missile tests on the future of the JCPOA, placing greater importance on Rouhani's election or defeat, stating: 'The fate of Iran's moderate president in the May elections will create a sense of insecurity... While Mr. Rouhani has been very committed to the agreement, if he loses (the election), the situation will change.' Despite the support of the European Union and the Director General of the IAEA for the nuclear agreement, along with full backing from China and Russia, the new U.S. administration's resistance to it alone could hinder the continuation of the JCPOA in its current form. With Michael Flynn's departure from the position of National Security Advisor in the White House, it can be expected that the implementation of countermeasures against the Islamic Republic will face delays for a while; however, an indefinite halt to pressures against the Islamic Republic would be largely optimistic. Trump and his associates have expressed views regarding the Islamic Republic and the nuclear agreement that reflect their thought tendencies. The Trump administration needs to formulate a clear foreign policy regarding the Islamic Republic and determine methods to achieve the set goals. This will not happen overnight and separately from regional developments and internal changes in Iran. The resolution of the war with ISIS in Mosul and the political future of Iraq is, in terms of timing, the first influencing factor on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy in the region and in relation to Iran. The next goal is the Syrian issue and arranging collective efforts to cleanse the region of Islamic extremists. Meanwhile, the presidential elections in Iran will take place, the results of which will undoubtedly influence the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Thus, the JCPOA can be seen as safe from internal and external threats for at least the next six months, until the release of two more quarterly reports from the IAEA, provided that no unexpected developments change the current 'roadmap.'