Ambiguity Again Surrounds Iran's Frozen Assets

Following the announcement of the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 countries, the exact amount of Iran's frozen assets has led to much speculation both domestically and internationally. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated in a meeting of the Council on Foreign Relations that after the release of Iran's assets, the amount Tehran will have access to is around $50 billion. This contrasts with former President Barack Obama, who had previously announced this amount as $150 billion. Inside Iran, various officials, from Valiollah Seif, the Central Bank Governor, to Ali Tayebnia, the Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance, and some members of parliament, have reported significantly different figures ranging from $23 billion to $150 billion for Iran's frozen assets abroad. Hassan Mansour, an economist residing in Britain, argues that until the Iranian ministries of Economy, Finance, and Oil officially publish these figures, none of the current statements can be trusted. Mansour states, 'The reality in this area is unknown. This is information that the Iranian Ministry of Oil and the Ministry of Finance should be able to provide, and only then can economists analyze it.' He highlights the confusion surrounding the figures, noting discrepancies from $22 billion mentioned by Seif to $180 billion cited by individuals with no responsibility in this matter, such as the Governor of Tehran. Mansour emphasizes that Kerry's recent statement does not clarify the situation, as it differs from Obama's claim. He expresses concern that instead of becoming clearer, the issue is becoming more ambiguous, even regarding known figures. For instance, when it is said that $35 billion has been invested in the Nikoo Company of the Ministry of Oil, it is unclear what has happened to that money. Has it been spent on projects, or does it still exist as cash? Or when it is mentioned that $22 billion in China has been corrected to $25 billion, it is unclear if this is collateral for Chinese financing. Mansour concludes that these statements are largely conjecture and that the figures Iran had in the U.S. were much lower and have faced numerous legal challenges. He notes that U.S. courts have repeatedly condemned Iran on terrorism charges, leading to financial penalties, and that the U.S. was not an importer of Iranian oil, with frozen funds primarily related to before the 1979 Revolution. After that, funds in Japan, South Korea, the UAE, China, and India could not be transferred due to banking sanctions.