America, the JCPOA, and Choosing the 'Third Way'

Donald Trump's statements on Thursday regarding Iran's 'non-compliance with the spirit of the JCPOA' before his meeting with senior U.S. military officials are the latest indication of Washington's decision to choose a 'third way' regarding the July 15, 2015 agreement, initiating a gradual 'death' plan for the JCPOA instead of a direct announcement of withdrawal from it, in order to prevent a new security crisis in the region. In implementing this significant and impactful decision for Iran, the responsibility for the gradual retreat of the United States from the commitments accepted by the previous administration is delegated to Congress instead of the U.S. government, which is the signatory of the nuclear agreement. Given the strong opposition of most members of Congress in both the Senate and the House of Representatives to the provisions of the nuclear agreement, predicting the actions of American legislators in this regard is not particularly difficult. Even during the previous U.S. administration, the Republican majority in Congress never shied away from expressing opposition to the nuclear agreement, and the then U.S. government only prevented a vote against it in December of last year by resorting to a filibuster in the Senate and the endless statements of some Democratic representatives until the start of the Senate's annual recess. The four other permanent members of the Security Council, plus Germany (the so-called 1+5 group), have also signed the nuclear agreement but, unlike the U.S. government, which is legally obligated to confirm Iran's compliance or non-compliance with the commitments accepted in the JCPOA, they play a silent observer role. Two days before the Thursday meeting of military officials with President Trump, U.S. Defense Secretary General James Mattis, alongside General Joseph Dunford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated during a meeting with several congressional representatives that the nuclear agreement with Iran aligns with U.S. security interests and that Trump should 'consider remaining in it.' On the other hand, it has been reported that the U.S. government, national security advisors at the White House, and senior security and intelligence officials have reached a consensus on how to deal with the October 15 deadline, which is the last day for the U.S. government to announce its opinion on Iran's performance within the framework of the nuclear agreement. Earlier reports indicated a difference of opinion between Rex Tillerson and Trump regarding whether to remain in the nuclear agreement or withdraw from it. With the introduction of a third option between confirming Iran's compliance and announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, it seems that the U.S. government's approach in this regard has become clearer. Thus, by refraining from confirming Iran's compliance with the nuclear agreement, which the Trump administration has hesitantly done twice so far, without announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, the United States has deprived the JCPOA of its legitimacy and has delegated the next decision in this regard to Congress. In the short term, to further align European countries, the U.S. government will try to prevent the imposition of harsh sanctions against Iran or the reinstatement of sanctions from January 1, 2012, which affected Iran's oil exports, through consultations with congressional leaders. At the same time, without announcing an official withdrawal from the JCPOA, which would give the Iranian government the opportunity for retaliatory action or to announce its withdrawal from the JCPOA, the U.S. will intensify its confrontation with the Iranian religious government in other areas. It can be expected that the confrontation with the Iranian government will occur in the following areas: 1- Imposing non-nuclear sanctions in retaliation for the Islamic Republic's missile tests or human rights violations in Iran. 2- Placing the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the list of terrorist organizations. 3- Countering Iran's military presence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and other parts of the Middle East. 4- Pursuing regime change objectives from within and supporting domestic opposition forces. 5- Taking punitive military actions against Iran's military and nuclear facilities. Trump's statements about the 'calm before the storm,' along with a photo he took with the Defense Secretary and senior military commanders on Thursday, faced widespread reactions and multiple interpretations shortly after their release. European interest in preserving the nuclear agreement with Iran stems from two clear factors: 1- Preventing the Islamic Republic from becoming a nuclear power 2- Expanding trade with Iran and utilizing its oil resources and export markets. The policies of major European countries (Britain, France, and Germany) regarding the Islamic Republic's missile activities and their interpretation of Security Council Resolution 2231 concerning ballistic missiles align with those of the U.S. On July 29 of this year, just one day after the Islamic Republic tested a ballistic missile (satellite launcher), Germany, Britain, and France, along with the U.S., issued a statement calling for an end to these activities. The speed of the joint statement's release indicates prior consensus among European countries with the U.S. on this issue. In the commercial sphere, major European countries, while competing with the U.S. in global export markets, are inevitably forced to choose between larger and smaller trading partners. Avoiding large financial penalties is another factor that particularly makes European banks hesitant to engage in monetary transactions with a country like Iran. The U.S. Treasury has imposed billions of dollars in penalties against banks (mostly European) since 2009, citing violations of its monetary laws and sanctions. The $787 million penalty against the French bank Crédit Agricole for violating Iran sanctions and the BNP Paribas, France's largest bank, which agreed to pay $8.9 billion as a penalty for violating U.S. sanctions against several countries, including Iran, are just two examples of penalties imposed on European banks. Last year's U.S. exports to EU countries amounted to $495 billion, while EU countries' exports to the U.S. reached $587 billion. In terms of foreign trade, European countries and the U.S. have made direct foreign investments with each other in similar amounts. The volume of foreign trade of EU member countries with Iran barely exceeds two percent of the figures for trade with the U.S., and the situation regarding direct foreign investment is not better than foreign trade. It seems that Europe's adherence to U.S. policies regarding Iran, even with expressed dissatisfaction in some cases, is unavoidable, and after the expected U.S. refusal to confirm the Islamic Republic's compliance with the nuclear agreement in the coming days, the continuation of the JCPOA can only be anticipated with temporary artificial respiration.