American Professor: Iran May Have No Choice but to Build Nuclear Weapons

As tensions between Iran and Israel have significantly escalated in a rising cycle, some in the Iranian government are now discussing the necessity of moving towards nuclear weapons development as a new deterrent. This approach, if successful, could restore Iran's deterrent capability, which has been significantly damaged over the past year, but the risks of this path are also considerable. While a group of hardliners in the Islamic Republic of Iran speaks of the necessity of acquiring nuclear weapons, in the United States, a president has come to power who has repeatedly emphasized that he will not allow Tehran to acquire a nuclear bomb. Moreover, even Democratic administrations in the United States and their European allies have always considered Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons as a 'red line.' In such circumstances, what will be Iran's approach and how will Israel and its allies respond to Tehran's pursuit of such a policy? Dr. Kari Lee, director of the National Security and Strategy Department at the U.S. Army War College, stated in an interview with Radio Farda that Iran may have no alternative but to move towards nuclear weapons development. Dr. Lee, who also teaches at this U.S. Army educational institution, believes that with the new administration in the U.S., Washington may be willing to risk accelerating Iran's response to Israel. In a recent article for Foreign Affairs titled 'The Paradox of Israeli Deterrence,' you wrote that Israel's elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah has significantly limited Iran's options for response, which may lead the Islamic Republic to take more aggressive actions, including moving towards nuclear weapons development. But how could this be possible? If Iran's capabilities are limited, shouldn't we expect them to behave more conservatively? I want to emphasize that everything I say is merely my personal opinions and analysis as an independent academic analyst, not the views of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, the government, or the Army War College. In response to your question, I would say this is a kind of paradox of deterrence and a security dilemma in the Middle East. Essentially, by eliminating Iran's resources for deterrence, Israel has significantly limited Tehran's capabilities for response, retaliation, and even conducting offensive actions. However, the result of this is that Iran is encouraged to seek other ways. It is not that Iran will simply surrender to Israel's military power. Tehran will have to look for other ways to threaten Israel, as it can no longer rely on Hamas and Hezbollah. This could take two forms: either horizontal escalation, where it tries to endanger Israel's or the United States' allies and partners in the region, or vertical escalation, moving towards building larger and more destructive weapons. However, both of these possibilities you mentioned would occur if Iran is in a weak position. Iran is not only militarily and weapon-wise comparable to Israel, but it also faces an economy under pressure from sanctions and is becoming increasingly isolated in the international arena. In such circumstances, moving towards one of the two dimensions you mentioned would not be a kind of 'suicide'? It depends on what kind of action you are talking about. It is true that Tehran knows that any direct action against Israel that endangers the vital interests of that country would be a kind of invitation for others to attack Iran. However, when you look at Israel's military strategy and capabilities, you see that this country needs significant support from its allies, including the United States, to inflict serious damage on Iran. Iran is a large country, so when we talk about potential Iranian actions or its military response, the term 'suicide' seems a bit exaggerated. You mentioned in your article that deterrence does not necessarily lead to absolute peace and is more about preventing a rival from crossing the red lines of a player. But in the case of Iran and Israel, hasn't the Islamic Republic's enemy long since crossed all red lines? From the destruction of Hamas to irreparable blows to Hezbollah and, of course, direct military attacks on targets in Iran? We may have different definitions or understandings of Iran's or Israel's red lines. Of course, I must say that I am a specialist in deterrence and do not have expertise in the domestic politics of Iran or Israel. However, I think Iran has proxy forces so that it can use them to avoid putting itself at risk. This is the main reason for having proxy forces. You use these groups to bear the costs or be sacrificed instead of you. As a result, I do not think the destruction of Hamas or Hezbollah has been a red line for Iran. I may be wrong, but I have never seen Iran decisively identify this issue as its red line. In recent months, although Iran and Israel have escalated tensions, especially after the attack on the Iranian embassy in Syria, both sides, especially Iran, have been very cautious not to escalate the conflict. In Iran's attacks on Israel in April, we saw that Tehran selected its targets in a way that clearly indicated its goal was merely to retaliate for a specific action by the other side. Even the types of weapons they used clearly showed that Iran did not intend to escalate the conflict. You say that given the developments in the region, Iran may consider building nuclear weapons. However, we know that once a country makes such a decision, there is a time window before a nuclear test, during which Western countries and Israel may have more motivation than ever to carry out a direct military attack on Iran. In such circumstances, wouldn't a potential decision in this regard be a high-risk gamble for the Islamic Republic? This is a risk that Iran takes, absolutely correct. The United States and other countries have clearly stated that Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons is a red line for them. Iran has sought other methods, such as proxy groups, to demonstrate its power and influence in the region, but when these groups are eliminated, the cost-benefit calculations fundamentally change. Therefore, it is not impossible that Iranian leaders, observing the current environment, feel they have little choice. I am not saying this will definitely happen, but certainly, in such circumstances, the way any leader in the international system thinks about the costs and benefits of having nuclear weapons can change. Under the Biden administration, Israel carried out a direct military attack on Iran for the first time, but starting in the new year, a government will take power in the White House that has at least shown through its first four years in power how committed it is to supporting Israel. Moreover, the appointments that have been made so far in foreign policy and security sectors confirm this situation. With Trump in the White House, are we one step closer to a direct military attack on Iran? Both Israel and Iran have attacked each other's territories for the first time, and it has not only been Israel that has carried out attacks on Iran. With the new administration in the U.S., I think Washington will face a specific challenge because they have clearly shown that there are no neutral players in this dispute. The Trump administration has clearly chosen pro-Israel individuals, for example, Mike Huckabee as the U.S. ambassador to Israel has always provided unconditional support for Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu. Therefore, this is a challenge for the Trump administration, as they can be seen as less neutral actors by the people of the region, especially Iran. In my opinion, under the Trump administration, Iran will be less able to trust the United States to restrain the Israelis. Thus, unconditional support for the Netanyahu government and Israeli military actions will pose a challenge for the U.S. government and may lead them to risk accelerating Iran's response.