America's Need to Create Balance Between Sanctions and Continued Implementation of the JCPOA

Given the developments that have occurred in Tehran-Washington relations since Donald Trump's presidency began, Radio Farda intends to conduct a series of interviews with analysts and political experts from various factions and viewpoints in America on this matter. In the upcoming interview, Radio Farda speaks with Robert Einhorn, a senior disarmament analyst at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Einhorn previously served in the U.S. State Department, including as a special advisor to Hillary Clinton on disarmament, and played a crucial role in shaping U.S. policies at that time regarding Iran's nuclear program, sanctions, and negotiations. You have experience working in various U.S. administrations. In your opinion, considering what we saw in the first weeks of Donald Trump's administration, which institution is responsible for or guiding policy-making regarding Iran? The White House? The State Department? The National Security Council? In Washington, most policies are the product of dialogue among various institutions. At this stage, the Trump administration has not yet fully formed for these inter-institutional meetings to take place. This is also because many senior officials have not yet been appointed or confirmed. Consequently, there is hope that a more systematic process will begin in the next month or two. However, at present, it appears that the White House is leading many policies, but over time we will see that the State Department and the Department of Defense will play significant roles in policy-making regarding Iran. James Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, has spoken about Iran, and I am sure he will play a very important role from a military perspective, while Secretary of State Rex Tillerson will lead the diplomatic aspect of the Iran issue. However, so far, the initiative has been in the hands of the White House. Mr. Einhorn, do you think that given the ongoing implementation of the nuclear agreement and the multiple crises in the Middle East in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, does the White House feel urgency in determining its strategy regarding Iran? I do not think at this stage the Trump administration considers Iran to be the most urgent issue to address, especially given the recent missile tests by North Korea, which has gained a significant position on the Trump administration's priority list. And of course, we must also consider the situation regarding the fight against the group known as the Islamic State and the recapture of the cities of Mosul and Raqqa. These issues have also become important. And alongside these, there is the issue of relations with Russia. As a result, at this stage, Iran is not the most urgent issue, and I think this is good because it allows the administration to take its time, carefully review policies, and clarify its strategy. Frankly, so far, I think the Trump administration has been somewhat silent regarding Iran, especially when we talk about the future of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The examination of the Iran issue is being conducted carefully rather than hastily adopting a policy. Of course, in these past few weeks, we have seen a warning to Iran from former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn. Yes, but I think what happened was related to Iran's actions. Iran tested a missile on January 29, and immediately General Flynn spoke of a warning to Iran, and a few days later the Trump administration announced sanctions against 25 companies. These were sanctions prepared by the Obama administration and put on the shelf; the Trump administration felt it had to respond to the missile test, and it did. I think if the medium-range missile test had not occurred, I doubt we would have seen the imposition of sanctions. As a result, I think the Trump administration has shown appropriate patience. You mentioned the nuclear agreement. In recent days, Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, spoke about this and noted that the U.S. must consider various issues, including this agreement, and that this will be time-consuming. Given that the campaign promises to tear up the agreement on the first day have not been fulfilled, my question for you is what is your prediction for the outcome of such a review? You are correct. The Trump administration does not agree with the basis of unilaterally tearing up the agreement. The administration can simply not implement the agreement by not renewing the sanctions waivers that the president must sign in May, but I think this option has been opposed. It also does not seem that the option of renegotiation is very feasible, and the administration has realized that even close European allies do not support renegotiation. Europeans, and consequently Russia and China, believe that the agreement works and are not inclined to change it at this stage, and of course, the Iranians have also stated that they oppose the idea of renegotiation. As a result, this option is also off the table. I think the option that attracts the administration is to maintain the nuclear agreement, implement it carefully, and try to counter Iran's provocative actions that were not discussed in the agreement, which include Iran's support for its proxies in the region, its actions regarding ballistic missiles, the imprisonment of dual nationals, and its harassment of American ships. These are all actions that the U.S. and other countries see as actions that should be protested, and these issues are not included in the nuclear agreement, and I think the Trump administration will decide that although it will maintain the agreement, it will counter these actions. Do you think the U.S. Congress, which is currently reportedly drafting various bills to impose new sanctions against Iran, will support such a strategy from the Trump administration? The JCPOA does not prevent the U.S. from maintaining non-nuclear sanctions; this agreement also does not prevent the U.S. government from imposing new sanctions that are not related to the nuclear program; sanctions that may be imposed for new missile tests, support for terrorist groups, or human rights violations. As a result, the imposition of such sanctions is permissible. And I predict that the Trump administration will impose such sanctions when necessary. And as you mentioned, lawmakers in Congress are preparing sanction proposals. I think it is necessary for the Trump administration to try to establish a kind of balance carefully. On the one hand, this administration will want to impose new sanctions for non-nuclear behaviors, but on the other hand, it does not want to appear as if the goal of these new sanctions is to reconstruct the pre-JCPOA sanctions in a non-nuclear package. And it does not want to be interpreted that the administration wants to reverse the lifting of sanctions and its benefits. The administration knows that if Iran perceives that the U.S. is trying to reverse the lifting of sanctions, then Tehran will be less inclined to continue fulfilling its nuclear commitments. Therefore, it is necessary for this balance to be established very carefully so that the imposition of sanctions when necessary is not interpreted as the U.S. backing away from its commitments regarding the lifting of sanctions in the JCPOA.