America's Options for More Serious Implementation of the JCPOA

About two weeks ago, the U.S. government informed its Congress that Iran is adhering to its commitments under the JCPOA. This announcement is necessary every ninety days to avoid the imposition of nuclear sanctions. However, following this letter to Congress, multiple reports emerged indicating that President Donald Trump is dissatisfied with the issuance of this confirmation for the second time since he took office. Mr. Trump has repeatedly called the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran one of the worst deals in history, and recently told the Wall Street Journal that if it were solely up to him, he would have announced Iran's non-compliance with the JCPOA 180 days ago. One of the issues that the U.S. President and his associates have emphasized over these months is their desire for the JCPOA to be implemented very strictly. Now, the Associated Press reports, citing unnamed officials, that the U.S. government will use inspection elements to adopt a more serious approach to implementing the JCPOA and is also seeking to renegotiate some issues it sees as flaws in the agreement. According to the Associated Press, Thomas Shannon, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, shared these ideas with his European counterparts during a JCPOA commission meeting in Vienna last week. The report adds that Republican Senator Bob Corker also mentioned the issue of access to 'multiple facilities' in Iran during a meeting on Wednesday, adding that the U.S. does not want to be blamed for undermining the JCPOA because it wants to keep its allies on board. The issue of inspections of previously unannounced facilities or those classified as military bases in Iran has been a source of tension over the years. The infamous case of the 'Possible Military Dimensions' (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program and access to the Parchin site was one of the hottest topics surrounding Iran's nuclear program until the closure of this case about a year and a half ago, before the JCPOA was implemented. Over the years, Iran has repeatedly stated that its military facilities are off-limits, and ultimately, the IAEA Director General's visit and sampling by inspectors at Parchin took place under special conditions. Critics of the JCPOA today argue that the PMD case was not thoroughly examined and closed, leaving questions that the Trump administration should pursue. Among these critics is Olli Heinonen, a former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), who told Radio Farda: 'The PMD case was not genuinely closed. It was a political decision. The Board of Governors can announce whatever it wants. But there are still unanswered questions, and actions taken to close the case have been contrary to the agency's usual process.' Mr. Heinonen points to some issues in the IAEA's final report regarding the PMD. For example, the agency's brief mention of finding two pieces of uranium, which it stated at the time did not have sufficient evidence for further investigation. However, this former agency official says the agency should have conducted further investigations, asked more questions from Iranian officials, or conducted more sampling at that location. Mr. Heinonen states: 'The problem is right here. This is what I believe the U.S. government is trying to do, to attempt to go back and correct the context that was established during the negotiations.' However, not all nuclear and disarmament analysts agree with this approach; among them is Daryl Kimball, Executive Director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, who says the JCPOA regarding inspections looks to the future, not the past: 'The goal of the special inspection clause in the JCPOA was not to request inspections to raise concerns about Parchin again. This clause is about activities that may be ongoing today and inconsistent with the JCPOA.' Mr. Kimball adds: 'The special inspection clause in the JCPOA was included to identify and prevent potential Iranian violations at its military facilities, due to activities Iran conducted over a decade ago in the military sphere. But this clause was not intended to find a false pretext to say that Iran is not cooperating or does not accept visits to its military facilities.' The Associated Press reports that the U.S. must have sufficient evidence to request a visit to an Iranian facility. Olli Heinonen, who is now a senior advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, believes there must be a reason for an inspection and says: 'The JCPOA pertains to all of Iran's territory, and all countries are subject to the agency's inspections, provided they have a reason for inspection. No protected area should exist that could prevent agency inspections, but we must not forget that inspectors must have a reason for inspection.' Now that Iran and the P5+1 have had the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action for about two years, the process of granting access and conducting inspections has a specific and complex mechanism that cannot be achieved merely by the request of one country, such as the U.S. Articles 74 to 78 of the JCPOA in the section on nuclear commitments address access or inspections and propose various ways to alleviate concerns regarding Iran's activities. Article 78 states that if alternative inspection methods do not address concerns, and Iran does not agree within two weeks of the agency's request, the issue must be raised in the JCPOA commission, and five out of eight members, including Iran, must agree to the inspection request within the following seven days for it to proceed. If this agreement is reached, Iran has three days to take the necessary actions in this regard.