Analysis of the 94 Elections Results through Ten Questions and Answers

Through ten questions, one can largely understand the nature and reasons behind the developments resulting from the 94 elections: Why and how important were the elections? To answer this question, we must ask what elections are and what they are not in Iran. Elections in the Islamic Republic system are: 1. Management of disputes within the ruling caste, which is the main function of elections in this system; 2. An opportunity to sell members of the ruling caste to the people and display legitimacy; and 3. A type of management of public opinion and demands and movements of the people. None of these aspects pertains to improving the lives of ordinary people, but it does not mean that elections are merely a show; the claim of their democratic nature is a performance. However, elections in Iran are not: 1. An opportunity to determine fate; 2. An opportunity for the circulation of elites and the removal of some unworthy and inefficient officials from government and state positions; 3. A period for competition among alternative policies for managing society; 4. A managed and peaceful expression of the demands of social movements through the ballot box; 5. An opportunity for people to make very slight changes in the decision-making system; the main power structures are not elected, while even in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Venezuela, the main power structures are defined and changed in an electoral manner; opposition forces are generally excluded from participation, and the issue of boycotting or not boycotting is essentially irrelevant; boycotting makes sense only when a group can have meaningful activity and does not do so; 6. Civil participation; for this reason, non-participation cannot mean civil opposition. Were the results predictable? The results of the Tehran elections were not predictable for the reformist faction because more than two-thirds of their list members were unknown. The results in Tehran were also unpredictable for the authoritarian faction because if they were, they would not have formed the conservative coalition list with the prominence of the Stability Front. Furthermore, this result was not predictable for the Guardian Council because if it were, it would have disqualified the unknown candidates as well. The results in the provinces were largely predictable for both sides. The results of the Assembly of Experts elections in Tehran were unpredictable for both sides up to the removal of Mesbah and Yazdi. How accurate were the polls? The IP poll had about a 13% error in predicting participation in the Majlis and an 11% error in predicting participation in the Assembly of Experts. Scientific polls usually indicate an error of 3 to 5 percent. This level of error once again showed that polls in totalitarian regimes cannot be trusted. These regimes seek to manufacture opinion and prevent independent polling institutions by any means. Polling in an atmosphere of intimidation and security threats, and phone polling from outside the country makes the results of such activities unreliable. The lack of independent polling institutions in Iran is not a good justification for conducting this work abroad. What do the results of the 94 elections mean? Based on the results, the relationship between Rouhani's government and the future Majlis will be closer. The meaning of these results for the Assembly of Experts is that the elections of this assembly should not be conflated with the elections of the Majlis. Higher participation means the removal of unpopular figures and even some members of the Guardian Council from this assembly. The meaning of these results for the militaristic faction is that they must increase their repressive capacity. How will the composition of the Assembly of Experts and the future Majlis be? This question can also be asked in terms of which group won and which group lost in the elections. The composition of the two assemblies shows that neither won. The share of reformists in the next Majlis is very close to that of the authoritarian faction (83 to 78), with the note that the reformists themselves have moved closer to the positions of the authoritarian faction. Not a single reformist believing in structural changes can be seen among the elected representatives of Tehran. Reformists have increased their share in the Majlis by leaning towards the opposing side. The share of women has increased. 41% of the previous Majlis members and 38% of the previous Assembly of Experts members were not re-elected. The removal of Yazdi and Mesbah will not change the composition of the Assembly of Experts. Will the election results worry Khamenei? Three results of the elections could worry Khamenei: 1) The high votes for Rafsanjani and Rouhani in the Assembly of Experts elections, as he does not want anyone to have the power to stand against him; 2) A stronger presence of the reformist faction in the Majlis could accelerate the normalization process in foreign relations, which Khamenei does not want; and 3) Hashemi will play a more prominent role in selecting the next leader, which may disrupt Khamenei's plans if he has someone in mind for this position. All those close to Khamenei who did not win votes in this election are either working in appointed institutions or will hold higher positions in appointed institutions. In this regard, Khamenei is not worried about the removal of these individuals. How will developments within factions and blocs unfold? In the next Majlis, the pragmatic part of the authoritarian faction will distance itself more from the militaristic part. This has progressed to the extent of Larijani's absence from the coalition list in Qom. This gap will deepen as there are four serious disagreements within the authoritarian faction over the following issues: 1) To eliminate or work with the reformist faction, 2) Distribution of funds within the framework of populist policies or elitist economics, 3) Détente with the West and Gulf countries or escalation of tensions, and 4) Working within the framework of parties and organizations or operating within the framework of a military party leadership. How was this election engineered? Elections in Iran are usually engineered in four stages: 1) Widespread arrests of political activists and journalists before the election process begins; 2) Screening candidates and disqualifying non-affiliated individuals; 3) Managing voting (transporting voters by bus); and 4) Managing counting and manipulating the aggregation of votes (as was done in Zahedan or Noshahr and Chalus during this period). In this election, engineering was more intense in the first and second stages and milder in the third and fourth stages. Will anything change? If anyone expects that there will be an opening in their life due to the elections and their results, they should reconsider. In Iran, with the change of assemblies (except for the unsuccessful attempt of the sixth Majlis), only faces have changed, not policies. Even if there is a slight change in the composition of the Majlis or some slogans, the changes are not irreversible, and appointed institutions will do everything to return to the previous state (as they did with the sixth Majlis). The government has effective tools to neutralize any demand for change. Processes, procedures, laws, and policies change less even with changes in governments. The share of religious bureaucracy and security and military institutions from national resources does not change with elections. Elections are not the only channel for change. In Iran, they are not even an effective means for change because the role of citizens in this matter is ornamental. Elections in democratic countries are also not a channel for solving many problems. The government has closed the path of any transformation through elections with the lessons learned from the past and from authoritarian regimes. Some changes that occur in Iran are unrelated to elections and are against the will of the government, not within its framework. The change of faces should not be misleading. There is no significant difference between Mesbah and Reyshahri or Tashkiri and Dari. Given this situation, why do some people participate in elections? Because they do not see any other option for slight change and believe that elections are the only outlet. The people of Iran have little knowledge of negative (civil disobedience, boycotting state and religious institutions) and positive (public activities unrelated to the government aimed at reducing harm or improving living conditions) methods of protest and change. Some political activists have a reductionist view of activism with a state-oriented perspective. The author's opinion does not reflect the views of Radio Farda. Majid Mohammadi, sociologist.