AP Plus Protocol: A Solution for Nuclear Negotiations

One of the main challenges for negotiators in finalizing the text of the comprehensive agreement is the issue of inspections and access to verify Iran's nuclear program. It is said that the solution to this issue will be an agreement on a document titled 'AP Plus Protocol'. Ahead of another round of political negotiations in Vienna, and in response to remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken regarding the permanence of the comprehensive nuclear agreement conditions, Abbas Araghchi, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister, stated that the potential final agreement would have a specific timeframe. However, Araghchi emphasized that the commitments Iran would accept under the NPT treaty would remain in place as long as Iran is a member of this treaty. Among the commitments mentioned by Araghchi is the acceptance of the Additional Protocol, which remains one of the main challenges for negotiators. The three-month deadline that Iran and the six world powers set for drafting and finalizing the comprehensive agreement is quickly passing, with only twenty days remaining. Vienna is currently the focal point of activities. Experts from both sides are spending more of their time in the Austrian capital, continuing work on the comprehensive agreement text and several amendments to it, and starting Wednesday, deputy foreign ministers will once again be present in the city to hold another round of diplomatic negotiations. During these days, the quarterly meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is also taking place in Vienna, one of the topics of which will be Iran's nuclear program. All these round-the-clock activities are ongoing while discussions about the manner of inspectors' access to Iran's nuclear and non-nuclear facilities and the process of resolving disputes remain hot topics among various officials. Yukiya Amano, the IAEA Director General, states that it is still not possible to comment on Iran's undeclared activities. Behrouz Kamalvandi, spokesperson for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, in an interview with the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, responded to Amano's remarks by saying, 'We have always said that this issue can be referred to countries that have signed the Additional Protocol. We are not currently implementing the Additional Protocol, so there is no expectation for this statement to come up for us to comment on it.' Of course, Kamalvandi's statement comes at a time when the implementation of the Additional Protocol, if Iran and the 5+1 group reach a comprehensive agreement, will be one of the keys to advancing the goal of 'verifying the peacefulness of Iran's nuclear program.' During Mohammad Khatami's presidency, Iran voluntarily implemented this protocol, which is referred to as a complement to the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty), for a short period. With the emergence of disputes, reports from the agency, and the imposition of sanctions, Iran halted the implementation of the Additional Protocol. Now, several years later, the approval and implementation of this protocol are considered important aspects of a potential agreement. The main challenge is observed in that, on the one hand, without granting certain access to the agency to investigate past actions, this body cannot confirm the peacefulness of Iran's program, and on the other hand, Iran is concerned that by granting certain accesses, its sovereignty will be questioned, and its security secrets will be revealed. For this reason, some analysts, including François Nicolo, former French ambassador to Iran, believe that what Iran previously accepted as the conditions of the Additional Protocol is not sufficient to respond to the agency's questions about actions that may have military aspects (PMD), and thus it seems that the negotiating parties are seeking to draft a section in the comprehensive agreement as the AP Plus Protocol or an annex to the Additional Protocol that may address challenges such as access to certain non-nuclear sites or interviews with nuclear scientists that are not necessarily mentioned in the Additional Protocol itself. In this regard, Mark Hibbs, a nuclear issues analyst at the Carnegie Endowment in Berlin, emphasizes the importance of the precise implementation of the Additional Protocol or any other document regarding the 'AP Plus Protocol' and states, 'For NPT member countries, the AP Plus Protocol addresses issues beyond what the agency has done so far. In the case of other countries that have signed protocols with the agency, this body has been allowed to conduct inspections and access in the country, and these are carried out as complementary accesses. However, the most important issue regarding Iran and the AP Plus Protocol is that if Iran had fully cooperated with the agency, such an annex protocol would not have been necessary at all. Because we have previously had questions about PMD-related actions, and in some cases, the agency has been able to reach conclusions with a country that has not even signed a protocol. Therefore, I think it mainly depends on the level of cooperation, and it does not matter how many legal documents are signed with the agency.' However, Hibbs emphasizes that an AP Plus Protocol is not supposed to grant unlimited access to the agency. This nuclear issues analyst also discusses the background of this topic, stating that the AP Plus Protocol emerged following disagreements between the agency's secretariat and its Board of Governors, which at that time believed that Iran's commitments under the Additional Protocol were not sufficient for PMD discussions. Some analysts, including François Nicolo, former French ambassador to Iran, believe that what Iran previously accepted as the conditions of the Additional Protocol is not sufficient to respond to the agency's questions about actions that may have military aspects (PMD), and thus it seems that the negotiating parties are seeking to draft a section in the comprehensive agreement as the AP Plus Protocol or an annex to the Additional Protocol that may address challenges such as access to certain non-nuclear sites or interviews with nuclear scientists that are not necessarily mentioned in the Additional Protocol itself. Hibbs mentions that the Board of Governors has supported negotiations to reach a solution since the Geneva Agreement and has left it to the world powers to define the architecture of this agreement and the manner of inspections and verification by the agency. You can be sure that the Director General's office will continue consultations with the 5+1 and also with the member countries of the Board of Governors to continue investigations into Iran's nuclear program. However, there is also a gap that needs to be filled. Some of the 5+1 countries say that if the agency insists on obtaining the right to comprehensive inspections, anytime and anywhere, through the AP Plus Protocol or annex, it will face opposition from Iran due to historical reasons and past experiences, which could lead to the failure of political negotiations. For this reason, Hibbs believes that Iran and the six world powers must reach a compromise through difficult and complex negotiations that alleviates concerns about Iran's nuclear program while ensuring that access is not so extensive that Iran cannot accept it. In recent weeks, the issue of access to non-nuclear facilities, specifically military ones, as well as interviews with scientists, has faced severe criticism from some in Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, is at the top of the list of officials opposing such access. Jalil Roshandel, a political analyst in the U.S., believes that this opposition does not necessarily mean a definitive rejection of the issue, as negotiations to find a middle ground on this matter are still ongoing. Roshandel states, 'Opposition is expressed while the Islamic Republic government is officially pursuing this issue in negotiations. Mr. Zarif, as foreign minister, at least comes and explains the principle of inspections and states that an agreement with the agency is almost impossible without reviews. As a result, they know this principle, accept it, and negotiate based on it. Mr. Khamenei opposes reviews, but he does not oppose the principle of negotiation. Therefore, if he accepts the principle of negotiation, he implicitly does not have a problem with the principle of reviews. Perhaps these last weeks are the bargaining phase for both sides, and Mr. Khamenei or others do not want to withdraw from this negotiation to possibly gain or give concessions that ultimately lead to the lifting of sanctions.