Arab Concerns and Hopes Regarding the Nuclear Agreement

As negotiations continue between Iran and the 1+5 group in Vienna and reports of progress emerge, Arab media have not only reflected news and reports of the negotiations but also attempted to showcase analyses from experts. Following the agreement, the pan-Arab newspaper Al-Hayat, in an article by Elias Harfouch, has sought to address the potential impacts of a nuclear agreement between Tehran and the 1+5 group on Iran's future. The author points out the challenges in reaching an agreement and the obstacles to its implementation, stating: "If one side of the negotiations were Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of Iran, and the other side were the leaders of the Republican Party in the U.S. Congress, the negotiations would proceed more easily and transparently." Harfouch emphasizes the necessity for continuous contact between President Hassan Rouhani's government and Iranian negotiators with Ayatollah Khamenei to convince him and receive green lights from him, while also presenting any potential agreement to the Republican-majority Congress in the U.S. for decision-making, which he considers one of the existing difficulties. The author continues by stating that the Vienna negotiations are not solely about the nuclear issue but are, in fact, political negotiations that relate to shaping Iran's image post-agreement. He stresses that after an agreement with the "global arrogance" powers, it will be very difficult for Iran to remain "revolutionary." The author writes in Al-Hayat: "Iran must make its decision and identify the greater danger to the future of the regime and the country; it must choose whether it wants to remain within the walls of international isolation or seek to change the situation and improve relations with the world, a step that will come with its political and economic costs." Regarding the impact of the agreement on regional affairs, Rawda Bou Munsif, a writer for the Lebanese newspaper An-Nahar, raises the question of which regional issue will be addressed after the agreement between Iran and the 1+5 group. This writer has attempted to point to the agreement's impact on relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, predicting that after a potential agreement, one of the regional issues that has caused concern for both countries and others in the region will be opened. The An-Nahar writer refers to two analytical orientations: one that believes the nuclear agreement will strengthen Iran's axis and enable it to assert its will in issues such as Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon, while others believe that an agreement with Iran will coincide with extracting concessions from it in some regional issues. According to the author, resolving the situation in Iraq will be postponed, but it is still unclear which will take priority between Syria and Lebanon. The question arises whether, in light of the imminent danger of the sudden collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, regional parties will first seek a resolution to the crisis in that country, or whether they will first address the Lebanese issue, which seems simpler, and engage in interactions to select a president for that country. The Al Jazeera network published an article by Hassan Ahmadian, a strategic affairs expert, discussing the miscalculations of Arabs regarding their positions on the potential nuclear agreement between Iran and the 1+5 group. The author first refers to some Arab positions that accused Washington of betraying its allies following the interim Geneva agreement. Proponents of this view believe that the U.S. is trying to conclude the nuclear file and subsequently "abandon the Middle East and its allies for Iran." The author outlines three assumptions in this analysis: "The nuclear agreement is an Iranian-American understanding framed within the 1+5 group, there is a broader agreement than the nuclear file that encompasses all Middle Eastern issues, and the U.S. is seeking a permanent exit from the Middle East, viewing Iran as a replacement for itself in managing the crises of this region." Ahmadian counters these three hypotheses, stating first that even if the U.S. has the upper hand in negotiations, it does not mean that other members of the 1+5 group will follow Washington, as objections and conditions from other members, such as France, have delayed reaching an agreement several times. Second, the United States and, more clearly, Iran, always try to keep nuclear discussions separate from other contentious issues to reduce complexities. Third, the reduction of U.S. influence in the Middle East is a policy unrelated to the nuclear file, and even if implemented, given Iran's enmity with Israel, it is unlikely that Washington's trust in Tehran will increase in the region. The author considers the second miscalculation to be in assessing the capabilities of certain countries and figures regarding U.S. strategy. He believes that the Arab countries' propaganda war regarding Iran's role in chaos in the Middle East and events such as the Yemen war cannot significantly influence Washington's strategy, as the decision-making and policymaking system in the U.S. is not person-centered and is based on various institutions. Therefore, changing the mindset of American strategists is a matter that requires decades of effort. The author believes that attempts to dissuade the U.S. from an agreement with Iran within the framework of the 1+5 group stem from a perspective that maintains the U.S. as the key to resolving regional problems and crises. He writes that this reliance on the U.S. role primarily stems from a lack of understanding of strategic changes in the U.S. and, secondarily, from a fear of taking on regional responsibilities through collective and climatic cooperation. The author further considers efforts to scare Western countries away from an agreement with Iran to be rooted in genuine concerns among Arab countries that, should sanctions on Iran be lifted, it would increase support for its allies. He writes that proponents of this view believe that Iran has not yet sufficiently supported its allies. Ahmadian sees this hypothesis as flawed in that, first, Iran has supported its allies as much as it has been able, and second, that if necessary, even with ongoing sanctions, it will find a way to increase its support for its allies. In this context, Kerry is on the verge of issuing a statement regarding the nuclear negotiation process with Iran, while the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament criticizes domestic opponents of the nuclear negotiations, marking a "significant day" in the nuclear negotiations.