Arak Heavy Water: The White Elephant Threatening the Future of the JCPOA

Ali Larijani's harsh statements during the December 2 session of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, threatening the U.S. with reciprocal action in response to what he called the 'approval of fifty anti-JCPOA bills in the House of Representatives and Congress' of that country, stem from Tehran's hasty concerns about the future of the nuclear agreement, which in turn could negatively impact the behavior of the next Washington administration in this regard. The issuance of a statement signed by 200 members of the Islamic Consultative Assembly in the same session indicates that Larijani's threat against the U.S. is not an isolated action specific to the Assembly, but can be attributed to the hasty reaction of the Iranian ruling establishment to internal developments in the United States. Larijani threatened: 'Iran will bring the U.S. to its senses with reciprocal action.' Meanwhile, the current U.S. administration has not only taken no action against the JCPOA so far but has also utilized its available capacities to assist Tehran and facilitate the implementation of the JCPOA. The purchase of excess heavy water beyond the permitted storage limit in Iran occurred despite its lower quality than expected by the U.S. and the payment of a corresponding price, while the Islamic Republic, despite extensive efforts to sell the product to India, China, and Russia, failed to do so and was forced to send the surplus product to the neighboring country of Oman for temporary storage instead of dumping the produced water into the sea, incurring additional costs to comply with the commitments outlined in the JCPOA. The author of this piece raised the issue of the possibility of forcing Iran to dump heavy water into the sea due to the obligation to adhere to the commitments outlined, and not only was he sharply criticized by the regime's supporters as usual, but he also faced an official statement from the Atomic Energy Organization of the Islamic Republic. In the June statement from the Atomic Energy Organization, the author's opinion was rejected, emphasizing: 'Iran can hold its excess heavy water without a time limit until it finds a suitable customer.' Abbas Araqchi, head of the JCPOA Implementation Follow-up Headquarters, also emphasized in a phone conversation with the evening news network of the Islamic Republic on June 6: 'Iran is not obligated to sell its 40 tons of excess heavy water and can keep it indefinitely until it finds a buyer.' The news website Mashregh, close to the conservatives of the Islamic Republic, also quoted the author's article in a report on June 16, stating: 'Since Iran's excess heavy water has no buyers in the international market, the Islamic Republic is forced to dump it into the sea.' Contrary to the official statement of the Islamic Republic and Araqchi's remarks, the Islamic Republic announced last week that it had removed 40 tons of its heavy water stock from the country and transferred it to Oman! The Arak heavy water plant was built 25 years ago, and its production in the second phase increased from an initial 8 tons to 20 tons per year. The plant's products, intended for use in the 40-megawatt Arak reactor, were stored on-site under the supervision of the Atomic Energy Organization. According to the JCPOA, Iran is required to maintain 90 tons of heavy water at all times and has provided 32 tons of its reserves to the U.S. for $8 million. With the closure of the Arak nuclear reactor and the filling of its main core with concrete, it is impossible to return the unit to its previous conditions, and the status of the replacement reactor depends on a tripartite agreement between the U.S. (for design), China (for manufacturing parts), and Iran for its acquisition and maintenance. The next Arak nuclear reactor, which does not seem to have a capacity greater than 15 megawatts and, under the best conditions, will take between five to seven years to complete and launch, will burn enriched uranium instead of raw uranium, which was the fuel for the closed reactor, if built. Thus, maintaining the Arak heavy water plant, whose products are neither needed domestically nor have buyers abroad, lacks rational justification; this white elephant that the Islamic Republic has made a matter of prestige under the pretext of 'preserving nuclear achievements' could create doubts about Iran's full compliance with its commitments under the JCPOA, as noted in the recent agency report and mentioned as 'Iran's violation' in the recent approval of the sanctions bill against Iran in the U.S. House of Representatives. Although Iran has so far almost fully complied with its commitments under the JCPOA, it appears to feel compelled to retaliate against actions that have not yet materialized due to preemptive concerns about a change in U.S. policy in this regard. Among other things, Larijani mentions the approval of '40 bills' sanctioning Iran in the U.S. House of Representatives, none of which have become law. However, if Tehran continues its threats of retaliation, today's proposals from U.S. lawmakers could become law and actionable with the signature of the sitting president after January 20, 2017; a development that is certainly not in favor of the Islamic Republic. Furthermore, with the relinquishment of its nuclear capacity, the transfer of 10,000 kilograms of enriched uranium to Russia, the closure of Fordow, and the removal of the fuel core from the Arak reactor, Iran is practically unable to restore its relinquished nuclear capacities for a long time. The only remaining option for Iran to retaliate is to move towards building a nuclear bomb using the Natanz enrichment unit, changing the arrangement of cascades, and enriching it to military levels. Choosing this option initially requires Iran to exit the NPT and expel agency inspectors, and secondary actions will not go unnoticed by observers and will undoubtedly lead to a military conflict with unpredictable outcomes. For the Islamic Republic, it is necessary to understand that U.S. domestic policy is in a transitional state, and any provocation without justification from its next government, under the pretext of unimplemented sanctions in the current administration, can only pave the way for the legalization and implementation of sanction proposals against Iran, and the Islamic Republic, after relinquishing its nuclear capacity and being deprived of the 'oil weapon,' is practically unable to retaliate.