Are the Military Forces Being Driven Out of Iran's Foreign Policy?

The state of the Islamic Republic's foreign relations has recently been examined from various angles through two new documents. The first document is an important study published on June 27 by the Congressional Research Service, responsible for feeding debates among American lawmakers, and the second document is from the European Parliament titled 'Europe's Strategic Policy for Engagement with Iran After the Nuclear Agreement.' The first document, titled 'Iran's Foreign Policy,' was prepared by Kenneth Katzman and refers to 'disarray and confusion in Iran's foreign policy.' Meanwhile, the other document published by the 'Iran and Europe Research Group' for the European Parliament mentions opportunities that have gone unused due to the disarray in Iran's foreign relations. The final decision-making power in foreign relations rests with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, and this area is divided between the military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs without having a focus or separation of responsibilities. The announcement of Ali Akbar Salehi's affiliation, the senior nuclear negotiator and Deputy Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic, to the Quds Force, the extraterritorial operations arm of the Revolutionary Guards, has further highlighted the mixing of military and governmental power in the realm of foreign policy. One aspect of examining recent changes among the military commanders of the Islamic Republic, which may continue in the coming days and weeks, can be related to the possibility of a gradual reduction in the role of the military in the country's foreign relations, and correspondingly, an increase in the government's role in determining objectives and selecting tools for guiding foreign relations. Although recent changes among the military should not be solely attributed to a motivation to reduce military influence in Iran's foreign relations, the observation of other parallel and simultaneous movements can strengthen this hypothesis. The media statements of several displaced figures, particularly Hassan Firouzabadi, the former Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, who was replaced by Mohammad Baqeri, have always had a political color and have repeatedly positioned his political stances and those of other military commanders in opposition to the government's foreign policy. The new Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, in his first statements after his appointment, only addressed the necessity of defending the rights of the oppressed in the region and combating terrorism. The direct intervention of the military in domestic politics and the management of a large part of Iran's foreign relations was such that Qassem Soleimani, within a few weeks between his trip to Russia for discussions about the situation in Syria (which was indirectly denied), also attended a session of the so-called 'Followers' faction in the Parliament and effectively determined the composition of the board of directors and the Speaker of the Islamic Parliament. Strengthening the role of the National Security Council's secretariat in foreign policy matters, particularly Ali Shamkhani's recent trip to Moscow to discuss the civil war and the political future of Syria, instead of Qassem Soleimani, could justify the use of a 'mediator' role in the gradual transfer of military responsibilities in foreign policy to the government. The division of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy arena into two spheres of military and governmental influence, and the relentless competition between these two branches, is a weakness that, in addition to other adverse consequences, makes timely adjustments in policies and the correction of movements in response to regional and global developments not only difficult but somewhat impossible. In response to last week's internal developments in Britain and the referendum for leaving the Union, Iranian officials' reactions were contradictory, with the Foreign Ministry's statement calling it 'the democratic vote of the people and the necessity of accepting it,' while Massoud Jazayeri, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, claimed that 'Britain must pay the price for years of colonialism and crimes against humanity,' while inciting separatism in Scotland and Ireland. After several years of hiatus in conventional relations between Britain and Iran, following the nuclear agreement, Tehran-London relations are on the path to normalization, and both governments are trying to elevate current relations to a higher level of exchanges in the coming months. The holding of 'Quds Day' and the renewed expression of hostility towards Israel is a goal that conservatives and the military do not see themselves fully aligned with the current government in pursuing; therefore, after this year's relatively low-key ceremony, the Tasnim news agency, which is close to the military, criticized the 'lack of reflection of the passionate and popular movement of Quds Day.' Compared to Tehran's confusion in determining a unified foreign policy path, the neighboring government of Turkey, whose foreign policy is directed from a single source, after several disappointments, adopted a policy of 'non-tension relations with regional powers' and made two significant moves to reform relations with Russia and Israel. Tehran's foreign policy is influenced by multiple factors that do not necessarily act in concert with each other. The desire to export the Islamic Revolution, which has not yet extinguished, competition with the Sunni branch of Islam that has made Tehran's relations with Riyadh critical in recent years, the regime's fear of threats to its existence—especially from the West and Israel—alongside threats to territorial integrity and national interests and concerns are the main drivers of the Islamic Republic's foreign policy. The Islamic Republic is seeking to overturn the power structure that, according to the regime's military, protects the interests of the United States and its regional allies, while contrary to the military's wishes, it does not possess the necessary tools to create such a change. Accepting Western conditions for relinquishing questionable nuclear development programs is a symbol of pragmatism in the government's civilian branch, while its military branch pursues objectives influenced by ideological beliefs in the region; a behavior that has made continued de-escalation with Iran's neighbors impossible. The content of the two research documents from the U.S. and Europe regarding Iran's foreign policy, while emphasizing the emergence of new opportunities after the nuclear agreement, indicates the continuation of wasted opportunities due to disarray and lack of focus in the country's foreign relations; a situation that could gradually improve if the military were to exit this domain, although the final decision-maker claims that he is 'not a diplomat but a revolutionary.'