Arming Supporters of the Party and Increasing Protests in Azerbaijan

(In previous sections, we examined the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party under Stalin's orders, and the opposition of the Tudeh Party and Western powers such as Britain and the United States to this newly established party. At the same time, Turkey was displeased with the emergence of such a party in Iranian Azerbaijan and sided with the Iranian government in the dispute between the party and the central government.) With the establishment of the 'Azerbaijan Democratic Party', one of the most important clauses of Stalin's order was implemented; an order that was approved on July 6, 1945 – 15 Tir 1325 – by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In the first and second clauses of this 13-article resolution, the necessity of separatist activities and the establishment of the party were mentioned, with the name of the party being determined as 'Azerbaijan Democratic Party' in the second clause. However, this was not all of Stalin's order. The sixth clause of this order was another key clause of this resolution; the next step in the Azerbaijan project: 'Suppress groups that have been armed with weapons made in foreign countries. The aim of this is to allow Soviet supporters and activists of the separatist movement of democratic and party organizations to defend themselves. This task should be entrusted to Comrade Bulganin and Comrade Baqirov.' Among the two individuals responsible for this operation was Nikolai Bulganin, a high-ranking military officer of the Red Army, who later held positions such as Minister of Defense and Prime Minister of the Soviet Union. Along with Mir Jafar Baqirov, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan, they devised a complex plan to suppress opponents. As Touraj Atabaki, author of books such as 'Azerbaijan in Contemporary Iran' and 'Iran in World War I' and a professor at Leiden University, states, from the very first day the announcement of the party's existence was published, the plan to eliminate opponents was initiated, but not by Soviet military forces, rather by Iranian supporters of the party. He says: 'In those early days, there were people who opposed this movement in Zanjan and the middle region, but they were assassinated. The Fedaiyan of the party did not allow opponents to operate and attacked the homes of large landowners or relatives of the major tribes in the region, seizing their houses. Of course, these events occurred throughout Azerbaijan, but in some areas of Azerbaijan, we have reports confirming these attacks, and many industrialists and merchants fled Azerbaijan in panic to Tehran. Interestingly, these groups formed associations in Tehran and throughout the life of the Democratic Party, Azerbaijanis who had fled and gone to Tehran acted as a pressure group, urging the Iranian governments (Hekimiy and later Qavam) to pay more attention to the Azerbaijan issue and put an end to the life of the Democratic Party.' The paramilitaries supporting the Democratic Party, who called themselves 'Fedai', primarily needed weapons to carry out their mission. If the Red Army supplied weapons to the Fedaiyan of the party, the organizational relationship between the Soviet Union and this organization would quickly be exposed, and even ordinary citizens of Azerbaijan in Iran would understand that the Soviet Union was one of the main supporters of this affair. Bulganin and Baqirov executed this part of the plan with considerable complexity. Touraj Atabaki states: 'This was a very serious issue for the Iranian government, and they had news that people in Azerbaijan were forming armed groups and partisan groups. These weapons were mainly provided by Soviet forces. Throughout these years, all military barracks of the Iranian army in Azerbaijan were under the control of the Red Army. They had disarmed some of the barracks and provided these weapons to their supporters. After the formation of the party, they supplied these weapons to the Fedaiyan of the party.' Thus, the Soviet Union not only established the separatist party it desired but also, shortly after, formed armed groups whose weapons were supplied from Iranian barracks. The next step was to create an autonomous government in Azerbaijan, inciting discontent and creating unrest in Iranian Azerbaijan. This was also done through demonstrations. Within ten days of the announcement of the party's existence, the Democratic Party held a meeting titled the Founding Committee. In this meeting, Pishavari was appointed as the head of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party, and another statement was issued repeating the demands of the September 12 statement. However, this time another issue was added to the statement, which, according to Touraj Atabaki, could be interpreted as a new step for the party in distancing itself from the center. This university professor says: 'In this second statement, it is stated that our nationality is different from our citizenship and must be separated from each other. It is written that we are subject to the Iranian government, but our nationality is Azerbaijani. This is somewhat derived from the constitution of the Soviet Union. While they considered themselves citizens of the Soviet Union, their nationality was Azerbaijani, Georgian, or Armenian.' In Mehr (October), the activities of the party continued, and the first national congress of this party was held in Tabriz. In this congress, which lasted three days, government officials such as the deputy governor of Azerbaijan, the mayor of Tabriz, and the head of the Tabriz police were present as guests. Mirza Ibrahimov, the Minister of Culture of Azerbaijan, of Iranian origin and born in Serab, acted as a liaison between Baqirov and Pishavari. As Jamil Hasanli wrote in his book about the developments of this period, events in Azerbaijan were reported daily to Stalin through Baqirov from Aban (November). In this month, Baqirov sent an instruction through Mirza Ibrahimov, the Minister of Culture of Soviet Azerbaijan, to Tabriz, which details part of his plans that can be traced. This instruction, like dozens of similar documents currently kept in the state archive of Azerbaijan, was translated by Mansour Hamami and published in the book 'The Ups and Downs of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party' by Jamil Hasanli in Iran. The text of this instruction states: 'You must promote that the current situation in the half of Greater Azerbaijan that constitutes the fourth province of Iran is unacceptable. You must intensify your operations. Inform Sharifov and Baqirzadeh to form a society of friends of Soviet Azerbaijan. If they do not start working as soon as possible, we will hold them accountable. Do not annoy the local residents. They must consider themselves the rightful owners of the country and accept us as those who have come to help them. They must be made to understand that we are temporarily there and that after a maximum of four months, they will manage affairs without our help. They must prepare themselves for carrying out party, governmental, and military tasks.' In fact, they had to be ready to seize power in Tabriz as soon as possible; an issue that did not escape the attention of politicians in Tehran. From this point onward, the Azerbaijan issue became the most important issue across the country that was still occupied, and all other developments were overshadowed by what was happening in Azerbaijan. Ibrahim Hakimi had two options. The political option to resolve the crisis by appointing a new governor for Azerbaijan and negotiating, or the military option of sending military forces to this province of the country. (In the next section of the program, we will hear how the Prime Minister took initiatives to resolve the Azerbaijan crisis and how, after his repeated failures, the autonomous government of Pishavari was eventually formed in Azerbaijan. The party aired every night at the end of the evening magazine from Radio Farda.)