Assessment of Iran's Reaction to the Designation of the IRGC as a 'Terrorist Organization'

Less than an hour after the announcement of the inclusion of the 'Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' in the list of 'Foreign Terrorist Organizations' by the U.S. State Department, Iran's Supreme National Security Council declared that the U.S. Central Command in West Asia (CENTCOM) and all its affiliated forces are considered a 'terrorist group.' The statement from the Supreme National Security Council of Iran was released shortly after a letter from Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's Foreign Minister, to Hassan Rouhani, in which Zarif requested that, based on the law 'Countering Human Rights Violations and Adventurism and Terrorism by the U.S. in the Region,' CENTCOM be placed on the terrorist list. These chain of actions indicates that the Islamic Republic has a relative diplomatic readiness to respond to the U.S. government's actions and has attempted to minimize the psychological impact of the U.S. State Department's action with a swift response. The behavior of the Islamic Republic in this regard has a history. The law 'Countering Human Rights Violations and Adventurism and Terrorism by the U.S. in the Region' was passed by the Iranian Parliament on August 13, 2017. This law was, in fact, a reaction to the sanctions plan against Iran that was signed by Donald Trump on August 2, 2017, after being approved by the U.S. Congress. In the law passed by the Iranian Parliament, special support for the 'Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' is emphasized, and the 'U.S. military and intelligence forces' are recognized as 'supporters of terrorist groups in the region.' Accordingly, the Islamic Republic imposed sanctions on these groups and mandated the Foreign Ministry to collaborate with the Quds Force of the IRGC, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Intelligence, and the Central Bank to register and publish the names of American individuals covered by this law in the 'sanctions list.' The law emphasizes that this list must be updated every six months and, if necessary, on a case-by-case basis. The judiciary of the Islamic Republic has also been tasked with dedicating several branches to handle cases related to this law. This law also considers 'any cooperation with the U.S. government and military and intelligence forces in terrorist crimes' as deserving of judicial and criminal action. The mentioned law also required the Iranian Foreign Ministry to prepare a list of 'human rights violators' active in the U.S. military and intelligence forces and those who have cooperated with the U.S. government in this regard, and to update and publish it annually and, if necessary, on a case-by-case basis. Prohibiting the issuance of visas, seizing assets, and freezing bank accounts for officials listed in these two lists were other punishments approved by the Iranian Parliament. According to this law, the government was also mandated to allocate 4 trillion tomans for the development of Iran's missile and defense program in 2017, and an additional 1 trillion tomans specifically for strengthening the Quds Force of the IRGC. Despite nearly 19 months having passed since the approval of this law, there has been no report on the actions of the Islamic Republic, the list of individuals who have been or will be sanctioned, and the implementation of potential punishments, apart from the budget allocation for military and governmental institutions. It is evident that the reason for not publishing such lists is not necessarily the incapacity of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and the publication and updating of these lists have no particular practical value inside and outside Iran. Meanwhile, during this time, the U.S. government has intensified sanctions against Iran and exercised power, which, according to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, has 'created significant damage to Iran's international trade relations with other countries.' These types of reactions have not been limited to the Iranian Parliament and Foreign Ministry. On July 17, 2017, a few days before the proposal for intensified sanctions against Iran, Mohammad Baqeri, Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, stated: 'Equating the IRGC with terrorist groups and imposing similar sanctions' poses a 'great risk' to U.S. forces and bases in the region. Mohammad Ali Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, also threatened the U.S. government on July 19, 2017, stating that if it pursued 'defensive sanctions and sanctions against the IRGC,' 'it must first withdraw its regional bases up to 2,000 kilometers around Iran.' Despite such threats, over the past year and a half, the U.S. government has sanctioned Iran's defense industries and various sectors of the IRGC, and not only has it not withdrawn its bases, but it has also signed an important strategic contract with the government of Oman, which has been considered a strategic friend of Iran in the Middle East in recent years. In fact, assessing these actions suggests that senior officials of the Islamic Republic, despite having a relative awareness of their practical inability to counter the increasing pressure from the Trump administration, still consider the psychological effects of U.S. actions to be more important than their practical consequences and strive not to lose in the psychological war. The swift reaction to the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization was also made from this perspective. Iranian officials also hope that by repeating sanctions over the past year and a half, the impact of these actions on the domestic economy, especially on currency and gold prices, will remain limited to prevent the overflow of the consequences of these actions into domestic politics and the economy as much as possible. Naturally, the intensification of sanctions in the medium term will have a significant impact on both Iran's domestic economy and its international trade relations, but the most important issue for policymakers in Iran is to control short-term consequences so that the situation does not get out of their hands. In this recent case, the designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization could negatively affect this institution's economic activities in Iraq, where its trade exchanges with Iran have exceeded 12 billion dollars, and complicate the IRGC's presence in the reconstruction program in Syria, both of which are considered important targets for the U.S. government. However, it seems that these shocks also do not hold a special place in the current calculations of Iranian officials, which are focused on short-term economic and political goals. In more precise terms, in a long-term assessment, it is unclear what the Islamic Republic's program and strategy are for managing the current crisis in its diplomacy, and the pillars of Iran's diplomacy, even in the most complex and dangerous situations, are based on 'reaction,' not 'planning.' The decision-making process regarding FATF and the regulation of Iran's relations with the European Union is a specific example of this confusion and lack of perspective, which has neither helped save the JCPOA nor enabled the use of the EU's tools or power in the current environment. The persistence of the mindset of the Islamic Republic's officials in the 'psychological war' space and their focus on short-term tactics, which are tied to hopes for changes in U.S. policy in the upcoming elections, has trapped Iran in a diplomatic quagmire. One can expect to see extensive media and political propaganda from government components in the coming days defending the IRGC and promoting unity in diplomacy, but the display of unity, as ineffective as it has been in reducing or managing the gaps and wounds of domestic politics, holds no particular value in the diplomatic sphere either. Solving the current crisis of the Islamic Republic does not require 'displays of unity'; it requires a program and 'decision.'