Ayatollah Khamenei and Conditional Opening of Interaction with the U.S.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's remarks during a meeting with a group of mourners opened a new window into his macro views regarding the U.S. and regional disputes. After a week-long delay regarding the Lausanne statement, he stated that he has no supportive or opposing opinion. The Leader showed a cooler stance regarding the initial political understanding of Lausanne 2 than expected. His tone was somewhat angry. Although he reiterated support for the continuation of negotiations and described the nuclear negotiators as honest individuals committed to national interests, he simultaneously warned that trust has existed until now, and its continuation in the future depends on the performance of the nuclear negotiating team in the remaining months of negotiations. The main point of Khamenei's remarks was to diminish the importance of the Lausanne joint statement, which he believes is not worthy of congratulations and that nothing has happened yet regarding the essence of the agreement, its content, or the process. He once again emphasized the need for the complete removal of sanctions without any conditions and the openness of the path for technical progress. Khamenei's words generally aligned more with critics of the Lausanne political understanding, and considering what happened in the confrontation between Mohammad Javad Zarif and Jawad Karimi Qodosi, the representative from Mashhad, it can be concluded that Khamenei sided more with Qodosi and his like-minded individuals. Khamenei explicitly rejected Zarif's claim that he oversees all details of the negotiations, asserting that he does not interfere in the complete drafting of negotiations and only defines the generalities and red lines. Thus, he indicated a distance from the specific approach of Rouhani's government in nuclear de-escalation. However, by observing the system's performance and the complexities in Khamenei's practical behavior, it can be concluded that he does not oppose an agreement based on the narrative that the Foreign Ministry has regarding the political Lausanne statement but insists that the government should not give more concessions and restrict the negotiators' flexibility. He also urged the government to consider the views of hardline conservatives and the worried ones and to inform the public and critics about the content of the negotiations. He specified that there is no rush for an agreement, and extending negotiations beyond the July 11 deadline is not a problem. This stance increased the likelihood that negotiations would not be halted by the mentioned deadline, which Abbas Araghchi, one of the nuclear negotiators, confirmed, stating that if a desirable agreement for the Leader is not reached in the next ten weeks, there is a possibility of extending the negotiations. Khamenei also made it clear that he does not want Rouhani and Zarif to become heroes after the nuclear agreement and that the outcome of a comprehensive agreement should not create a positive political atmosphere for advancing the moderate political agenda. He does not want the result of the negotiations to polarize the government arena and seeks to control its impacts among political factions, ensuring that the existing balance of power is not disrupted. The desired state from his perspective is to avoid factional exploitation and to generalize win-win outcomes to domestic political negotiations so that both Rouhani and the hardliners can jointly benefit from the potential achievements of a comprehensive agreement. However, the realization of this event is unlikely, and ultimately, in the short term, advocates of the moderate discourse will gain more concessions. If the nuclear negotiations succeed... Overall, Khamenei's remarks did not create an obstacle for a comprehensive agreement but made achieving it more difficult. He indicated that, given the skepticism towards the U.S., he would only defend an achieved understanding when the content claimed by the nuclear negotiating team becomes a binding and legal document, and the resulting agreement is clear and unambiguous. He also wants to clarify that the strategic enmity with the U.S. should not change. However, an important part of the Leader's remarks, which can be considered a turning point, was the conditional opening of interaction with the U.S. in other areas of conflict. For the first time, he stated that if the experience of nuclear negotiations is successful, it will be repeated in other areas. Until now, the Leader had repeatedly emphasized that negotiations were only in the nuclear domain. However, he has now sent a positive signal to the U.S. government. Of course, the government has previously had limited negotiations with the U.S. government in foreign policy areas. Since the beginning of his leadership, Khamenei has consistently stated that if the U.S. government changes its hostile behavior, the Islamic Republic is ready to repair relations. However, this time it is believed that the desired interaction and dialogue will have more substance and manifestation, and the de-escalation goals sought by the Leader will find opportunities beyond the nuclear crisis. This issue, considering Obama's new strategy of increasing engagement with hostile states and non-democratic governments, provides considerable capacities for reducing differences between Iran and the U.S. It also serves as an incentive to increase the likelihood of success in the negotiations related to the comprehensive nuclear agreement. At the same time, Khamenei's goal is to further stabilize the regime and expand influence in the Middle East. This approach does not align with U.S. grand strategies in the region and poses a challenge for the success of potential extra-nuclear negotiations. However, it has the potential to transform Iran-U.S. relations from two hostile poles to two opponents with less tension. The most serious area of dispute at present is Yemen. The most problematic parts of Khamenei's remarks were his harsh statements regarding the Yemen crisis, which overshadowed the recent diplomatic efforts of Rouhani's government. Instead of de-escalation and understanding, he supported a confrontational approach and defeating Saudi Arabia. This position was likely influenced by the unmet expectations he had from behind-the-scenes negotiations and consultations with the governments of Turkey and Pakistan. However, considering some of the flexibility shown by Erdogan and Pakistan's opposition to participating in military attacks with Saudi Arabia, Khamenei's harsh stance may be practically moderated, and the governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia may begin dialogue to resolve the issue. But if this does not happen, then Iran's regional disputes will increase, and at least part of the potential positive effects of a comprehensive nuclear agreement in foreign policy may be diminished. Of course, the final and decisive variable will be the fate of the Yemen crisis. If the Houthis and their allies in the Yemeni army can neutralize Saudi attacks, then the government's position in the Middle East will be strengthened, and as a result, the ground will be paved for more adventurous leadership, making the benefits gained justify the costs incurred for the regime. Overall, the main points of Khamenei's remarks focused more on the potential negotiations with the U.S. in non-nuclear areas and regional confrontations rather than on nuclear negotiations.