Ayatollah Khamenei and the New Assembly of Experts

The first meeting of the members of the fifth Assembly of Experts with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic did not receive the media attention it deserved. During this meeting, Ayatollah Khamenei once again revealed his disregard for the supervisory role of the Assembly of Experts; it was also made clear that the Supreme Leader considers himself to hold a superior position over this institution. The fifth Assembly of Experts was formed without the presence of two clerics favored and aligned with the system's top figure: Mohammad Yazdi and Mohammad Taqi Misbah Yazdi; two prominent figures of the authoritarian camp who, due to a significant vote from Tehran citizens, were unable to participate in the Assembly. At that time (March 2016), the failure of Yazdi and Misbah was met with a quick, explicit, and harsh reaction from the Supreme Leader. In his last meeting with the members of the fourth Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Khamenei emphasized: 'Individuals like Mr. Yazdi or Mr. Misbah are those whose presence in the Assembly of Experts lends more dignity to it. Their absence does not harm them; yes, their absence is a loss for the Assembly of Experts.' The new Experts, without Yazdi and Misbah, gathered behind the new president (Ahmad Jannati) to listen to the words of the system's first figure; words that reflect the establishment of autocracy in today's Iran. The Leader Wants the Assembly to Be a Show Ayatollah Khamenei, in his meeting with the new Experts, made a very significant remark regarding the reduction of the functions and status of this institution, stating: 'It is not reasonable to expect that [the Experts] sit and wait for the specified responsibilities in the Constitution to arise; no, they can do many other things.' In other words, from the perspective of the Supreme Leader, the only duty and responsibility of the Assembly of Experts is to appoint a successor leader after the current leader's death. He indirectly dismisses the supervisory role of the Assembly of Experts and declares it nonexistent. This is while, according to Article 111 of the Constitution, the Assembly has the legal right to 'dismiss' the head of the political system due to its supervisory role over the leader's performance. However, Ayatollah Khamenei considers himself the presumed and definitive leader of the system until his death. Thus, he not only does not grant any dignity or status to the Assembly of Experts in practice but also, in this meeting, indirectly diminishes the status of this institution by citing a strange example. He said: 'We do not forget that in the early days of the movement (in the years 1961 and 1962), Imam Khomeini advised and sent messages to scholars in the provinces to meet every once in a while, even if just to drink tea; just being together and seeing each other, even if there is no serious discussion.' The internal regulations of the Assembly of Experts explicitly state that 'the duty of the Assembly of Experts in its ordinary sessions is to implement Article 111 of the Constitution and to discuss and exchange views on issues related to leadership and to find the best way to fulfill this serious responsibility and propose it to the Leader.' However, since Ayatollah Khamenei does not consider any supervisory, critical, or even advisory role for the Assembly of Experts, he resorts to 'task creation' and 'assigning responsibilities' for this institution. In this meeting (with the members of the fifth Assembly of Experts), he suggested: 'You can issue resolutions on various issues.' The belief of the Supreme Leader is that the Assembly can 'influence public opinion' and 'when public opinion is formed, it will naturally lead the executors, legislators, and stakeholders to follow it.' He invites the Experts to make demands: 'You can demand from this humble servant, from our dear Mr. Rouhani, from the members of the Assembly, and from the judiciary.' But will a leader who considers himself superior to the Experts pay attention to the demands of the members of this Assembly? Regardless of the fact that most members of the Assembly are appointees of the Supreme Leader in Friday prayer pulpits or representatives of the Supreme Leader in provinces and other governmental institutions, it is predictable that the main focus of the Assembly's demands will be directed towards Rouhani's government, rather than other parts of the ruling system. In a few rare cases, such as the criticisms and questions of Ayatollah Dashtgheib regarding the bloody suppression of the Green Movement and the house arrest of its leaders, Ayatollah Khamenei's response has been indifference, as well as attacks by his security and military subordinates on the domain and mosque of the former member of the Assembly of Experts. The Leader's Intervention in Forming a 'Revolutionary' Assembly Last December, after the failure of Yazdi and Misbah in the Assembly elections in the capital, Ayatollah Khamenei expressed his anger and emphasized: 'The Assembly of Experts must remain revolutionary; it must think and act revolutionarily,' making it clear that the presidency of the Assembly would not be held by the moderates. Especially since the imposition of the notorious Jannati on the list of elected representatives of the capital had made the core power projects clearer. Projects that had previously been indicated by the widespread disqualification of non-aligned candidates (including Ayatollah Dashtgheib, Ayatollah Amjad, Mousavi Bejnourd, Soroush Mohalati, Ghorviyan, and even Hassan Khomeini). The approach of Ayatollah Khamenei led Hashemi Rafsanjani, with a realistic assessment of the balance of power in the Assembly and aware of the will of the Leader and the security forces dominating the Revolutionary Guard, to refrain from running for the presidency of the Assembly. The outcome was clear: Jannati, the Secretary of the Guardian Council, as one of the most hardline political actors aligned with the system's top figure, became the head of the Assembly, further embodying the 'revolutionary Assembly' desired by the Leader. The only effective output of an Assembly whose eight-year term has coincided with the illness of the Supreme Leader is the selection of the third leader of the Islamic Republic; a task that is not hidden from Ayatollah Khamenei's eyes and has compelled him to tell the Experts: 'When it comes time to choose a leader, they should set aside considerations and formalities; they should consider God, their duties, and the needs of the country; based on this, the leader should be chosen; this is the most important duty in our view; they should be vigilant. If there is any negligence in this stage and in this great duty, it will cause fundamental problems in the work.' Who Will Dismiss the Supreme Leader? A few days ago, the members of the committees of the fifth Assembly of Experts were specified. The composition of the main committees of the Assembly is very noteworthy; for example, the important Research Committee, concerning Article 111 of the Constitution (supervision over the performance of the leader and his dismissal), has the following composition: Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, former head of the judiciary and appointee of Ayatollah Khamenei in the High Council for Resolving Disputes; Ahmad Jannati, cleric appointed by the Supreme Leader in the Guardian Council; Mohammad Ali Mohammadi Kermani, appointed by the system's leader in the Expediency Council and Friday prayer leader of the capital; Seyyed Ebrahim Raisi, appointed by the Supreme Leader at the head of the Astan Quds Razavi; Seyyed Hashim Hosseini Bushehri, Friday prayer leader selected by Ayatollah Khamenei for Qom; Morteza Moqaddam, former head of the Supreme Court and Secretary of the Supreme Council of Islamic Seminaries across the country; Mohsen Mojtahed Shabestari, representative of the leader in East Azerbaijan and Friday prayer leader appointed by the Supreme Leader in Tabriz; Seyyed Ahmad Khatami, one of the appointees of the Supreme Leader for Friday prayers in Tehran; Mohsen Qomi, a member of the Supreme Cultural Revolution Council and collaborator with the leader's office; Abbas Kabi, a member of the Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary and former member of the Guardian Council; and Abdolnabi Namazi, Friday prayer leader and representative of the Supreme Leader in Kashan. Does such a composition possess the capacity and capability to evaluate the performance of the leader and critique his record? The answer is not difficult. It is evident that Ayatollah Khamenei, fully aware of this situation, will pursue his political-ideological projects, indifferent to the demands of the majority of society, from a superior position and with the support of the security apparatus dominating the Revolutionary Guard, and will speak to the Experts from a position of superiority. Despite all this, not all the play is in the hands of the system's top figure; the political structure of power does not have the uniformity desired by totalitarians; pragmatists and realists are not few, and civil society forces, despite all the violence and repression they have endured, continue to resist against autocracy and political blockage. Thus, at the 'critical moment,' the outcome of the effective and active forces in the government and society will illuminate the future situation.