Babak Zanjani: A Window into Understanding Politics and Society in the Islamic Republic

Economic experts have discussed the economic conditions that give rise to billionaires (in dollars) like Babak Zanjani. However, there has been less discussion about the social and political conditions surrounding the emergence of this phenomenon. The billionaire status of ministers (like Mohammad Reza Nematzadeh and Sadegh Mahsouli), lawyers, ambassadors, high-ranking clerics, and their associates has become a norm in the Islamic Republic (as Khamenei seeks to concentrate wealth among his own). They take from the source. However, Babak Zanjani and individuals like him are not part of the governmental elite, and their billionaire status is a different phenomenon. Where and how did they acquire such capacities and abilities? Are they operatives and pawns of power circles, or do they have an independent role? If, as claimed, these individuals have connections with dozens of ministers, members of parliament, and high-ranking military and intelligence officials, why were they not given a cleaning agent like Saeed Emami after Zanjani's arrest? To what extent do discourses, relationships, and social structures in Iran contribute to the emergence of these phenomena? What services do these individuals provide to members of the governmental elite that facilitate their becoming billionaires? Zanjani and similar individuals are multifaceted social phenomena with high capacities for gaining trust, bargaining, and manipulation across different strata, especially the ruling class. Contrary to popular belief, they are not merely lackeys of officials; they know which direction to act in. They also have a realistic understanding of their surrounding world, and this realism helps them continue their existence on the fringes of the government. Zanjani's activities were extensive, ranging from film production to managing a sports club, from an airline to constructing commercial centers, from banking to oil and gas condensate sales, and from gold trading to foreign investment. His operational domain was also international. This capacity is not created overnight and does not disappear overnight. Zanjani essentially entered the larger economic scene of the country to circumvent sanctions during Ahmadinejad's presidency, but midway, he decided to invest billions of dollars abroad without paying the 'big men' their share. Zanjani and individuals like him also have the capacity to surf the political waves and understand political forces and developments. He has operated under three presidents—Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad—with different approaches to managing the economy and politics of the country, without facing limitations or dead ends. He also knew what the government's sensitivities were domestically and cleverly avoided them. Zanjani and those like him are not fundamentally mysterious phenomena. Only those who do not understand the mechanisms within the power caste think they are mysterious. Such individuals follow specific formulas or instructions rooted in the internal relationships among high-ranking government members and the bureaucratic state. They know where resources are concentrated and plan to approach and benefit from them. Those who hold the resources do not know or cannot independently mobilize and profit from them. Babak Zanjani and his ilk are operatives and thus enjoy security in the shadow of the 'big men' of the regime. The use of terms like leech, victim, corrupt, and rent-seeker in state and semi-state media regarding Babak Zanjani is not to explain reality but to conceal it. A leech, according to public perception, usually sits on its host without the host's consent and feeds off it, but Babak Zanjani was a collaborator with state and governmental institutions and high-ranking members of these institutions. He was not a victim of the system because he knew what he was doing. He is corrupt within a regulated system, but not within the framework of the Islamic Republic, where corruption is the norm. Babak Zanjani was not fundamentally among the insiders of the government (look at his dancing with Tajik girls) to receive rent. He and his ilk are engaged in managing the assets and rents of others, not rents that belong to them, but someone like Zanjani wanted to surpass them midway. Iranian society over the past four decades has been one encompassing different and sometimes contradictory value systems without frameworks for coexistence, cooperation, and negotiation. Ethnic, ideological, gender, religious, and lifestyle divides have fragmented Iranian society into isolated islands. Today, hundreds of other Babak Zanjanis are working in Iran, who, due to their lack of ambition and contentment with the share allotted to them, do not find themselves dragged into court. Considering about one trillion dollars in foreign currency income during the three presidencies of Hashemi, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad (134, 194, and 640 billion dollars respectively, according to the Central Bank), imagining hundreds of Babak Zanjanis managing this wealth for the ruling class is not far from reality. During the war, there were also those who amassed legendary wealth from arms deals and wartime needs, but their income (in the range of millions or tens of millions of dollars) was not significant compared to the wealth of later periods. Babak Zanjani was precisely an 'economic Basij.' A Basij is someone who, by helping to sustain the regime and the interests of its high-ranking members, benefits from this assistance by any means and without red lines (receiving shares, permits, and rewards). He operated precisely within this framework in the economy. He was active in the same network where security and military forces engaged in economic activities. Their operational scope included Central Asia and Turkey, the southern Gulf countries, and East Asia, as money laundering is easier in these countries. Zanjani's gold imports and exports and his foreign investments were precisely within the realm of money laundering. Zanjani essentially entered the larger economic scene of the country to circumvent sanctions during Ahmadinejad's presidency, but midway, he decided to invest billions of dollars abroad without paying the 'big men' their share. During Ahmadinejad's presidency, the government minimized attention to expert work and maximized cooperation with brokers, thus increasing the status and role of individuals like Babak Zanjani. Thus, there is an inverse relationship between the level of expertise and planning of the government and the emergence of brokers around managers. This phenomenon has also been observed in the state radio and television organization. With the decision of Khamenei-appointed officials to reduce the level of expertise in the organization, it was these brokers who reaped the projects for film and series production. The planning organization was dissolved for this reason during Ahmadinejad's presidency. Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, just as they elevated eulogists over clerics, Basijis over academics, and security/military personnel over technocrats, also elevated brokers over experts. How to succeed in a dysfunctional society: Iranian society over the past four decades has been one encompassing different and sometimes contradictory value systems without frameworks for coexistence, cooperation, and negotiation. Ethnic, ideological, gender, religious, and lifestyle divides have fragmented Iranian society into isolated islands. It is difficult to find a norm that the overwhelming majority of society accepts and adheres to. On the other hand, widespread law-breaking and corruption have left no general norm for society. If order and security are observed from the outside in some areas of this regime, it is merely due to the fear and intimidation of coercive forces. In the first 11 months of 1394, fifteen million visits to police stations were reported (the head of the NAJA Prevention Police, A, March 10, 2016); this means about 16.5 million visits in a year, which, assuming at least two parties involved in disputes, results in 33 million visitors, half of the population over 15 years old in the country. In such a society, it is impossible to find a norm accepted by the majority for resolving disputes and living together peacefully and without hassle. Alongside these conditions, the 'war of all against all' leaves no reliable image of the future for individuals to imagine that they can achieve their desires through honorable work within a specified period. In today's Iranian society, anyone who wants to act according to the rules gets nowhere. In such a lawless society, where nothing assures individuals that they are on the path to progress, outsiders must resort to three methods for success (education and other work are not avenues for advancement): 1- Getting close to insiders to use their connections and resources (to obtain loans, state facilities, and information exchanged in government agencies); 2- Moving faster by trampling and crushing others (such as bouncing checks, exploiting and bankrupting others, and taking the share of partners and counterparts); such behaviors are referred to in popular literature as 'cleverness'; and 3- Committing crimes and offenses such as fraud, embezzlement, and eliminating competitors. Individuals like Zanjani start with the first option at high levels and quickly move to the second option because connecting with insiders paves the way for them at a lower cost. Those who are greedier may also reach the third option, although the second and third options have intertwined boundaries. The government, by destroying civil institutions and relentlessly attempting to weaken social ties and capital, has paved the way for those who move along the three aforementioned paths.